TOPICS OF THE DAY
SHALL WE DEFEND CONSTANTINOPLE ? ARE we about to fight Russia, in order to prevent the tem- porary occupation of Constantinople until a European Congress has decided upon the ultimate ownership or guardian- ship of that great position ? That is the true and only ques- tion in regard to this war now before the country, and it is upon this that the public should make up its very reluctant mind. It is quite clear that the Cabinet as a collective body does not intend to intervene in this war merely to protect the Turks from the consequences of their own misdeeds. The time has passed for that ; for were we never so willing, we could not prevent the Russians from clearing the European provinces north and south of the Balkans of the last relics of the Tarkish authority which has so long oppressed them. We could not defend Adrianople, or any other position in the interior, without a strict Turkish alliance, and an effort which, if it involves a Turkish alliance, the nation has decided not to make. It is also clear that the Government does not intend to seize Gallipoli and keep it as a sort of Gibraltar, a guarantee that our interests should be protected in the Congress which, when Russia has once destroyed a Turkish army, will become inevitable. It is true that appearances point just at this moment to such an occupation ; but appearances must be deceitful, unless, indeed, much more is intended. The Fleet is lying at Besika Bay, just the place from which a rush on Gallipoli can be most easily made. The Mediterranean garrisons are to be brought up to such a position of completeness that a emps d'arme'e of fifteen thousand men, with the necessary comple- ment of engineers and artillery, would be ready to start at an hour's notice for active service. The reinforcements sent to those stations take no wives or children with them, and they will include, unless everybody is mistaken, a regiment of hussars, who are not, we imagine, intended to defend Malta against an invasion of rabbits or against shells from sea. They are fine troops, but Malta is not precisely the place where English mili- tary authorities station a crack regiment of cavalry, unless it is en route for some other point. Moreover, the transports which convey the troops to Gibraltar and Malta will be ready to convey them still further afield. All this looks like Gallipoli ; and yet it is nearly impossible, in spite of all military gossip, that Gallipoli should be by itself the end. What are we to do there ? Troops there will not protect Constantinople from a land attack, and for a sea attack the Russian Government has no kind of means. We cannot, by holding the peninsula, enable ourselves to declare that the Dardanelles shall not be opened, for that would be to declare war upon all Europe in defence of a privilege which, if we hold Gallipoli, we could not help claiming for ourselves. Our ships-of-war, it is clear, if we hold the key of the Dardanelles, must enter the Sea of Marmora ; and if we enter it, or take power to enter it, the Treaties closing the Straits are at an end, and all the rest of the world must come in. Suppose a German frigate asks a passage, are we to fire upon a German frigate ? And if not, what becomes of our key ? It may be given to us by a Congress, no doubt, but our occupation will not make the gift more probable, for if Europe refuses, we shall not fight all Europe for so uncertain a gain. It is only as a post on the road to Constan- tinople that Gallipoli is of importance, and the single question to be decided is, whether we are to go there,—that is, whether we are to declare war or accept war rather than suffer the city to pass temporarily into Russian hands ? It cannot remain in Russian hands for any length of time, for neither Germany nor Austria could permit Russia to hold direct military control of such a point, or spread her authority as she might spread it northwards to the Danube. Their interest in that matter is at least as strong as ours ; they can intervene on the Russian flank, and they have been fully warned by the events of the war that their intervention would not be too serious a risk. If the war has made anything clear, it is that the Russian army could not remain south of the Danube for a week after Ger- many and Austria, or Austria alone, with German sanction, had signified that it must retreat. The Russian Staff knows this quite well, and the Russian Government has consequently pledged itself up to the lips before its own subjects and before Europe, to let Europe decide on the permanent ownership or guardianship of Constantinople. It is impossible to make words plainer or more solemn than those of the Czar. It is only, therefore, to prevent a temporary occupation that we can go there, and the only object of preventing a temporary occupation must be to protect the Turks. We are to go there in order to assure the Turks that, defeated or victorious, how- ever they may wage war, or however they may resist peace, they will be free and masters in the centre of their power, will be able from thence to "govern,"—that is, to harass and. tax to the quick—all Western Asia. Our appearance in Con- stantinople would and could have no other meaning, unless, indeed, we are prepared to assist in terminating Turkish rule. The Porte would be at liberty to fight on as long as Asia could sustain the war, and being safe from Russian coercion, would fight on gallantly and ferociously to the very last, and then remain, defeated, indeed, but safe and master of great provinces. That is the meaning, and the only meaning, of an English defence of Constantinople.
But, says the newspaper which speaks most clearly the mind of the Premier, we should go to Constantinople merely as "the bailiffs of Europe," prepared to hand over the great capital to any authority upon whom Europe may fix its choice. Very good ; then let the Government say so clearly in Parlia- ment. It is certainly not we who should resist that righteous and statesmanlike design. If the Government is prepared to bring the Sultanet to an end, as a mischief to the world or as an anachronism, to hold Constantinople in pledge against the will of the Turks, and to quell all resistance to that policy by force, it will do precisely the act which will terminate the Ottoman Empire in Europe, and which was in effect re- commended by Mr. Gladstone, when lie advised us to stop the despatch of troops from Asia across the Bosphorus. The Turks must have fired on ships so employed, and the ships must have returned the fire. But who believes for one moment that a Government with Lord Beaconsfield at its bead would pursue any policy of the kind? He wants to save the only Asiatic State left in Europe, not to destroy it. His sympathy—we do not blame him for it, and he has avowed it in a hundred chapters of his books—is with the Semitic races, and not with the "snub-nosed Saxon" or more snub- nosed Belay. He may talk about holding Constantinople as a pledge—though, to do him bare justice, he has never done anything of the kind, leaving his devotees in the Press to do it for him—but if he waives at Constantinople he will say, and say truly, for there is no doubt of the fact, that he can hold it only with the sympathy and the assistance of the fighting half of its population, that is, by cementing an alliance with the Turk. There would be no way out of it. A British army cannot be withdrawn without accomplish- ing its end, and the end of holding Constantinople, without being either the masters or the allies of the Turkish popula- tion, is absolutely unattainable. The Turks would not stand it, to begin with. Whatever their faults, readiness to surrender an Empire without striking a stroke for it is not one of them, and they may be acquitted fully, as fully as Indian sepoys in mutiny, of caring one straw about the ultimate strength of nations. They would fire on an English fleet coming to Con- stantinople without their permission as readily as into a Russian one, or more readily, for they might be afraid of the Russian vengeance, and would not be afraid of ours, It is ridiculous to go to Gallipoli, unless we are going to Constanti- nople. It is impossible to go to Constantinople, except as the allies or the enemies of the Turks. Is, then, the country prepared to go to Gallipoli ? That is the question, which Parliament, when it has solved the terrible problem how to master three Irishmen who will play, but will not play accord ing to rule, ought to decide before it leaves Lord Beacons. field uncontrolled master of the Empire.
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