A FIELD-orsicza's LAST YEAR IN CHINA.
THE Field-officer left Madras in August 1841; and, after deten- tions at Penang, Singapore, and Macao, or rather Hong-kong, em- barked, at the end of November, to join the Army, and got to Chusan in the middle of January. The remainder of his time was passed with the forces ; and the volume consists of (we doubt not) bona fide letters to friends, descriptive of such occurrences as fell in his way and attracted his notice. A revision has caused the omission of many passages and names ; giving to much of the volume a fragmentary air, and balking the reader; explanatory or corrective notes are added to the letters where needful; and the author has prepared a brief closing chapter taking a general view of our Chinese policy. The Field-officer appears to belong to the Company's service ; at all events, he has more liveliness and more looseness than usually attend upon her Majesty's commission. These qualities give to the Letters a pervading readableness and spirit, with an occasional flippancy : but we doubt whether the Field-officer has mental calibre to be implicitly trusted in any remarks upon policy or the large operations of war. Of this deficiency he seems to be con- scious himself, and he makes no pretension to any thing beyond sketches—" As Mr. Pickwick said of his stockings, so the author may say of these pages, Have you any objections to these letters as ktters ? for they pretend to no higher character." Notwith- standing this frankness, the book, we suspect, will not support the expectations of the titlepage ; for scarcely half of it relates to the seat of the Chinese war, and very little to the war itself. The de- lays of a sea-voyage against the wind—the discomforts of a crowded vessel—a short description of Penang, and what the voyager did there—a longer ditto ditto of Singapore—a sketch of Hong-kong, not very new or striking, and a better account of Macao, as em- bracing the changes produced by the late change of affairs—are matters that require a more searching mind and a more powerful pen than our touch-and-go militaire, to invest them with a strong attrac- tion. Such off-hand and lively sketches, however, would have done well enough as an introduction, provided the rest had been of a more solid, informing, and interesting character ; but we are not sure that the earlier part is not the best. In point of general informa- tion, the despatches—as regards personal anecdote and minuter particulars, the letters published in the newspapers— convey a great deal more, and more vividly than these Letters of a Field-officer. It may be true, as the writer alleges, that we are too near to write the history of the expedition, and that the best approach to it is the official documents. It seems to be true that he was not very actively employed, and when employed was so engaged with his duties as to have little time for observation. In our remarks we are not finding faults but stating facts, and the fact of the Last Year in China is, that it is an " outside " book—we get at the kernel of nothing. The fullest and completest thing in it relates to the Chinese endeavours to terminate the war by kidnapping in- cautious individuals, of whom some score seem to have been among the " missing " ; and the largest, to the miserably puny manner in which the Whigs carried on the war.
"The whole force left here (Hong-kong) at present, including the sick, is about five hundred men, under the command of (local) Major-General Bur- rell, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Eighteenth Royal Irish. Nearly all the Eighteenth, Forty-ninth, and Fifty-fifth, a detachment of the Twenty-sixth, and the detachments of the Royal and Madras Artillery, have gone to Amoy and Chusan. 1 have no means of getting very accurate information on these subjects at present ; but it would appear the whole force in China is about 2,500 bayonets; and with these a hope of putting an end to the war is still en- tertained by some. "A vessel has arrived at Amoy, where a detachment of the Twenty-sixth and a wing of the Eighteenth were left as a garrison—about six hundred men. We hear that Ningpo and Chusan have been also taken ; not, however, without loss on our aide. When a garrison is left at Ningpo, and Unman is occupied, our stupendous force will be divided into four armies, averaging about six hundred men each."
The general remarks upon our future policy are sensible, but not new ; and it is not necessary to have sailed to China to be able to make them. Something not very far from the following may have been read in our own pages. It is, however, well expressed, and comes with a sort of authority from one who has been in the flowery Empire.
"But the diplomatic difficulties did not terminate with, but on the con- trary commenced from, the treaty of Nanking. That treaty 'Avail made by cannon and musketry, and established by knock-down arguments. Under such circumstances, the ordinarily tortuous paths of diplomacy were, as far as im- mediate negotiations were concerned, made straight and easy to the conquerors; but the making and carrying into effect the regulations for future commercial intercourse with the five ports mentioned in the appendix will be no easy matter. The chief difficulty, however, will be to preserve peace.
"No sensible or humane person can desire another contest with the Chinese ; yet great skill and judgment will be required to avert the evil. It will be quite as necessary in future to protect the Chinese from the violence of Euro- pean adventurers, as the Europeans from the insults of the Chinese.
"Fortunately, the present Plenipotentiary is universally considered fully equal to the difficult task of controlling the commercial and political confusion, which more or less threatens us in a country, where the real weakness of the Government is now first apparent to its own subjects, as well as confirmed to strangers.
"If, adopting our usual Eastern policy, we interfere in the internal concerns of China, other European nations will follow our example; and wars, not con- fined to Asia, will be the too probable consequences. "We must, therefore, continue to exercise the moderation displayed in the treaty of Nanking, and allay the fears of the Chinese as to our views of terri- torial aggrandizement.
"But this will never be the case if we suffer any of the Missionaries in China to combine political with religious views. We must not permit the doc-
trines of Machiavelli or Robespierre, engrafted on those of our Saviour, to be preached in that country; though there exist persons who imagine, most un- wisely, that the Christian religion can be propagated by fire and sword.
"If peace is to be maintained, if the aim of conquest is sincerely repudiated, it will be requisite to invest the authorities in China with very great powers, which will be necessary also to secure commercial prosperity to England and India."
The statement about the "political "views of the Missionaries is not very clear to us. We know that some of that class have for some time past been virtually advocating a warlike policy, not with China only, but with Japan, in order to facilitate the in- troduction of the gospel into those countries ! But it seems a needless fear to suppose that these persons, zealously presump- tuous and indiscreet as some of them are, should preach politics to the Chinese. The future difficulties will arise from their preaching at all. If the Chinese authorities could be fully possessed with a view of the Christian religion, and be satisfied that the Missionaries had no other object than conversion, it is possible they might allow them to pursue their hopeless task of stimulating the atheistical indifference of the people. But it will be impossible to con- vince the Chinese of this ; and the most European nation, under similar circumstances, would be apt to suspect that religion was merely a stalking-horse for politics. Dr. MOH- BISON, one of the earliest missionaries, was also interpreter to the East India Company, and much more conspicuous to the higher Chinese in his character of diplomatic agent than of preacher : Mr. GuTztArr, the well-known missionary, was also interpreter to the late expedition : young MORRISON and LAY, also interpreters, were, we believe, either in the missionary line or connected with it : THOM, we think, is the only excep- tion. If, therefore, out of five important diplomatic agents, constantly visible to the Chinese, and without whom it is im- possible to take a step, four are found to be missionaries as well as politicians, the conclusion of any people would be that religion was merely a cloak. A contemporary seems to wish that the Missionaries should be directly controlled : but this, we sus- pect, is scarcely practicable, All that the state can do is to disconnect itself entirely from their proceedings, and to let them distinctly understand that if they persist in forcing themselves into China against the laws and wishes of the Chinese, they must take the consequences of their conduct. The only means of con- trolling them would be, to invest our diplomatic residents at the five ports with a power analogous to that formerly possessed by the East India Company, of deporting offending individuals : but this would be difficult, and might give rise to abuses. Even to carry into practical effect the last suggestion of the Field-officer, will not be easy ; yet, unless some means be adopted of effctually controlling the smuggling and other adventurers who will resort to China, we are only "at the beginning of an end."
Previous page
