ITALY IN AFRICA.
IT is well at this moment for the permanent interests of the country, that Lord Dufferin is Ambassador at Rome, and Lord Salisbury Foreign Secretary. Lord Dufferin is certain to be at once intelligent and suave ; and Lord Salisbury knows, if anybody does, that the rela- tions of Great Britain with Italy affect interests more important than those involved in the possession of any tract of territory in Africa. If inferior men were managing our relations with Italy, the amity between the two countries might within the ensuing fortnight be seriously imperilled. The confines of English and Italian possessions in Africa are to be " delimited " by treaty, and the task will be one requiring most unusual delicacy and care. We cannot, of course, as the Times says in an article far too little considerate towards Italy, allow Signor Crispi to stretch the Italian dominion in Africa westward until it touches the Nile. That river ends in the Lakes ; and its course from source to mouth ought to be, and in the long-run must be, left in British hands. There is no hurry, and we fully recognise the enormous difficulties, moral as well as material, which still impede our policy in the Nile Valley ; but if Eastern Africa is to be permanently claimed for civilisation, the "Iron Gates" of the Nile must be at last blown up, like those of the Danube, or evaded by short ship-canals, till a British steamer can steam full- speed from the Mediterranean to Lake Albert. Never- theless, it is folly to deny that the Italians have a colourable claim to extend themselves to the Nile. The Protectorate of Abyssinia is theirs, with the . cognisance and assent of Europe, which is in Africa the final law—else how do we occupy Egypt ?—and we have in other directions recog- nised the doctrine that in Africa the possession of a sea- front involves a preferential claim to the "Hinterland," or back-country. We have expressly admitted that argu- ment in our bargain with the Germans, and we cannot establish new principles in every new contingency just to suit our own convenience. We can, of course, allege that we represent Egypt, and that Egypt has never resigned her claim to Khartoum and. the Equatorial Provinces ; but that is a plea which in the Portuguese case we do not allow,—a plea, namely, that abandonment does not terminate possession. It does terminate it, we say, on the Zambesi ; and we can hardly assert a few days after, that it does not terminate it on the Nile. We retired from Khartoum, and so did Emin from Wadelai ; and therefore, if the dispute is to be settled by precedents, the Italians have some right to advance from Massowah to the great river. Under these circum- stances, the only thing to be done is to induce Italy to waive her claim to reach the Nile—which would only embarrass her, as she does not want to accept the costly duty of crushing the Mahdi—and to be liberal, even generous, in meeting her wishes in every other direction. If she wishes for more coast-line towards Suakim, let her have more coast-line. If she wishes to extend Abyssinia westward to the crests of the Hills between that country and the Nile, let her extend it. If she is anxious for still more explicit acknowledgment of her exclusive position at Gondar, let that position be frankly and ungrudgingly acknowledged. We are a great deal too greedy in appearance in our way of dealing with these questions. As a rule, we try, after a fashion, to do justice ; but we never do it in a sympathetic spirit, never make presents, never lose our reputation as over-grasping bargainers. The moment the negotiations begin, somebody representing some commercial interest writes to the Times pointing out the extreme value of this or that strip of territory, or this or that river-mouth ; the Foreign Office begins to fear that votes may be lost if it gives way ; and there is -a sharp squabble, the object of which is not to grasp anything, but to be able to assure a profoundly ignorant public that we grasped all that was attainable. We do not want that process to begin with the Italian Government, which has a hot statesman at its head—Signor Crispi is just Bismarck over again, with a temper of tow, and no scruples instead of too few—which has behaved exceedingly well in the negotiations with the East Africa Company, allowing it to almost double its coast-line, and which, as we must maintain once more, is our only possible effective European ally. We wish that ally could be France, for a hundred reasons, and it may when we have recovered our senses about Morocco, which is the proper " compensation " for Egypt ; but at present our only possible ally is Italy. She alone has no interests anywhere in the world which do not clash with ours. Even Italian hopes do not irritate Englishmen, who would feel no objection if she possessed herself of Tripoli, or succeeded in framing a close treaty with an armed Federation of the Balkans. She alone will help us willingly to preserve that freedom of the Mediterranean which is essential to our grand Asiatic position, and to the trade by which we have our wealth. She alone agrees with us thoroughly both as to the Balkans and Asia Minor;. for though France did so formerly, the France of to-day would sell Constantinople itself to Russia for the chance of revindicating her provinces. She alone can assist us with a great army which can never be employed against ourselves; and she alone both could and would be an efficient ally- in Egypt and East Africa. The French are there our enemies, and, through the Sultan at one end and the Portuguese at the other, have large means of worrying. The Germans are reasonably good friends, but they want to make money quickly, and to do it will tolerate slavery —not the slave-trade—will create monopolies, and will offer a refuge to the Arab chiefs, whose extinction is a necessity of our kind of order and civilisation. Italy alone, moreover, possesses a body of electors which more or less comprehends the English character, and will not at every turn of events burst into a fury of savage suspicion that we are preparing some grand coup for their permanent disadvantage. And, above all', Italy is the only first-class State with whom a permanent alliance is possible, an alliance, we mean, permitting of combinations intended to last for generations, and to affect the whole future of our external policy. We shall need such an alliance sadly before we have done, if we go on stretching the Queen's authority over the whole world, yet refusing not only a conscription, which may be wise, but such payment to our voluntary soldiers that we could increase their number by twenty regi- ments at a time almost at will. The Italians have a powerful fleet, a position in the centre of the Mediter- ranean, and nearly half a million soldiers, who have recently in Africa given great examples of discipline and courage, and who bear up singularly well against the destructive African climate. To affront such a Power, at present most friendly, on a point very near to her rulers' hearts by our stingy, bargaining ways, is not only ungenerous, but positively foolish. The Italians of to- day are a sensitive people, very eager to take a share' in making the history of the world, but unwilling, and,. indeed, unable, to pay much for that gratification of their pride. They do not want to spend much money in Africa, and hope by customs-duties and monopolies to make their new possessions pay expenses. There is no reason for forbidding them, always assuming that slavery is prohibited ; and no reason for jealousy, should they form, as they wish, a cheap army of Christian Sepoys. Let them do as they like with our hearty good- will, and every kind of assistance that we can conveniently give. We confess we do not understand our countrymen in this matter. They profess not to wish for conquests, not to care about trade advantages, and not to fear the " designs " of anybody ; and then, the moment another- Power begins to move in the neighbourhood of our terri- tories, they wake up in a fever of suspicious irritability-,. and scold at Lord Salisbury, who is himself a keen, bargainer, for recognising that he cannot acquire the whole of the unappropriated world without either fighting for it or paying for it. They seem to think it. quite sufficient to say that such a territory would be convenient to Great Britain, for it to be assigned to them without a word. There was a discussion the other day about Massowah, which was positively discreditable after our promises to Italy,—all the more because we pre- tended to be appalled at the notion of Egypt under our- guardianship losing anything, as if it had not been we- ourselves who, very wisely, gave up Egyptian sovereignty in Khartoum. We have quite enough for the time. If the people really understood what it is we have taken in the last ten years, and what their responsibilities are, they would be aghast, and would, we sincerely believe, for a year or two let anybody else have anything without a murmur. We do not ask them to do that, but we do ask them to let their safest ally have anything she wants and they do not want themselves, without raising a ridiculous tempest of grudging protestations.
Previous page
