BOOKS.
COLONEL CHESNEY'S ESSAYS.*
AMONG modern essayists, Colonel Charles Chesney is entitled to a high rank, because he not only possesses a power of clear state- ment, but, what many of the so-called brilliant writers lack, he is remarkable for accurate knowledge and sound judgment. Some- times, indeed, he strains a point a little too far, in his anxiety to reach that judicial impartiality which, if it tempers the ardours of composition, is an error on the right side. Order, lucidity, vigour are the salient qualities of his style, as a thirst for truth, habits of exact investigation, and a trained, dispassionate faculty, which enables him to form sound conclusions, are the qualities of his well- balanced mind. The essays collected and published in this volume are not only of a nature to interest the military, but the general reader. Whether he carries us into the camps, or along the track of the Grand Army on Muscovite soil, guided by the accom- plished De Fezensac, or throws a light on Sachet's Spanish cam- paigns, while sketching the career of Henry von Brandt ; whether he draws a picture of Cornwallis, or renders the exploits of Chinese Gordon intelligible—not his easiest task—or whether he finds a theme in recent American warfare, Colonel Chesney is always entertaining and instructive. But we call especial atten- tion to the four essays which relate to the American war, not only because they are well done, but for the reason stated in the author's preface, namely, that the military excellence displayed during the mighty struggle " has been unduly depreciated by comparison with the late events on the Continent ;" and, indeed, we may add, unduly depreciated from the very first, notably by soldiers who should have known better than to sur- render at discretion their judgment to their political prejudices. Colonel Chesney was always an exception, and in his preface be has the courage to repeat some striking truths which the vulgar,
Essays in Military Biography. By Charles Comwallia Chesney, Colonel in the Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel in the Ro yal Engineers. Reprinted chiefly from the Edinburgh Review. London: Longmaus and Co.
no matter what their rank, and the ignorant, no matter whether professional or not, have generally disregarded. Thus, measured by actual fighting, "the most seasoned soldiers of Europe are but as conscripts compared with the survivors of that conflict" ; while the conditions of war on a grand scale, says our author, " were illustrated to the full as much in the contest in America, as in those more recently waged on the Continent." He justly points out that in " the art of feeding and supplying an army in the field, the Americans displayed quite as much ability as any Con- tinental power " ; that as regards courage, " the actual fighting was far more stubborn " ; and that if the organisation and discipline were inferior, compared with European models, yet, considering that the armies on both sides were improvised, under the very stress of collision, they were certainly the best troops built up from nothing which have been seen in modern days. Colonel Chesney rightly says the actions were inconclusive, chiefly because " the beaten side would not break up," but retired in good order, keeping a bold front to, the victor. "In order to pursue there must be some one to run away, and to the credit of Americans, the ordinary conditions of European warfare in this respect were usually absent from the great battles fought across the Atlantic." It may be added that the nature of the country favoured the exhibition of what Colonel Chesney calls "an in- herited quality,"—enabled infantry to resist horsemen, and check a whole army until fresh arrangements could be made by the con- querors. There was, doubtless, a deficiency of cavalry, but even Seidlitz himself, had he been there with his squadrons, would have been puzzled how to use them in an American forest. The battles were relatively inconclusive, because the troops on both sides were good, because the country abounded in natural obstacles, and because rapid movements were impossible in the face even of slight resistance. Yet the greater actions were quite as decisive as all but the exceptional fights in Europe. Fort Donelson and the much-criticised Pittsburg Landing really cleared an immense tract of country. Grant took Vicksburg when he defeated Pem- berton on the Big Black ; he saved Tennessee when be won Mis- sionary Ridge. Meade, in one of the best fought battles of the whole war, Gettysburg, decisively freed the North from invasion, and forced the Confederates thenceforth to stand on the defensive. Against the troops they possessed and the country on which they fought, Napoleon himself could not have won anything like an Austerlitz, still less a Waterloo.
The strange disposition to carp at American Generals must be mainly the fruit of a very imperfect study of their campaigns and the conditions under which they were fought. It is all the more remarkable, because America possessed what England did not, a first-rate military school. Whence could you hope to get good Captains, if not from West Point? We also had excellent training establishments in our Artillery and Engineers, but the untrained and uneducated Infantry and Cavalry monopolised all the com- mands, and laughed to scorn scientific soldiership. And out of the genuine Military Academy on the Hudson came really educated soldiers, although so many of them, absorbed in commercial and industrial pursuits, or engaged in obscure duties, lived compara- tively unknown. When the war broke out they came to the front as natural leaders, and with one exception, they alone did any- thing great or decisive. It was West Point, divided against itself, which fought the campaigns, and we say they are worthy of being compared with any campaigns of modern times. Menof transcendent genius, since the very dawn of recorded history, have been so few that they may be counted on the fingers. But among those who stand in the second rank, Lee, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan must find a place ; and of these four, beyond question, the man who approached most nearly to the highest genius, the man who showed the pro- foundest insight into strategy, was General Sherman. There were many bright strokes in that prolonged war, but the brightest, the most Napoleonic, the greatest, as well as the truest concep- tions, were the march through Georgia, and subsequently from the Savannah to Cape Fear River. And they were purely Sher- man's own inspirations, or rather, to speak correctly, inventions, and he obtained permission to execute both only after considerable hesitation at head-quarters. If Marlborough deserves credit for marching through a peaceful country to the Danube ; if Napoleon is exalted because, crossing the Alps, he suddenly placed an army on the Ticino and Po, then also is Sherman entitled to renown for having the brain to conceive and the boldness to execute a great march through a hostile country, which dealt the deadliest blow struck at the Confederacy. It must, as a stroke of supreme generalship, take rank among the finest recorded in military history. In saying this, we do not intend to underrate the military qualities of Grant, and still less of Lee. There are now, as there were in the early years of the war, many who refuse to credit Grant with intellec- tual ability or military genius. Certainly Colonel Chesney is not• of the number. Although, as we think, he is too severe on the General when treating of the Virginian campaign, he speaks in- no equivocal terms respecting the enterprise against Vicksburg.. The time came, he says, when, " pursuing one great object stead- fastly, he was to win it at last, bye display of resource such as the most brilliant or scientific of modern Generals could not surpass."' Sherman was a competent judge, and in his famous letter to- Grant, in March, 1864, he frankly writes, " My only points. of doubt were in your knowledge of grand strategy and of books of science and history, but I confess your common- sense seems to have supplied all these." Of the men of books of science and history, some, at least, still entertain doubts- which the great soldier who saw his comrade at work flung away for ever, certainly after Vicksburg. What is genius, at least of the highly practical sort, but the soundest common-sense, set in• motion and reduced to fact by that infinite capacity for taking, pains of late so much talked about? No mistakes made by Grant- in the overland advance upon Richmond can blot out or seriously diminish his credit among competent men. It would almost seem that• some critics are angry with him for perceiving that the soundest- strategy was to "operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it could be found," the strategy he announced to Sherman on April' 4, 1864, conveying plans which gave the latter General " infinite- satisfaction," and made him exclaim, " That we are all now to act on a common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like en- lightened war." No doubt the method of carrying it out is open to_sharp criticism, and that the manoeuvres of Sherman compare- favourably with the bloody fighting which preceded the manoeuvring- of Grant. Yet here we should do well to remember the words of Colonel Chesney, when speaking of " the charge of wasting his- army by pressing it on against unfair odds of position." He says, " A little more of success in the results, and we should have heard• nothing but praise." After all, he gained his point, which was to, break up Lee's army, if possible ; if not, to force it back into Rich- mond, and hold on until the Confederacy was vanquished. He- did this, partly by fighting bloody battles, and partly by out- flanking his adversary. Lee met with his match,—encountered a foe who could stand up to him, frustrate his tactics, and march round him ; but naturally, the force acting on the defensive, a line which the Confederate was soon obliged to adopt, lost the fewer men, yet could ill afford to lose those. We never could understand- the statement that Grant changed his line of operations, since, out- flanking his opponent, he still went direct upon Rich- mond. He shifted his immediate base several times, but- how and when did he shift his line of operations ? As to the allegation that he might have moved, in the first• instance, from the Rapidan to the James by water, and not• by land, we have always thought the criticism did not sufficiently appreciate the political and physical conditions of the campaign.. It certainly was, as we well remember, originally advanced in this- country solely by political opponents of the North, desirous of de- tracting from the reputation of a General who had driven Lee into- Richmond, and who held him there. But we have not the space- required to state even the pros and cons upon a question possess- ing, however, almost wholly a speculative interest. We are bound' to say that Colonel Chesney throws upon President Lincoln all blame for the adoption of the " impracticable plan," which, how- ever, ended in the capture of Richmond. When General Badeam finds leisure to complete that Military History of General Grant' which he began so many years ago, we shall have sounder materials- for a judgment than any we now possess.
The subject is so vast, that we can only touch slightly on ay few salient points, and refer the reader to Colonel Chesney's suggestive essays, if he has neither time nor inclination for deeper study of military operations quite as instructive as any which have occurred since Napoleon's career as a soldier came to- its abrupt close. We can only regret that our able military essayist has not given us his estimate of Sherman, whose volume- of despatches furnishes a tempting theme exactly suited to Colonel+ Chesney's gifts. But we are glad to see his weighty protest against the vulgar error that American Generals are inferior to their European brothers in arms. That the troops raised from nothing were long inferior in organisation and discipline is true ;: but we doubt whether at the end of the war many, if any,. European armies have surpassed, in these respects, the soldiers. whom Grant and Sherman led back to Washington in May, 18651.
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