THE WAR MINISTRY.
Da claim is revived for a reorganization of the War department, and the Times lends all its weight to the demand for abolishing what it terms "the anarchy of independent and coordinate powers, "a republic or federation of departments." But we do not find that the case is quite made out for present intervention. The most im- portant facts are not produced. We are reminded of the division of many departments—the War Office, the Treasury, the Commissa- riat, the Admiralty, the Ordnance and the Colonial Office ; and "the only argument in favour of al present system" is said to be, "that it is dangerous to make a change in the presence of actual hostilities." Undoubtedly, that argument would be very weak if the present " anarchy " or "federation" were justly chargeable with the "absurdities" alleged against it. If a distinct ease of maladministration or of confusion could be advanced, actual hos- tilities would be a reason for reform, and not against it : but the evidence is wanting. The absurdities which are alleged consist principally in certain small defects of costume ; and it surely does not require a reorganization of the British Executive to procure a reform of collars and belts?
That inexpedient results might follow from divided authority, there is no doubt; but, as we have before said, it would not only be more convenient to conduct a reorganization in time of peace,— such a reorganization would also appear more necessary then ; for it is precisely in war-time that one of the Queen's Secretaries becomes War Minister, and that the several departments are united under one head. The divided authority of peace-time is merged in a more united authority dining war-time, and it remains to be shown that this authority is insufficient.
It is tame that in military matters, above all others, coordinate authority is inexpedient and mischievous : clashing of orders ought to be impossible in an administration where action and de- cision are essentially necessary. If it were suitable to our system, therefore, there should be no such thing as an equal officer in the military administration, but each one should be superior or subor- dinate to any other with whom he could come in communication. Consultation for purposes of advice is desirable ; but the ultimate decision should issue in the form of orders upon him who receives them. To secure this species of uniform subordination, however, it would be necessary, either that the military Commander-in-chief should be subordinate to the War Minister, or that the Command- er-in-chief should himself be a member of the Cabinet. Once in the life of the Duke of Wellington a great outcry was raised upon that very point ; and it was considered unconstitutional that the Commander-in-chief should have a seat in the Cabinet, since his military duties oblige him to take orders from the Crown, and he is so far removed from the vague civil responsibility to Parliament. On the other hand, there might be equally valid objections to placing a civilian between the Crown and the Commander-in-chief. The prerogative of the Crown, preserved intact in the military administration, and responsible government preserved intact in the Parliamentary accountability of Ministers, may come in conjunc- tion, but appear to be forbidden a positive union, from their essen- tial incompatibility. Perhaps it would be impossible theoretically to construct a War Minister with absolute authority over the command-in-chief, or to unite the command-in-chief with the Civil Government.
Notwithstanding this theoretical difficulty, it yet remains to be shown that it is not overcome in practice,—m the fact that one of the Secretaries of the Queen is acting War Minister • and that he, as War Minister, not only conducts the political administration of the war, but concentrates its working administration. The Duke of Newcastle has already intimated as much; and he has informed the grievance-makers through Parliament, that the effect of the reconstruction would be, to place all the departments under one officer of high rank, and so to prevent the head of each depart- ment from being an officer of such high rank as we now seem*. The events before the public,—the rapid mustering of an efficient force for a strong expedition abroad, the sending out of the expe- dition with such unprecedented despatch, the thorough equipment of the whole force, the unchallenged adjustment of defence for the positions from which the forces have been withdrawn, the facile substitution of the Militia for the Guards and troops of the Line at home, the prompt and perfectly satisfactory recruiting both for regular and irregular forces,—are great facts, which appear in- compatible with the supposed " anarchy " or " confusion " of co-. ordinate authorities. The administration of the French force is again held up in contrast with our own : we were enabled, before Ministers themselves brought forward the fact in Parliament, to state that the unparalleled promptitude and efficiency with which the Eastern expedition has been mustered and sent out, have oc- casioned very strong contrasts to be drawn in Paris between their own military administration and ours ; and we have reason to know that in the very highest quarters of the French Government the respect for our military administration is profound and undis- guised. On these facts, therefore, it occurs to us that the evidence actually before the public tends to establish the existence of a concentrated and efficient military authority ; and we must regard such evidence as conclusive until some specific and reliable counter- evidence be produced. The unanswered objection to the existing arrangement lies in the fact that the Colonial Minister is absorbed in the acting War Minister, and that Colonial affairs necessarily and hazardously fall to the disposal of -Under Secretaries and the usual bureau- cracy of Downing Street. No doubt, self-government diminishes some inconveniences to the Colonies ; but it aggravates the risk to Imperial authority, from the practical suspension of the responsible Secretary of State.
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