THE CAVALRY MAN(E1TVRES.
THE officers who claim to represent the modern spirit in our Army are above all things anxious not to make their craft a mystery, but to take the public—or, as they frankly say, the tax-paying part of the public—into their confidence on the main wants and wishes of their profession. The criticism on the recent cavalry manceuvres among the Berkshire Downs which appeared in Wednes- day's Times, is, in fact, a justification by the modern soldier, addressed to the modern civilian, of the new move in Army training.
The lessons which the writer considers to be taught by the manceuvres are,—first, that the officers of our cavalry regiments, after the experiences and mistakes of the past fortnight, may be granted the fruition of the prayer in the Talmud in being "taught to say they do not know ;" and that, secondly, the taxpayers realising that their cavalry certainly do not know, may give them the opportunity of knowledge by coming down handsomely with the money requisite for further and completer training of the cavalry arm, just as they have sanctioned an annual outlay on the training of ships and men in the Navy. The request so modestly and sensibly preferred should meet with the most favourable consideration ; and the uniform good behaviour of the troops, and the courtesy and geniality of the officers in command. in the district which was the scene of their peaceful invasion, will go far to smooth away any difficulties which might arise in the choice of a district for future practice. It is some- what strange that the great wars of the last thirty years should have left the part to be played by cavalry in the future unknown, or at least undetermined. In the Franco- Prussian War, the mounted arm on either side were at cross-purposes, and that so completely that no fair inferences could be drawn from the data left us. The French cavalry, in accordance with the older tradition of war, were held "in reserve," and with so tight a hand that the German troopers, acting partly as a screen, partly as a first line of offence, were allowed far greater liberty of action than would have been the case had their enemy met them by similar tactics. In the Russo-Turkish War, the Turks were almost without regular cavalry ; and until actual trial by battle, peace manceuvres will no doubt be in request to aid rival theorists in arriving at a provisional solution of the difficulty. They offer to the soldier the plain, common-sense opportunity of learning his work ; and it is no light evidence of the earnestness of the modern soldier of England in his calling, that he is not only willing but anxious for the means to increase and widen his professional knowledge.
If manceuvres and mobilisations could indeed give all that knowledge which is power, a study of the military intelligence from the Continent during the last two months should make us prophets indeed. From the Neva to the Loire, the earth has been trodden daily by myriads of armed. men gaining by painful practice that " experience " in the use of arms which, according to Aristotle, was the basis of courage in the professional soldier. In numbers, Russia has far exceeded the other nations : 140,000 troops exercised in the dusty plains by Lake Ladoga, before the Czar and the German Emperor. With less ostenta- tion, but perhaps with more practical objects, an even greater host was assembled opposite the Galician frontier of Austria ; and while the Austrian Army were taking lessons in the use of the new explosives in Hungary, they had the pleasure of knowing that the Russians had just sent into cantonments across the open frontier north of the Carpathians, 180,000 men. Meantime, the German Emperor has been entertaining his ally of Austria with the sight of his Army at Breslau; and. the head. of the House of Hapsburg seems not unwilling to be comforted. for the ancient robbery of a province by the thought that his ally can so effectually shut the door against a present enemy. In France, preparation for war is being carried out with a painful and minute exactness which with a duller people would be impossible, and in the case of the French soldier is indispensable. It is not enough that the officers should labour from daylight till midnight at the theory and practice of their profession. The nature and bearings of the French military spirit have also to be considered, and the moral effect of strange and altered conditions of battle, produced by the new ex- plosives, is equally the subject of comment and advice with the use of new weapons or the adoption of new tactics.
Numbers, physique, equipments, tactics, health, mobility, —these are data which a study of the rival canips may give. Peace manceuvres may even test a War Depart- ment, or make or mar the reputation of a strategist. But on the great question of all, the Oracle of War —or mimic war—is dumb. After all the reports, dis- cussions, and. statistics, is there any one who could do more than hazard a guess as to the probable result of a conflict between any two of the armed nations of the Continent ? The most that can be gathered is that, as regards armament—not the most important element of success—they are fairly equal ; and. that in dis- cipline, which must always be of the first importance, they do not greatly differ. The main, the determining element, must be something which neither practice nor money can buy. "In the end, that side will win which can stand up longest to be shot at," is a truism of war which time is not likely to alter. National character, on the other hand, may and does alter fast under the swift progress of modern life. The most striking and most recent instances of this change are no doubt to be seen in the population of new States of Eastern Europe. Forty years ago, the Roumanians, unable by law to serve in the Army of the Sultan, members of a despised and subject race, would hardly have been credited with the virtue of military courage. Yet the Roumanians took and held the Gravitza Redoubt in the great assault at Plevna, and gained the sole success of the siege for the army of the Czar. Ten years after their emancipation from the Turks, the Bulgars defeated and almost destroyed. the army of the Servians, who had a military reputa- tion of two hundred years' standing. There is always an unknown factor in the problem of war, which is apt to upset the nicest calculations, and. derange the most carefully thought-out combinations of Court or camp. If materialism gains ground in the old nations, ideals find fresh and. congenial soil in the new. New and higher motives and standards of courage are supplied to the members of each band of States that combine to form a nation ; and the citizen of a United. Germany, a -United Italy, or a free Bulgaria, fights under sanctions and. stimulants unknown and unfelt by the peasants of Parma, of Milan, or some petty German principality. If a guess must be made as to the growth or decline of the enduring courage which must turn the scale in a national conflict, we should. be inclined. to think that it will be found at its best in those nations which have made respectively the greatest and the least change in national and political status in recent times,—in nations like Russia, where the condition of the mass of the peasantry is still in the main amenable to those social and religious influences which existed in 1812 and. 1856.57; or in those which have fought their way to independence, and must look to further successes in war to maintain the place for which they pay so dearly. As for ourselves, in spite of the Army reformers, we shall probably still con- tinue to be "warlike without being military,' and. the material prosperity now enjoyed by the mass of the population, which is placing them in the old position of the lower-middle classes, will, it may be hoped, only raise the cost, without decreasing the efficiency, of our Army. Better food and. clothing cannot, at all events, diminish courage.
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