. The China Spectre OUR UN CORRESPONDENT writes :
Time was when the first few months of the year were a comparatively tranquil season at the United Nations. The Assembly was over, the captains and the kings had departed, the early spring crop of economic and social meetings were as yet barely showing their heads above ground, and many members of permanent delegations and of the UN stall had scattered in search of rest, sun or snow.
That was in the dear departed yesterday. Like all yesterdays, this one was not so dear when it was today. But of course it seems so in retrospect —and by comparison. Now, the old-timers say, with a combination of half-grudging pride and nostalgic resignation, it is more or less a year- round circus. Increasingly, the UN reflects the world (51 members in 1945, 113 today), and as the tide of world events quickens and swells it engulfs the Headquarters on the East River, leaving little leeway for refreshment, stock- taking or contemplation.
It seems strange now to remember that not so long ago the complaint was often heard that the UN was being 'bypassed.' Today, the UN is accustomed and conditioned to the realisation that sooner or later its machinery will be involved, as it was intended to be, in solving most of the world's problems.'There is a tendency, thus, to take in philosophic stride both the old perennials like Palestine and Kashmir, and newer storm centres even as alarming as Cyprus. They are problems of a type the UN has grown used to tackling, and they consist, broadly speaking, of disputes between member States, with conse- quences more or less far-reaching according to the circumstances.
Waiting in the wings, however, are two ominous giants of a different calibre, involving the very future of the UN itself, and the shadow they cast sends chills down many a hardened spine. These two grim spectres are the issue of Chinese representation, and the question of what is going to happen now that the Russians have reached the peril point in their arrears of dues, and are thus in danger of forfeiting their vote in the General Assembly. Fervent prayers are being uttered on all sides, both publicly and privately, that neither of these monsters will have to be met head-on for some time. Political micawberism clings to the hope that something may turn up, and seasoned experience knows that adamant attitudes frequently soften, given a sufficient breathing spell.
Whether or not the volume of prayer will be answered remains to be seen. According to present indications, the Assembly's regular 1964 session, due to open in the third week of Septem- ber, is likely to be postponed until after the United States presidential elections, early in November. A special Assembly session over the Panama issue, which appeared quite possible a few weeks ago, is not expected as things stand now, since efforts are being made to settle it within the inter-American system. Cyprus is an- other matter, however, and officials are holding their breath lest the kaleidoscopic situation there should reshape itself in a pattern which would spell out the fateful words 'special session' and bring the two dread star players to the centre of the stage.
At the height of the impact of de Gaulle's recognition of Peking, there was a flurry of appre- hension that the Russians might raise the Chinese representation issue in the Security Council, due just at that time to start a new series of meetings on the Kashmir question. They did not, however, and it thus appears likely, although not certain, that the battle forum will remain the Assembly, as in past years. One point which should not be for- gotten is that between now and the convening of the Assembly the Chinese representation question is certain to come up in several of the UN's specialised agencies, all of them masters of their own procedure. Should Peking be admitted to any of these, it would be bound to have political repercussions in the UN itself. However, the Americans are confident at present that 'the line can be held' in the agencies.
As to the crucial question of the outcome in the Assembly itself, it is naturally impossible to make any hard predictions at this stage. Here, too, the US believes that the necessary majority can be achieved again this year, and the trend of thinking among the 'experts' (a much over-used term) is that 1965, rather than 1964, is likely to be the year when the Chinese Communists will be voted into the General Assembly. But, of course, far from being 'the end of the affair,' that would open a Pandora's box of political and legal hornets from whose stings stalwart statesmen and international lawyers are already flinching in anticipation.
Among the nightmare complexities which loom, for example, is the de lure possibility of the Assembly seat going to Peking while the Security Council seat is retained by Formosa. Technically, 'the Republic of China' (Formosa) is one of the five permanent members of the Council, and it could thus veto any attempt to replace itself by Peking. However, before it could do so, the Council would have to decide that the matter was substantive, not procedural--since only sub- stantive issues are subject to the veto---and this would undoubtedly produce an interminable debate, and would raise the vexed question of the 'double veto,' that is to say a veto on a decision as to whether a question is substantive or pro- cedural. Yet although this situation in the Security Council remains a legal possibility, in practice it is not expected to arise. Peking is con- sidered Most unlikely to accept a seat in the Assembly alone, and the Nationalist Chinese might well not wish to remain in the UN if they were beaten in the General Assembly.
As far as other main UN organs are concerned, the Economic and Social Council would probably follow the Assembly's lead. But in the Inter- national Court of Justice, where the dismissal of any member requires a unanimous vote, a change is virtually out of the question until February 5, 1967, when the term of the present Chinese member, Judge Wellington Koo, expires. In the corridors and lounges, the burden of gossip (sub- scribed to, be it noted, by more than a few African delegates, among others) is to the effect that some way must be found to include both Chinas. But this would necessitate some alchemy which would overcome the refusal of Nationalist China to be admitted as Formosa, and at the same time dissuade Peking from vetoing Formosa's admission, since it claims the island as part of China. The only solution, it is said vaguely and far from hopefully, would be some kind of political agreement, possibly arrived at with the mediation of a French Merlin. Yet this latter possibility is regarded as unlikely. All in all, UN officials scanning the sombre landscape are inclined to say with Wordsworth's afflicted Margaret, 'my apprehensions come in crowds.'
Trial of Strength.
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