Tragedy of Errors
Toutbreak of fighting between French and 1 Tunisian forces at Bizerta was a tragedy; it will become a catastrophe, if it is allowed to continue. It was the kind of incident which both France and Tunisia had every interest in avoid- ing, and, from the welter of conflicting reports, it is not altogether easy to see how it was allowed to happen. On the French side there was certainly ,sOme negligence in the failure to take account of Tunisian claims to the naval base. However difficult it may be for President de Gaulle to make
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other concessions while negotiating for peace in Algeria, he ought to have realised that Mr. Bourguiba could not follow a policy of friendship towards France indefinitely without having some concrete results to show for it. From the moment that French troops were withdrawn from Morocco it was clear that bases in Tunisia would have to be given up too, and failure to draw this conclusion in time is partly responsible for the present situation. The French military reaction, too, was inexcusably strong. The stories filed by Correspondents of the bombardment of Bizerta with heavy civilian casualties will not easily be forgotten; they will cast a shadow over Franco- Tunisian relations, and they have already gravely compromised the whole of French policy in the Maghreb. France has made one of its staunchest friends, Mr. Bourguiba, into an enemy, thereby alienating one of the most pro-Western of Arab political leaders.
Yet the forcing of the Bizerta issue seems to have come from the Tunisian side, and the ques- tion may well be asked why Mr. Bourguiba should suddenly have chosen this method of pushing a claim which was certain to be met, in the long run. Everything in his past career suggests that he is unlikely to welcome the presence of foreign volunteers in Tunisia, and the operation of steal- ing his opponents' political clothing will hardly disarm them.
Behind this enigma may lie the tangled relation- ship between TUnisia and the provisional govern- ment of Algeria. At the same time as he launched the attack on Bizerta Mr. Bourguiba also forcibly reasserted his claim to a portion of the Sahara at present owned by France, but'which may soon be part of an independent Algeria. The fighting at Bizerta would provide an excellent anti-colon- ialist cover for a separation of part of the Sahara from Algeria, and there are indications that FLN representatives regard it in this light. Moreover, Mr. Bourguiba must be conscious that he has to pose his own candidature for leadership among North African politicians, and a resounding clash with France is undoubtedly the best way of doing this. Were the new series of Franco-Algerian talks to break down, Mr. Bourguiba would have to swing into opposition to President de Gaulle in any case, and his recent actions may be merely an anticipation of what he believes is likely to happen.
Whatever the truth of the matter, France's allies, Britain and America, can only be horrified at the lamentable mess that has been made over a comparatively minor issue, which should have been settled long ago. For the present, it is important that the Security Council should be obeyed and that the present precarious truce should prove lasting; efforts must be made, too, to reach a wider settlement of the dispute, which not only embitters Franco-Tunisian relations, but also hinders the attempt to make peace in Algeria. And it is hard to see how any settlement can now be concluded on terms other than the return of the Bizerta base to Tunisia.
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