28 AUGUST 1852, Page 10

RAILWAY AMALGAMATION.

THE subject of railway amalgamation on a gigantic scale is entering upon that sort of discussion which usually precedes some practical conclusion : it is argued for and against on the ground of expe- diency rather than principle, and the controversy is gradually narrowing itself to some very specific point concerning the public convenience. The North-western Railway Company has proposed an amalgamation with the Great Western, for the mutual benefit of the two : the exact terms of the proposition have not been made public, but the Times infers much from the reply of Mr. Russell, speaking for himself and his colleagues of the Great Western in 'these terms—" It is our deliberate opinion, that it would not be deemed consistent with the policy of the present times to commit to the hands of one large company such an undivided control and power over the public traffic of nearly one-half of England, while the growing requirements of the traae of this country necessitate an extension rather than the limitation of means of accommodation upon existing railways." An omission in Mr. Glyn's rejoinder suggests to the Times a confirmation of its inferences. "To all the other points made by the Great Western Board Mr. Glyn offered very elaborate replies, but the general assumption that the public was to be 'victimized' for the benefit of the Companies he did not pretend to contradict." Here the Leading Journal may be said to have hoisted the true standard around which the conflict will be fought. There is an idea that by these amalgamations, great companies, which have shown so strong an appetite for dividends even at the expense of murderous accidents, intend to " do " the public ; and the Times de- clares that the public shall not be done. Now, in order to attain to amalgamation, it will be necessary for the great Companies to show that there is bonfl fide no intention to " victimize " the public. We do not believe that they are yet prepared to show any such thing : obvious as the arguments for and against amalgamation now are, we do not believe that the question is yet ripe for a final solution ; the utmost that it can hope to attain at present is a provisional solution.

The subject is one which has at least the advantage of being dis- cussed with arguments, on both sides, equally manifest and large. The benefits of amalgamation are immense and unmistakeable. It involves saving of capital, unity of plan, and mutual aid by Rail- way Companies, in lieu of the very opposite to all three. At pre- sent there is the utmost diversity of plan. Not only have capitals been wasted in the construction of lines that are not wanted, in the prevention of lines that were wanted, in the construction of two lines where one would suffice, and in an enormous conflict in Parliamentary Committee-rooms, but the same sources of loss con- tinue in a minor degree, and a competition which little serves the

public suffices to injure companies in various ways. It has for some time been very well understood by persons of sagacity and knowledge in railway affairs, that genuine railway prosperity is independent of competition, and that it entirely coincides with the public interest. That policy will most conduce to the prosperity of railways which most conduces to the habit of travelling on the part of the public. This statement is but a different expression for saying that a great development of convenience and facility for tra- velling will be a great development of the revenue to accrue from travelling. Amongst these facilities would be simplicity in the arrangements of journies, and especially of cross-journies ; a faci- lity now impeded at every turn by a jealous and obstructive policy of conflicting governments. The advantages of united action are indeed so evident, that we need not trouble our readers with ex- pounding them in detail. On the other hand, there is nothing to show that those who at present possess the management of railways are fit to be trusted as public servants. We do not speak from any accusations against railway functionaries, but we judge solely by their own avowals and acts. The manner in which they conduct the competition be- tween each other at present unmistakeably shows that they would not consult the public interest if they had the management with- out check by competition. When a railway company, under the screw of competition, can abate its charge from Lincoln to London to a certain sum, and can then exact a higher charge for the shorter journey from Lincoln to Watford, simply because at the latter point it escapes from the competition, it practically records the confession that it does not mean to charge the public that fair price at which the interests of railway and public meet—but that it will charge more, unless it be prevented by competition. The public knows well enough that railway, companies are too big to be altogether coerced by any influence of the sort : but we all see, however, that competition is some check, and we are not pre- pared to give it up. Again, the language which Mr. Laing, the Chairman of the Brighton Railway Company, permitted himself to utter in regard to accidents,—desoribing them as things no more to be controlled by railway-managers than " the light- ning from heaven,"—is quite sufficient to convince the 'public that he is not the person to be intrusted with the management of the highways of this country on behalf of the public. The public sees well enough, that competing lines brought within one manage- ment might be very beneficially used for that division of heavy from slow traffic which is so much needed ; but, beneficial as that division would be, the public cannot feel convinced that if they were released from all check the managers of railways would realize it. Mr. Laing, Mr. Glyn, and Mr. Russell, are amongst the most educated and intelligent men now publicly moving in the commercial classes of this country; but by their nets and their speeches the public knows that these the best men of the class are not yet ripe to be trusted with great public interests. The public knows that they will sacrifice these great public interests to the supposed trading interests of the bodies which they represent ; and for that reason, the public will not consent to give up such hold as it may have over them, imperfect as that hold may be.

The Government Railway Board has proved to be a failure, partly from want of knowledge, partly from want of powers, and partly from that want of will which is the great vice in all public men and in the public habits of the present day. Mistrusting it- self, trimming between public demands and influential "interests," the Railway Board shillyshallied until it redueed its efficiency to nought. Its reports on projects of legislation, which might have been so useful in directing Parliament, proved to be of little avail. Its control over railway companies has been very slight indeed; and it may be almost said, that in only one of its functions has it realized any decided and obvious successes. In that one function the success has been manifest, and very beneficial to the public. It has enforced a real investigation into some of the most remark- able "accidents," and has thus exacted a searching exposure of causes injurious to the public, which would otherwise have been covered up.

Feeble as the Board has been in its action, no doubt can be en- tertained as to the possibility of rendering it more useful ; but in order to do so, it ought to be placed in a position less conflicting with railway interests at large. On the other hand, the facts at which we have rapidly glanced, of themselves suggest, that while railway companies are not fit to be trusted with the sole public ad- ministration of the national highways, there are substantial bene- fits to be attained by a common understanding and a common ac- tion. A machinery, therefore, which could give effect to that com- mon understanding and common action, might place within our reach certain benefits very desirable both for company and public. Such a machinery, for example, would be furnished by the creation of a Railway Board comprising perhaps the present official Board and also representatives from all the great Railway Companies. The immediate advantages to be anticipated from such a tri- bunal are apparent. It would ipso facto furnish a ground on which negotiations for mutual convenience might be conducted un- der a sanction imparting to the conclusions great authority. By reviewing all schemes of railway extension, amalgamation, or transfer, it might not only prevent many competing and abortive schemes, but might also suggest modifications equally conducive to the interests of the public and of the undertakers. If its sittings were held in public, it would not only furnish the best ground for discussion of railway projects by the most competent people, but it would also induce the separate interests to put their projects in the best possible shape, in order to secure public favour, and to command the respectful attention of the joint tribunal. One

might anticipate from such discussions smut elevation of moral feeling on the part of railway-managers themselves. By supervising various important details in the control of railways, as it might do—by the revision of by-laws, the revision of schemes, and the regulation of joint traffic—the Board might at once remove an im- mense cause of Parliamentary abuse, and render the stream of Parliamentary control, narrowed to fewer points, much more effi- cient. These are but a few of the functions implied in the very existence of such a Board : others will be suggested by the mere consideration of the idea. Such a tribunal appears to us to be for the present the utmost approach that could be made towards unity of administration, consistently with the training of those who have at present the practical administration of railway affairs, or with the public feeling. It would be a machinery for attaining as much unity as the march of events has prepared ; it would give, instead of amalgamation, a kind of federation under official sanction ; it would develop all the powers hitherto existing, and would endow them with greater efficiency, and with proportionate respon- sibility.