THE OBJECT OF THE SHAH'S VISIT.
THE Shah quits England on Thursday, and as soon as he has gone the public will be very anxious to know why he came, why he seemed so satisfied—that gift at Windsor of his own sword to the Duke of Cambridge is the most remark- able act of courtesy we ever remember in an Asiatic Prince— why the Ministers have worked so hard to entertain him, why all the Princes have devoted themselves to that some- what dry amusement, why the self-appointed Mehmendar of Great Britain, the Duke of Sutherland, who really does his self-imposed work admirably, has done so much—a Shah in one's house being no joke—and above all, why the Cesare- witch has chosen this particular moment to be every- where that the Shah—of whom he had seen quite enough at St. Petersburg—happened to be. Has any poli- tical business been done or not ? We cannot help sus- pecting that there has, that the long interview on the first day between Lord Granville and the Shah termi- nated in a contract or promise, to be ratified probably at Simlah, which was very soon known in Berlin, whence it elicited the curious telegram that England was again entering upon a great policy ; and still more speedily at St. Petersburg, whence has issued the ordre du jour to the Press to blackguard Britain. The Mir has a fair political right to censure our annexations in India, but why are they so reprehensible just now, or why does the Government of Poland feel
so hurt at the suppression of the mutinies ? It is nearly certain that the Shah, who has been worried by insurrections all his life, who has seen his population decay for years, who knows how his realm is honey- combed by religious dissent, who found his army power- less in 1856, was greatly upset by the famine, and the subsequent pressure from St. Petersburg, and has decided that his Empire must have an ally or must go under, and has made up his mind to an alliance with Great Britain. He sees Russia on the Caspian, he feels her on the Attreck, and now he hears of her conquest of Khiva, once the capital of Kharism, whence three Shahs ruled Persia. His Northern frontier is Russia, his Eastern frontier is open to Russia, his Western fron- tier will be open the day he finishes that railway from Reshd to Teheran, which he is nevertheless pledged to finish ; and he must have support from the South, where the Viceroy reigns, who, on a telegram from England, can send him officers, engineers, artillery, troops, and moral power, all within a month's distance when Renter's Railway is made from Teheran to Bushire.
We cannot but believe the Shah has asked some assurance of such assistance, and judging from the wrath of the Russian jour- nals, has in return given us his support in insisting that the word of the Russian Government shall be kept, and that no perma- nent Russian lodgment shall be made in Khiva. If our Govern- ment were like any other on earth, there would be no doubt of our duty to cause that obligation to be kept, and in keeping it there is no doubt that the Shah can help us materially. He knows the way well enough ; he has men and camels ; he still retains his Central-Asian reputation, and with a little money, a few batteries of English Artillery, 5,000 Europeans, and a British General, could make the continuous occupation of Khiva an impossibility. If, as Russian journals will plead, it is impossible to leave Khiva in anarchy, why should not the Shah have it ? He does not govern so badly as the old Khans did, and under British influence might govern better ; and if we had once agreed to support him, we should have no further cause to fear him. The danger is not from him, butfrom him as a Russian vassal, and that is precisely the position from which he would be relieved by our affiance. Neither Westward upon Turkey nor Eastward upon Afghanistan could the Czar move a step with Lord Northbrook standing armed at Teheran. Marshal MacMahon might as well attack Belgium with Von Moltke in full strength at Metz. While the Isthmus between Reshd and Mahomrah is ours—in the sense that the Isthmus of Suez is ours, that is, that without war with us it cannot be shut—India is safe from Russian attack, or rather, to speak carefully, a strict alliance with the Shah would give us a year's notice that it was time to spring to arms, with, if we pleased, all Mohammedan India behind us. It is quite true, as the Pall Mall Gazette says, that the majority of Indian Mohammedans are Sunis ; but they are hostile to Russia as the enemy of the Khalif, while the number of Sheeahs is still great. The Nizam's dominions look to the Shah as their religious chief, and on both sides of the Peninsula there is scarcely a town where the festival in honour of Hussein and Hossein is not kept, where the bitter old feud between the hereditary and the elective descent of the Kaliphate is not still maintained. A summons to defend Persia would be very speedily answered.
But this would involve a Protectorate of Persia ? • Certainly it would, and as we have been maintaining for the last ten years, if Russia intends to attack Persia our choice lies between a protectorate and annexation. It is quite certain that the Shah cannot defend Laaself by himself, and quite certain also that we cannot hold India in security if Persia becomes Russian. That we could defeat her we believe, for India, governed as it is, like a military monarchy, with no House of Commons to chatter, and no Press capable of reveal- ing plans, and a boundless Treasury to draw on, is immensely strong ; but the process of defence would be unendurably costly and vexatious, demanding, as it would, an ironclad fleet in the Persian Gulf, where the sailors would die in ovens, and 40,000 or 50,000 Europeans in the Bombay garrison alone. We do not want merely to keep India, but to keep it without crushing its people. Of course, as the Times says, if we can conciliate the people of India, nothing matters much, though even then we had rather India were isolated ; but we have not done this yet, and till we have, we may rely on it that the Shah's affiance is worth much trouble and some outlay. We waste words in trying to prove a fact that to Anglo-Indians seems as absolute a verity as that a strict alliance between Paris and St. Petersburg would be disagreeable to Berlin. The two hands, once joined, squeeze all between, and if Calcutta and Teheran act together, Khiva, or Bokhara, or Afghanistan becomes about as important in the great Asiatic strife as so many Swiss cantons in a European war.
If we have formed this alliance, formed it meaning that the Indian Government, which does not understand nonsense, shall keep it, we have accomplished a grand diplomatic stroke ; if not, we have merely fidgetted ourselves to give an Asiatic Prince a little higher welcome than his due, and to give genuine pleasure to at least six millions of our own Mohammedan people.
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