TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE MISFORTUNES OF RUSSIA.
"LIVERY Englishman who has watched and worked _12.1 anxiously chning three years of war must be inclined to say on the first impulse that the chaotic retreat of the Russian troops on a considerable front is heart-breaking. To think that Russia, who proposed for herself, and calmly accepted, the terrific sacrifices of 1914, when she distracted German attention from the Western Front, should now fail —now, When she is equipped with munitions as she never was before, and when the German line opposed to her is thinner and less resolute than at any time in the war ! But immediately after the first impulse of thought comes the reflection that the moment when one feels that one's heart might break is the very time not to allow it to break. It is the time for stronger efforts than ever, and true great-headted- ness. After all, the great Russian disappointment is unnerving only by comparison with what we had hoped from the noble offensive undertaken by that fine soldier General Brussiloff. We really had no right to count on an offensive at all after the Revolution had plunged Russia into disorder. And even as it is, the cause of the Allies is far better off than it would have been had the Tsar remained on the throne and his per- fidious advisers had made a separate peace with Germany. In pitying ourselves we must not forget to spare a special degree of sympathy for those gallant leaders in Russia who have seen the results of their work crumble away under their hands. Nothing is more mortifying and harrowing to a soldier in this life than to be rendered helpless on the field by the indiscipline of those whom he believed he could title. That N. Kerensky and Oeneral Brussiloff and many other men of great character and high spirit will try to retrieve the disaster we know. All our good wishes go to them.
But—this is the first practical thing to say—we must proceed exactly as though Russia had to be " written off." We do not for our part in the least think that Russia will have to be written off, and we shall try to give some reasons for our belief ; but nevertheless prudence requires that we should act on the worst presumption. Britain, France, Italy, and the United States must more furiously hammer away along the line from the English Channel to the Cars* till Germany cries "Hold, enough ! " If that is the prospect we keep steadily in view, everything that Russia may yet do, directly or indirectly, to help us will be something to the good. We shall hail all the assistance she can give with joy as a windfall—of all kinds of emolument the most pleasing, for some impenetrable human reason. But if we count on definite things in Russia, although the whole situation there is in its nature indefinite, we shall be making trouble for ourselves. With these premisses, let us calmly see how the situation looks. Of course if the Russian mutiny spreads, and the Germans are allowed to continue their present very easy advance, ways will lie open to them to the heart of the Ukraine, to the rich and important city of Kieff, to the great corn-growing lands of Southern Russia, and to positions where they will be able to cut off the Russians in the Bukovina as well as the whole Rumanian Army. Not that these latter events would be at all likely to happen, for the left of the Russian line and the Rumanians would be compelled to fall back long before they were cut off. We are contemplating, for the purpose of argument, a German advance on a huge scale. Now suppose that such a thing happened. The longer the Gentian lines of communication became, the more men Germany would have to find to guard them and to keep up the supply services of her distant armies. Some people talk as though long lines of communication were a great source of anxiety to every army in the world except to the Germans. But this is of course a silly superstition. The Germans have no patent solution of difficulties that affliat all mankind.
Of course if Russia made a separate peace with Germany, German anxieties in the East would be at an end. That is admitted. But the difference between the old regime in Russia and the Revolution is that whereas the old regime were capable of deserting their Allies, and probably contemplated doing so, the Revolutionaries have asserted positively over and over again that they will make no separate peace. So long as that holds good Germany will always be in suspense in the East. She will not dare to withdraw troops for fear that fighting might break out again. Indeed, if she continues her advance, she will require many more troops than now. Thus the Russian armies, even if they do nothing but retreat, will render us the valuable hadirect service of immobilizing, so far as we are concerned, a large number of Germans. The possi- bility remains, no doubt, that the Russian armies might be destroyed. Germany might say "Make peace or we will annihilate you." Such a threat as that may look terrible on paper, but in practice it is the surest way to rouse men's blood and put the Devil into them. And the Russians are tem- peramentally more liable to sudden revulsions of feelin,,a than we are. If a British army voluntarily abandoned positions and guns and stores and marched sullenly home- wards, we should have to give up hope of its redemption. We expect it to hold on to the very last, and we know that when it thinks its " very last" has been reached it is almost hopeless to try to shake that conviction. An Englishman who has voluntarily turned his back on the enemy has practically no moral reserve to draw upon. Fortunately he hardly ever reaches that stage. But other nations are not altogether like us. In the present war a French officer said, half jokingly, half seriously, to a British officer : "You don't run away enough." He meant that we had not enough elasticity of mind to "draw back to leap better." We recognize and admire in the French the ability to yield ground in order to save losses without the smallest effect upon the spirit of the men. They come again as confident as ever when oppor- tunity serves. For somethin,g of the same reason, we must not assume that the Russians who have mutinied have perman- ently turned their backs. There is no moral finality in their act. They are suffering from an indigestion of political ideas. They have not much hold upon realities. But what is lightly lost in temper or mood is often quickly regained. As an example of military recovery there is always the famous instance of the French Revolutionary Army. That Army was defeated again and again on the Rhine. It seemed that the French soldier would not stand. It was not till the brain and determination of Napoleon got to work and instilled new methods into the soldiers that the wonderful spirit of the Grand Army began to emerge.
In speculating on the possibility of a Russian recovery it is important to remember that the Russians dislike the Germans, and regard them as their hereditary enemies. The Social Democrats of Petrograd, and indeed Marxists every- where in Russia, very consciously derive from Germany, and towards philosophical Germany entertain something like political affection. But these men are a small though clamorous minority. It is surely a remarkable sign that the Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates should have voted what amount to dictatorial powers to the Provisional Government. This in practice will probably mean that M. Kerensky will be dictator, for a Socialistic Government cannot suddenly take up office and produce order, since order depends upon a perfected system of co-ordination in the Departments of State. The Russian Socialists have never had power before ; there are no permanent officials of their faith, and there is nowhere among them a practical experience of affairs. It seems to us, therefore, that in reality power will accumulate more and more in the hands of M. Kerensky. There would be nothing to be surprised at if he became a dictator. History shows that there is something in the character of the communist which enables him to hand over affairs to a single man, or to an oligarchy, much more easily than the temperate plodding sort of moderate individualist would ever make the same surrender.
On the whole, a Kerensky dictatorship would probably be the best transition from the present chaos to the Constituent Assembly. It may be that M. Kerensky has yet to leave one of the deepest marks on the page of history. His opportunities are certainly unique. He is a great lover of his country, and he has to bring the nation to the understanding that revo- lution is by no means anti-national in essence. The noblest of the makers of revolution have been the purest nationalists like Cromwell and Mazzini and Cavour. What a chance M. Kerensky has ! He has to prove that a nation which is working for self-rule is working for a system worth defending. What will the German bureaucrats answer if the Russian Revolu- tionaries say in effect that they have no precious jewel to keep safe, or rather that their political jewel is definitely not worth fighting for and defending ? The encouragement to the wor- shippers of autocracy in Germany will he immense. They will ridicule the Democrats who handed over land and guns and stores to autocracy. With the help of the National Socialists M. Kerensky may yet overcome the Social Democrats, and we are inclined to think that he will, and that Germany's rapturous joy over the Galician spectacle will turn to bitterness before many months have passed.
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