28 APRIL 1923, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

REPARATIONS AND SECURITY.

WE have always held that the best way of bringing about the settlement of the questions of repara- tion, security, and international indebtedness (the three questions which hang like a blight over the world) would be for the British Government, after a careful review of the financial conditions as they exist at this moment—not, it is to be noted, as they existed at some previous period, or as they may exist at some future time—to put forth a definite and detailed scheme.

These proposals must inevitably be based upon the answers to the questions How much could Germany pay without producing that internal ruin which would Erevent her permanent recovery, and so the recovery of urope as a whole ? 2. In what manner could this sum best be paid ? 3. How can we give to France security from a policy of German revenge—a security which we fully admit she has always needed, and which, alas ! she stands in greater need of now than at the Armistice, owing to the ill-blood caused by the French occupation of the Ruhr ? 4. How in the general interests of the world, financial and industrial, can the debt owed by France to Britain and to America, for value received, be liquidated ? As it is, the existence of that unpaid debt is a menace to the world's financial tranquillity and stability.

If we had answered these questions and on them based a definite scheme under which Europe could escape from its present peril, we venture to say that public opinion would have gradually solidified and have ensured the ultimate acceptance of the British terms, with little or no modification.

One of the great obstacles to a peaceful solution of the problem now darkening the world is the fact that no one has dared to put forward a definite plan. The result has been that all possibility of fruitful negotiation has been prevented. Jealousy and suspicion have reigned supreme and clouded the minds of the Governments of all the nations concerned. We know, of course, that there are many bargaining objections to putting forward a plan, but in a matter so serious as this boldness and the refusal to stand upon punctilios are the only safe courses. Fortunately, too, we are the Power best fitted to make the proposals, for we should not be trying to act as judge in our own cause in regard to the main issues. Neither France nor Germany can, in the circumstances, be expected to act in a judicial temper. We can, for we are looking for the restoration of peace and prosperity to Europe as a whole and not trying to get our pound of flesh. We admit that in a sense we are proposing to act as umpires ; but, after all, it is better that somebody should take on the odium of being an uninvited umpire than let the world go to ruin. At any rate, the umpire is not going to claim to eat the oyster himself and hand each party the shell, as does the lawyer in La Fontaine's fable. Here it is the umpire who would have to be content with the shells. His duty would be to induce Germany to give up the whole of the oyster to France, and France not to reject it as too small nor to insist on having an additional oyster, which it is not in Germany's power to produce.

We were disappointed that Lord Curzon, in his im- portant speech in the House of Lords on Friday, April 20th, did not see his way to put before the world A plan which , would act as a rallying . point for sane opinion in Germany, in France, in Britain and elsewhere. Norte the • less, he and Lord Grey of Fallodon, the two principal speakers, were able, we are glad to say, to provide very useful prolegomena to the proposals which it seems likely may now be made by Germany—presumably with a hint from us that if in these terms Germany tries to take advantage of the dangerous situation into which France has got herself by the occupation of the Ruhr, she will have British opposition and not British help. Germany is, clearly, under a great temptation to take advantage of the way in which France has entangled herself, but it is our duty to make it quite clear to her that it will be very greatly to her disadvantage if she yields to that temptation. This is not a game of forfeits, but an attempt 'to save the world from irreparable disaster.

The main thing to be said about the debate in the House of Lords is that it proves that Lord Curzon and the Government have taken a very just measure of the situation. They see how great are the dangers, and, further, fully realize where the only hope of a solution is to be found. Above all, we must accord to Lord Curzon very high praise for refusing to take the position au tragique. Though regarding it with high seriousness, he refuses to despair or even to appear to despair. That for the politician is the only safe rule. If he once lets himself be unmanned by the sense of tragedy his power of giving counsel, or of taking wise action, shrinks to nothing. This calm temper was well shown in the passage in which Lord Curzon told us the advice he had given to Germany—i.e., to approach France. " It is to the general interest," he declared, " that such an overture should be made. We must come to it sooner or later, and, in my judgment, the sooner the better. That is the substance of the advice I have consistently given to the German Government, and the general wisdom of which I see no reason to doubt." And here we may say that if the rumours are true that the German Government are going to act on that advice—no doubt in consultation with our Foreign Office—we may reach a solution which will be even better than our suggestion that we should formulate a scheme on our own initiative. The danger, of course, is that the German proposal may be made in a way which will cause offence in France. Misery, humiliation and despair, even though deserved, do not tend to make either men or States tactful. Further, it is to be noted that the consequences of a rejected proposal by Germany would be much more serious than the rejecting or the arguing over proposals by an umpire. It often soothes the parties to a dispute to find a compro- mise behind the back of the umpire. On this point then we will, for the present, say only this. If the German overture does not materialize, or is rejected by France, an impartial and specific proposal should at once be put before the world. The fact that it was in being might prove of incalculable value in case the local situation became worse.

On the problem of how to give France security Lord Curzon spoke with great good sense. We were willing, he declared, at any suitable time in the future to discuss plans or proposals. With admirable courage and judg- ment he added that, here our policy " cannot be carried out by the dismemberment of Germany, or the setting out of a new and running sore in the heart of Europe." " And," he went on, " if guarantees are to be given, they should be of a reciprocal nature." This veto on dismemberment, direct or . indirect, shows not only courage but judgment. A weaker man might have slurred this point over, and in doing so spoiled his case ab mitio. We would rather put off a solution for twenty years than agree to a plan which must entail a future war of revenge upon this unhappy world. " No more sowing of dragons' teeth I " is the essential formula. This fundamental was emphasized as strongly by Lord Grey of Fallodon as by Lord Curzon.

Lord Grey was at his best in dealing with this question of security. We are fully with him when he said that " separate alliances between one or two Powers, or even a special group of Powers in Europe," will not provide the security we need. Security, like freedom, is based on fellow-service. You cannot get security for yourself without according it to others. If you try to establish your own security in a way that endangers or alarms other Powers you have undermined your own foundations. Security is as international as trade. Just as a nation cannot make riches solely for itself, but must share them when made with the rest of the world, so a nation cannot be secure if at its gates gathers a hungry, jealous, ana 4a what is worse still, a frightened crowd. .4„..., tzed by 44„.„1.,, 41w,, tv Eat mem potential enemy calls security they call the power to strike.

We are sure that the mass of French people are quite honest in their assertion that they not do want to attack Germany, and, furthermore, honestly think that their proposals for dismembering the German Empire are solely based on the desire for security. If, however, they could be induced to put themselves in the position of the Germans, they would see at once that what they are regarding only as security looks like a terrible menace to the Germans. Security over insisted upon may prove the uncreating word, the prescription for European chaos. Lord Grey's actual words on this essential point must be quoted in full :- " I see no real security for the future unless Germany is got into the League, and unless there is a clear agreement with France that the one great security for her, and for all of us in the future, is to make the League a strong reality. I do not put that forward as a definite proposal to be made at the moment, but the Government must have some clear idea of the end towards which they are moving. They have offered no better or more practical suggestion of their own which is really going to give security and solve the question. The League of Nations ought not to be regarded as something out- side and separate from Governments and peoples. I would ask why it should not be made a definite instrument for creating security between the frontiers of Germany and France. I do not go into the various proposals which have been mooted, but we have to consider whether we cannot make the League an instrument to give security on these frontiers. The Government must have some definite policy in their own minds—the direction in which they will work to solve this question of French security. Our own security is bound up with it. I believe that only by some big scheme which makes Germany feel secure as well as France will you get that feeling of security without which I do not believe you will really get a definite settlement of the reparations question, and as long as this question of reparations and security remains unsettled the position in Europe will remain precarious." , It is very important to insist that the provision in the Treaty of Versailles for a slice of demilitarized territory between France and Germany—a territory consecrated to peace, in which no gun could ever be fired without its being regarded as an attack upon the League of Nations, and so upon the world as a whole—should be upheld as a reality. This strip will, of course, so far as all civil government goes, be as much a part of Germany as any other province ; but it will contain no fortresses and no soldiers, and any frontier problem raised in regard to it, either by France or Germany, should at once go to the League for settlement. The strip is defined in the Treaty of Versailles as the whole of German territory west of the Rhine and a zone fifty kilometres wide east of that river. Any breach of the demilitariza- tion is to be regarded as " a hostile act against the Powers " who signed the Treaty. Ultimately we might perhaps abolish international frontiers and make the League of Nations the link of peace between all States. By this means the immediate neighbour of every State would be the League of Nations. If the League of Nations could give us these Corridors of comity and courtesy we should be the first to rise and call its name blessed.