An ultimatum for Gaddafi?

David Carlton

In the matter of Libya I can only say to HM Government: 'I told you so.' Early in 1980 Colonel Muammar Gaddafi pro- claimed his intention of organising the elimination of his opponents living in exile in various European countries and several incidents duly followed. At that time some of our European allies were nervous about a possible oil cut-off from an alliance of radical Islamic states and were accordingly unwilling to react with vigour to Gaddafi's outrageous and open promotion of acts of international terrorism on their territory. We, on the other hand, free from the con- straint of oil-dependence, might have been expected to stamp hard on what was an all too declaratory form of undeclared war. But we were no doubt under pressure from such as the Italians to do nothing very drastic and we had of course a considerable non-oil commercial stake in Libya. The result was a shabby compromise. True, on

I June 1980 Gaddafi appeared to under- take to exempt Great Britain from acts of transnational terrorism and the Libyan head of mission in London was expelled. But otherwise we turned a blind eye to Gad- dafi's evident lack of repentance and his plain intention to continue to promote ter- rorism in other European cities.

On 9 July 1980 I wrote an article in the Daily Telegraph in which I asked: 'If it is right to expel a diplomat from London for threatening to organise terrorist acts, how much longer can we avoid breaking off rela- tions with his master in Tripoli whose language has been identical?' I added: `So far, however, no such rupture has occurred and hence lucrative commercial contacts re- main unaffected.' I then predicted that Great Britain, 'like the other NATO coun- tries, will find it expedient to seek to pre- vent the present vogue for State-sponsored transnational terrorism turning into outright inter-governmental conflict'.

Our Foreign Office mandarins have now reaped what they sowed, though naturally it is none of them, but WPC Yvonne Fletcher whose life has been extinguished. The ques- tion for the future, however, is whether `wet' counsels concerning Libya continue to prevail. The first indications were not auspicious for any fundamental change, despite the decision to break off diplomatic relations. So far in briefings too much em- phasis seems to have been placed on the safety of British subjects residing in Libya and not enough on our national honour.

I do not of course suggest that the Foreign Office should totally ignore the risk to our compatriots and every effort should always be made to negotiate the release of any hostages on tolerably honourable terms. But if the well-being of individual

Britishers living abroad is seen to be our paramount concern we are inviting an unending stream of acts of international blackmail from 'crazy' Third World states which will conclude that they only need to seize some British hostages to turn Whitehall's collective legs to jelly. This un- fortunately was the pusillanimous message signalled to the world by Jimmy Carter dur- ing the Teheran hostage crisis; and it has since been reinforced by the massively disproportionate US media concern for res- cuing Lieutenant Goodman from Syrian clutches.

The hard fact is that if Western govern- ments are faced with impudent acts of inter- national aggression by small Third World countries they have no rational alternative on any long-term assessment other than o be seen to respond with the utmost vigour even at some risk to their individual citizens who happen to be used for ransom pur- poses. Let us remember, too, that any British citizen living or working in Libya must have had some notion of the risks in- volved and accordingly is not entitled to ex- pect to be rescued now or in the future at to substantial a cost to British interests.

In the small matter of terrorism the Israelis should be our mentors. They have always appreciated that yielding to blackmail for the sake of individual hostages, even helpless children, is a losing game and they have as a result been the vic- tims of many fewer 'incidents' than would otherwise have been the case. And Margaret Thatcher might also learn a lesson from her Conservative predecessor. For Ed- ward Heath's Cabinet is said to have decid- ed collectively that if any of their number were to be seized as a hostage no policy con- cessions would be made to secure his or her release. The alternative course of pragmatic concession to threats, evidently favoured by many in the Foreign Office, usually has the consequence described by Winston Chur- chill in 1938: 'And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckon- ing. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time.'

I concede that calculated and selective acts of 'appeasement' may make sense if one is up against superior forces or against a sea of enemies. But in the case of Gad- dafi, Greit Britain, let alone the West as a whole, is surely not in the unhappy plight of Neville Chamberlain in 1938 facing at least three major potential enemies. According

The Spectator 28 April 1984 to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' authoritative publication, The Military Balance, 1983-1984, Libya has Aa population of 3,200,000 and total anne,mA forces of only 73,000. How, then, co Gaddafi rationally resist a resolute, ultimatum soundly based in internatiorw law?

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ultimatum: 1. Libya should be required in James's Square and make reparations no only to the relatives of WPC Fletcher but also to the Libyan victims;

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2. To apologise to the world for P elimination of Libyans living abroad an give undertakings as to the country's future conduct; and 3. To undertake to cease attempts I. destabilise neighbouring governments in Chad and the Sudan.

Given the complications we might face vis-a-vis the Arab world and, possibiY, thf Soviet Union, we might be prudent to seed" to put together a powerful coalition beht such an ultimatum. The United shStatTci France, Egypt, Chad and the Sudan °t/rh accordingly be approached. Against such accordingly — or even some of the :c Gaddafi would surely be at bay. If 7 he:17,2- cepted the ultimatum's terms, his huillci tion both at home and abroad arnong,T,11.hre World radicals would be total. resisted, his regime could be tnPPL‘r, without difficulty by an armed interventi°„_ which would be fully justified in intellar‘, tional law. And for once we could form For as war rather than talk hypocritical); as is our wont, about armed conflict. e Gaddafi's promotion of violent action on a_ British and other non-Libyan territory stitutes nothing less on his unambiguous act of war. Part than

bY But will any such initiative be taken

Mrs Thatcher's beleaguered administra-e- tion? If the past is any guide, she will Pre - er to pass by on the other side provided tr',, immediate threat to British subjects s..; Libya has been averted. Probably ti'se would like to ask us to rejoice that, beca_ai we have done nothing more than cut forwrits diplomatic links, our balance of paYtne

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position has not been jeopardised. wen after all, Gaddafi's next outrage inaYlarly kren be in Rome or Paris or some Which we

little. With European city about know whi,.

But what about opinion at home• es luck it will suffice if Mrs Thatcher arransIve for WPC Fletcher to have an exPell,Aubey memorial service in Westminster ed the along the lines of that which follow .10. Harrods bombing. But the Prime Minii; if will need to tread carefully, Partieularl, is that other mad Mullah, Arthur Snicaorrgel au:4d seen to be thriving. Otherwise, toe114300, more of her supporters may begin swtrheentkher or not the Iron Lady has a Y David Carlton is senior lecturer in interna-

tional relations at the Open University.