C )mmonwealth and Foreign
AS OTHERS SEE US
[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR] Sig,—I have had on numerous occasions during the past few weeks to ascertain the views of various foreign nationals on Britain's attitude to the present international situ- ation. The views came from potential friends and enemies, neutrals and actual or prospective victims of aggression, and inasmuch as they are expressed by individuals who not only live close to realities, but are also studious observers and think out their observations, their opinions are worthy of serious attention—if only because they illustrate the deadly danger we run uf misunderstanding our own motives and allowing others to misinterpret them.
There is, generally, a deep appreciation of the declared objectives of British policy—but at the same time widespread uncertainty whether we (and particularly the Govern- ment) appreciate fully the real implications, or, even, are sincere in these assertions.
It is, for instance, incomprehensible to most foreign observers (both in Eastern and Western Europe) how it is that critics of the present Government (even sympathetic) have been proved so consistently right and the Government spokesmen wrong—and yet these critics are not allowed to participate in governing, while those responsible for so many faulty judgements are still in power.
This point was well put by a Dutchman, who stated that the principle of democracy was that if a Government was proved wrong it had to resign—not because it could not change its policy, but because it would not be trusted, even if it did. He emphasised that, inasmuch as the British Govern- ment insisted in carrying on with the same composition, it did not command confidence in Europe, even if it repeatedly asserted its new policy.
Such judgements are worthy of consideration, because foreigners are apt carefully to compare statements by politi- cians with results—and base their future estimations accord- ingly. An important example of this foreign point of view is the attitude towards "Munich." There is at present still a widespread impression that the British Government may be preparini another " Munich " as soon as Parliament is safely away on holiday. The conception of " Munich " abroad— whether we like it or not—as expressed to me by a Pole, a Hungarian and a Czech, is a perfectly definite one : the achievement of a state of non-war by the deliberate sacrifice of a weaker third party, provided the pressure is strong enough. The question whether this was desirable or neces- sary at that time is considered to be quite a separate one, and it is emphasised that the British attempt to excuse the action on moral grounds—such as "peace with honour "—is a dan- gerous delusion in that it misleads other countries and pre- vents ourselves from forming clear judgements of the issues as they arise. The result is considerable anxiety on the part of actual and potential victims and so-called neutrals (as was pointed out to me by a Scandinavian).
Equally important—although different—is the German atti- tude to Munich. Non-Nazi Germans regard it as a sur- render to Hitler and a needless addition to his material gains and prestige—which he will exploit as long as our Govern- ment clings to its wishful thinking. Moderate Nazis, on the other hand, are puzzled, because though they too regard Munich as a surrender to Hitler's demands, yet they con- sider that this was because, by implication, we admitted the rightness of Hitler's thesis—and they are therefore worried and amazed that the inevitable logical development was prevented or is now being opposed.
I would like to add that the French to whom I talked seem to have an admirably realistic and sound judgement on Munich— which is not blinded by false moral justifications : this enables them to take both the " neutral " and German interpretations at the proper value.
In this connexion, the British attitude towards so-called " encirclement " is either misunderstood or regarded as insin- cere. I have heard from Belgians, Dutch, Poles, Rumanians, Turks, &c., that, in fact, we are—and should be—encircling Germany, as otherwise our policy can have no meaning or determined objective : either Germany is a danger or the whole thing is bluff on our part. They understand perfectly well that it is the German regime which is the objective—and argue that not to admit this patent fact gives teal ground to the German propaganda that we are insincere and have sinister concealed designs. The moderate German—including Nazi— view confirms this.
Again, the British frequent assertions that Britain desires a "just settlement" and "does not wish to hinder legitimate German expansion" arouse deep misgivings. What are " just " and "legitimate "? My Nazi friends definitely think that this—if logically treated—must mean the admission of the Hitler conception of Lebensraum. "Neutral" countries fear that it means merely the avoidance or prevention of a con- flict, and not the redress of past wrongs on all sides—and the question is pointedly asked whether the strong will not be penalised for their past abuse of strength or threats. Thus, a Czech emphasised to me that his people fear that they will not be helped to regain their freedom, and, indeed, will be betrayed again if they make any attempt by themselves. The reason he gave was that Mr. Chamberlain hates them, because they are still a living evidence of his action, the error of which he will not admit. This view might be attributable to bitter- ness—but I heard it expressed in almost identical terms by a Dutchman, and it is a striking illustration of the attitude to Munich, and the fear lest Czecho-Slovakia will be a permanent sacrifice.
The idea that Britain may leave to Germany the criterion of what is German "legitimate economic influence was vehemently criticised to me by Poles, Turks, Rumanians and Hungarians. Although the general theme was the same, it was best put by a Turk, who emphasised that the smaller nations had realised their sense of nationhood, wanted to carry out their own development, and considered that intercourse between them should be on a reciprocal basis, and not regu- lated from a big centre, and he resented the idea of being " complementary " to a highly developed Germany.
In connexion with the whole question of economics, Hun- garians, Turks and Poles expressed themselves as puzzled at our lack of clear thinking in making an economic effort and giving economic assistance to our friends. They considered that when the weaker nations were determined to keep their independence and prepared to sacrifice man-power for it, it was both unsuitable and incomprehensible to haggle over a few millions—especially in view of the enormous sums Great Britain was already spending. Also, if the objective was security and victory—no help in any form should be given to the opponents : i.e., any trade concessions, credits, let alone sur- render of balances such as the Czech gold, are regarded by the countries which would have to bear the first brunt as almost a sale of the lives of their nationals, especially when financial help to themselves is being given so grudgingly. In view of the high quality of some of the raw human fighting material, this must give food for thought.
The lesson which emerges from all the above is, that we must be much simpler and more honest in our reasoning, face issues as they are, and recognise once and for all that, having become the leaders of the freer countries to what they hope is victory, we cannot apply our insular system of thinking.—
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