SEABORNE TRADE.*
TIIE Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence has done well to devote a part of the history of the Grad War, which is appearing under its direction, to our seaborne trade, on which our fate and that of the Allies largely depended. Sir Julian Corbett is dealing with the work of the Royal Navy, and Mr. Archibald Hurd with that of the Merchant Navy. Mr. Ernest Mule's task has been to show how our trade was affected by the operations of the Navy and the Merchant Service, and by the attacks of the enemy. His first volume, relating to the first eight months of the war, is profoundly interesting. He has had access to the official records and to the confidential information collected by Lloyd's and the other shipping institu- tions, and he marshals the facts, many of which will be new to the public, in a very able and enlightening narrative. A separate volume of charts illustrates the text, showing the trade routes and the areas infested by the enemy cruisers.
The outbreak of the war was the most critical moment for our seaborne trade. It had long been feared that, if war came, fast enemy cruisers would be let loose on the ocean highways which are always crowded with British shipping. Further- more, it was anticipated that, apart from the losses of ships, the sense of insecurity would upset the insurance market, calico underwriters to refuse all war risks, and bring our seaborne trade to a sudden stop. The collapse of the delicate and complex fabric of international trade was by far the greater peril, and there can be little doubt that the Germans counted on our reluctance to face it, and on the possibility that it would cause us grievous losses at the outset. By supremo good fortune, however, a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had been considering this very question from May, 1913, and had reported on April 30th, 1914. The sub-committee, of which Sir. Huth Jackson was chairman, included Lord Inchcapo and several other well-known shipping experts, and it had worked out a practical scheme by which the Treasury should co-operate with the War Risks Associations of the shipping companies in insuring war risks on hulls and cargoes, on condition that the ships obeyed the sailing orders of the Admiralty. The mere threat of war in the last week of July, 1914, had produced a panic in the City, and the rapid rise of war risk premiums caused
• Seaborne Trade. Vol.!. The Cruiser Period. By C. Ernest Feel°. With Maps. "history of the Great War nasal on Official Documents." Murray. Pls. net.)
merchants to cease ohartering ships. The Cabinet decided on Sunday, August 2nd, 1914, to accept the sub-committee's scheme, and on August 4th, after Mr. Asquith had announced the despatch of the ultimatum to Germany, Mr. Lloyd George was able to explain the insurance scheme to the House of Commons. The State guaranteed the insurance of the cargoes in transit and of the ships which thus came under its control. The banks were thus able to continue financing the merchants and shippers, and to uphold the fabric of commerce. At the same time the ship- owners paid reasonable premiums and were encouraged to keep their ships at sea by the prospect of earning substantial freights. The State Insurance Office was opened on August 5th, the first day of the war, and fixed the premium on cargoes at 5 per cent. and the premium on hulls at only 1 per cent., or 21. per cent. for the round voyage. The Government thus "averted once for all the danger of a general suspension of traffic more disastrous than a hundred casualties." Mr. Faylo does not hesitate to say—with perfect truth—that "to this one measure, above all else, was due the uninterrupted flow of seaborne trade through all the vicissitudes of the war." Furthermore, the Admiralty was able to warn the thousands of merchant captains against dangerous routes and areas, and to collect from them useful information about enemy movements. Thus the Merchant Navy was able to carry on.
Mr. Fayle proceeds to give a thrilling account of the measures taken by the Admiralty to guard the entrance to the North Sea and to patrol the trade routes. Nearly all the German liners, forewarned from Berlin, had sought refuge in neutralports, which had to be watched lest some of the liners should emerge as commerce-destroyers. Luckily for us, the enemy lacked initiative at the critical moment and only sent out one armed liner from the Elbe. This North German Lloyd vessel, the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse,' left Hamburg on August 4th, evaded our patrols by hugging the Norwegian coast and passing north of Iceland, and then sailed due south to Tenerife. On August 15th and 16th she stopped two liners, releasing them because they carried women and children, and then sank two cargo boats. She then went to Rio de Oro, the unfrequented port of Spanish Guinea, in order to coal. There the Highflyer ' caught her at anchor on August 28th and sank her, as she was violating Spanish neutrality and would not surrender. In the previous week the 'Dresden' and Karlsruhe ' had been reported near the West Indies, and the Karlsruhe ' had been vainly chased off the Bahamas on August 6th. But by August 15th our North Atlantic shipping was as active as usual, and the open market premium for war risks had fallen to 2 per cent. With the flight of the Goeben ' and Breslau to the Dardanelles, the Mediterranean was free from any serious menace, as the Austrian Navy showed no enterprise. In the early autumn, however, the enemy cruisers in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean caused us some trouble and loss. The Admiralty were, of course, hampered by the scarcity of modern light cruisers and still more by the heavy responsibilities of conveying troopships from Australia and New Zealand to Egypt, from Canada to England, and from England to West Africa, to say nothing of the Expeditionary Force itself. It is wonderful, under the circumstances, that the enemy cruisers at large did not do more damage, as on every route innumerable British merchantmen offered an easy prey. The mere presence of the ' Dresden ' and Karlaruhe ' in the South Atlantic almost brought the trade of Brazil and Argentina to a standstill late in August, 1914, but the opening of the Panama Canal to commerce on August 15th enabled the grain-ships from San Francisco to avoid the danger. However, the 'Karlsruhe,' before she blew up in the Caribbean Sea on November 4th, had captured only fifteen British ships, and the effect of her activities passed almost unnoticed in England. The Emden,' which operated off Ceylon and in the Bay of Bengal during September and October, and was destroyed at Cocos by the 'Sydney' on November 10th, caused by far the greatest disturbance to commerce. She captured 24 steamers in all and sank 16 British steamers, valued with their cargoes at £2,200,000. But the loss was smaller than the inconvenience caused for some weeks to our Eastern commerce. Shipping was held up in Indian ports, and the Indian export trade was seriously disorganized.
The destruction of the Emden,' and the bottling up of the Konigsberg ' in the Rufiji river, freed the Indian Ocean once for all. The Southern Atlantic was not actually purged of enemies by the Battle of the Falklands, for two armed liners, the Prinz Eitel Friedrich' and the Kronprinz Wilhelm,'
remained at sea till March and April, 1915, respectively, when they took refuge at Newport News and were interned. But from that time the seas were clear. Mr. Fayle will have to devote his two remaining volumes almost exclusively to the
enemy ' boat campaign. Above water the Germans failed utterly to frighten our merchant ships off the sea.
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