Through the Brandenburg Gate
By ANTHONY HARTLEY cl ow. time this autumn or early winter France, Great Britain and the US are going to have to sit down at a table and negotiate with the Soviet Union about Berlin, for Mr. Khrushchev's declared intention of concluding a peace treaty with the East German Republic puts the onus °IE finding an acceptable settlement on the Western powers. President Kennedy has reas- serted that 'we will at all times be willing to talk, if talk will help,' but he has not indicated what lines the conversation could take; and the Wes- tern allies must decide, if they are going to the conference table, what proposals they should put fc 'rWard.
Obviously the Western powers will not find this easy. They have pinned their prestige and also much of their German policy to maintain- ing Positions that are becoming increasingly un- tenable; yet the loss of West Berlin to the East ernians, as well as being unthinkable from the Point of view of the population of that city, ‘t, °111d also make it appear to America's allies in other parts of the world as if, in the last resort, they would also be abandoned Russia, 100, would gain from the elimination of the owelcome contrast between West and East il erlirl and of an American listening-post in cen- tral Europe; and the rickety DDR, passing through a severe economic crisis at the moment, would benefit. ul.hese advantages are too great for the Soviet i rtion to give up its ambitions for West Berlin simply for the recognition by the West of the thcler-Neisse line. Mr. Khrushchev's demand, t:refore—repeated recently in his memorandum President Kennedy in Vienna—is that peace 1eraties should be concluded between Britain, 4naoee. the US and the USSR on the one hand orid the Federal German Republic and the DDR 4 t he other. West Berlin would then become pet, free city, independent and demilitarised- ia four-power under UN auspices, but in any case with tneut°°r-power guarantee of independence and marralitY which would not normally entail the be token of troops there, although there might .1`°11K. en forces for an interim period. at this Plan would leave the free city entirely fort ur mercy of East German and Soviet forces, 'tIssia or the DDR could easily manufac- ture an excuse for taking it over (how easily may be judged by the fact that, in Communist eyes, the very existence of democratic political activity constitutes a 'provocation'). Herr Ulbricht has already stated that flights in and out of West Berlin would have to cease after it became a free city; clearly it would not be free for long. Yet it is not easy to see how the West can prevent the Russian plan from being forced through. Sitting tight on legal rights and the Potsdam agreement is no use, since the Soviet Union has a wide choice of tactics avail- able: the game can be played either gently, with subtle propaganda and slow erosion of the Allied position; or noisily, with sabre-rattling and the stimulation of crises—in the belief that the United Nations, most of whose members care little for the rights and wrongs of the Berlin question or for the freedom of Berliners, will let itself be scared. Then, if war seemed imminent and the Berlin dispute were taken to the UN, the decision might well go against the West, with little regard to the illegality of Soviet demands or the excellent juridical basis of Western resis- tance to them.
The Atlantic powers, therefore,' cannot afford to let the Berlin crisis develop without negotiat- ing with the Soviet Union. But how can they negotiate if they have no concessions to offer and no counter-proposals to advance? Under- standing this situation, Senator Mansfield has suggested a 'third' way: a plan for a free city of the whole of Berlin with access guaranteed by UN troops. Even this, however, might not provide complete security for the city, given the difficulty of keeping a UN force in the field and the lack of interest in Berlin shown by the 'uncommitted' countries. The best way to interest them would be to transfer the UN itself to Berlin —a project which, I see, is being put forward in the House of Commons by a groups of Labour MPs. I would suggest the following plan: (1) The whole of Berlin to become the permanent headquarters of the United Nations. This seems to me the only way of guaranteeing the independence of the city, since the Russians and East Germans would hardly dare to put pressure on the UN or, rather, the reaction this would arouse in the uncommitted coun- tries would make the operation not worth while. The transfer of UN headquarters from New York now seems possible; the Russian demand that it should be on neutral territory is quite reasonable, and racial difficulties make it likely that they will be supported in this by the Afro-Asian bloc. As for the US, it has nothing to lose by such a move.
(2) The city tb he ceded to UN sovereignty: (3) Both the Federal German Republic and the DDR to be admitted to the UN. The West German Government might find this unpalat- able, but it need not constitute more than a de facto recognition of, the East German regime on the part of the West. Such recog- nition is being forced on us anyhow, and it would be less embarrassing to have East Ger- many (alongside West Germany) in the UN than to have to accept direct negotiations with it over Berlin. Moreover, for giving up his portion of the city Herr Ulbricht would expect compensation.
This plan would have the advantage of pro- viding a fresh raison d'etre for the continued existence of Berlin and Berliners as well as a guarantee of their economic future. Many Ger- mans would understandably resent the loss of their capital; but they should be able to accept a sacrifice made in the interests of world peace to an international organisation. The proximity to East Germany, too, would mean that delegates from countries unconcerned with the German problem would see for themselves the nature of the Ulbricht regime, its police methods and its lack of popular support.
Above all, such a plan would have the merit of providing a real test of Russian intentions. It makes three major concessions to the Soviet Union (the removal of the UN from New York, the end of Western 'provocation' in Berlin and the admission of East Germany to the UN). If this is all the Russian Government wants (and it is largely what Mr. Khrushchev says he wants), then the Soviets should have no difficulty in accepting. Rejection, on the other hand, would confirm suspicions that the Soviet Union desires the departure of Western troops from Berlin in order to be able to replace them by East German forces at some future date.
One of the advantages of the plan is its flexibility: its details could easily be altered and different permutations of its essential features tried out. And whether the Soviet Union accepts it or ilea, the West would stand to gain from making a counter-proposal to Mr. Khrushchetes demands. Such concessions would improve our standing in the eyes of third parties; rejection of it would put the USSR in the wrong. The scheme may not provide an ideal solution to the Berlin problem; but at least it offers the West a possibility of escape from an impossible solution without loss of prestige.
'how about "All good things must come to
an end"?'
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