plagues of Fort Detrick The Germ warfare

PETER J. SMITH

The activities of the Ministry of Defence chemical and biological warfare (cm) research centre at Porton Down have lately been the subjects of much controversy. But Britain's in- vestment in this field is chickenfeed compared with that of Fort Detrick in the United States, with whom Porton Down has a secrets shar- ing agreement. In this article Peter I. Smith, science correspondent of the SPECTATOR, dis- cusses the history and nature of America's CBW effort.

'Until I retired . . . I was not able to speak of a chemical or biological weapon without prefacing my remarks with the statement that the enemy might use it. I was never able to speak of the offensive, only of the defensive.' —Brigadier-General J. H. Rothschild, former Commanding General, vs Army Chemical Corps Research and Development Command.

Despite the upsurge in research over the past two decades, chemical and biological warfare (caw) is far from new. Indeed, it possesses a much longer history than that of the nuclear threat which has received by far the greater proportion of public attention devoted to weapons of mass destruction. Since to many the use of CBW appears even less humane than instantaneous nuclear extermination, the reason for the comparative lack of concern is not clear. Perhaps it is the very inhumanity of C.BW that has made its use unthinkable; but as the Vietnam experience clearly demonstrates, what at one time seems unthinkable may, under con- ditions of frustration, appear a little less so.

The use of caw began in a small way during the First World War not, we may note, with the well-publicised German chlorine attack of 1915 but with a French tear-gas attack in 1914. After the war, the United States took the lead in establishing international prohibitions on the use of caw by proposing, and ratifying, the Treaty of Washington (1922) whereby 'the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases' would be outlawed. Unfortunately, the French objected to the inclusion of clauses completely unrelated to caw with the result that the whole treaty was rejected.

A second American attempt was made with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which contained not only the earlier clauses relating to chemi- cal compounds but additional prohibitions on 'bacteriological warfare.' For various reasons, including a growing sense of isolationism and extensive lobbying by the American Chemical Society and the American Legion, the protocol never even passed the Senate.

With the Second World War, caw again became an issue with rumours that its use was contemplated by the Allies. To this, Presi- dent Roosevelt responded in 1943, in no uncer- tain terms, with what became established as the fundamental American position, and, until recently, remained so : 'Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilised mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope that we will never be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circum- stances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.' During the Second World War, caw was used by neither side.

Towards the end of the 1950s, however, it became clear that a re-evaluation of America's involvement in caw was taking place. The reason for this was twofold, relating partly to a fundamental change in government-military thinking and partly to a phenomenon well known in the scientific world—the inability of dying institutions to lie down.

As regards the latter: since the First World War, caw research had been invested in the Army Chemical Corps, an institution which, by the 1950s, had become thoroughly de- moralised, low in prestige and fearful of abolition. For years it had barely existed on small budgets derived mainly from vested in- terests—in particular, the Armed Forces Chemi- cal Association, a consortium of military and industrial executives and chemical companies, which was 'dedicated to scientific and indus- trial preparedness for the common defence in the fields of chemical, biological, radiological and related technology commonly referred to as chemicals.' The corps's low position in the national scheme of things arose because of a general abhorrence of its activities, the belief that its products would never be used, and the consequent inability of the corps to dispose of its wares.

By 1959, however, the corps had decided to reverse its fortunes; and, accordingly, appealed directly to public opinion through a campaign known as 'Operation Blue Skies.' In the midst of the nuclear stalemate arose the bright new concept of 'war without death.' All that was necessary was to incapacitate the enemy and then take over with no bloodshed, no destruc- tion and hence no lasting harm. In retrospect, the naivet6 of it all was incredible; but it worked, and the cash came pouring in from government and private industry alike.

At the same time, the corps took to adver- tising the opportunities it presented for funda- mental research. In conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences, which should have known better, a research fellowship pro- gramme was instituted. A glossy brochure list- ing opportunities for fundamental non-military research was produced and distributed. In all of this the raison d'être of the corps was con- veniently ignored. That the corps's campaign was basically dishonest is now clear, but in its emphasis on humane research there was an element of truth, and it took good care to exploit it.

Thus, while President Eisenhower was re- affirming Roosevelt's policy, other people in other places were having different ideas. A resolution placed before Congress in 1960, in wording very similar to Roosevelt's wartime statement, was opposed by the Defence and State Departments on the grounds that 'we must recognise our responsibilities towards our own and the Free World's security. These re- sponsibilities involve, among other 'things, the maintenance of an adequate defensive posture across the entire weapons spectrum which will allow us to defend against acts of aggression in such a manner as the President may direct.' But in the _course of its campaign the Army Chemical Corps had hit upon a fundamental issue which, though not quite so simple as it advertised, had also occurred to the new Ken- nedy administration. This was that, under the conditions of a nuclear stalemate, sole reliance upon the nuclear deterrent reduced freedom of action. A new and cheap weapon which would increase flexibility, especially in regard to a limited war against a smaller nation, therefore had its attractions. Thus it was that CBW be- came the beneficiary of a fundamental re- thinking of military capability.

The result of the re-evaluation of a decade ago is a current caw establishment of unpre- cedented size and scale. Whereas in the early 1950s the Army Chemical Corps barely existed on $35 million a year (peanuts, in American terminology), by 1961 the total, research.:and development budget, by now covering all three military services, had reached $57 million. By 1964 expenditures had risen to $158 million. Later figures remain classified. These expendi- tures are all exclusive of capital assets.

Fort Detrick, the United States equivalent of Porton Down, covers 1,300 acres of Mary- land with an establishment valued at $75 million. In addition to technical personnel, it employs over 700 qualified scientific and medi- cal staff. The bulk of the. research carried out there is classified, though about 15 per cent of the work performed is not so regarded and finds its way into the open scientific press. From the emergent tip of the iceberg it is possible to make a reasonable deduction of the composition of the vast bulk which remains below sea level.

Thus we know that detailed investigation has. been directed towards at least the following '1w-oriented diseases: anthrax, dysentery, brucellosis, glanders, plague and tularemia among the bacterial diseases; Q-fever and Rocky Mountain spotted fever among the ricketisial diseases; dengue fever, encephalitis, psittacosis and yellow fever among the viral diseases; and certain types of fungal diseases. Research concentrates not only upon produc- tion of the relevant organisms in militarily viable quantities, but also on their preserva- tion and packaging in convenient form for the consumer. Not only must biological weapons be highly infectious, they must also maintain their virulence during production, storage, transportation and eventual use. Thus far there is no authenticated example of the use of biological weapons, despite Chinese allegations to the contrary in the case of the Korean war. Somewhat more is known of the toxic chemicals emanating from Fort Detrick.

Although precise identities remain classified.

products range from the lethal to the merely incapacitating. As late as the early 1960s at least part of the chemical research was directed towards the hallucinatory drugs, including LSD. But when the consequences of inducing irrational behaviour in an enemy possessing nuclear weapons came to be realised, emphasis suddenly changed to compounds causing men- tal and physical .disability or paralysis.

At the present time at least four incapaci- tants are authorised for use, their effects being as follows: BZ. Interference with ordinary activity; dry, flushed skin; tachycardia; urinary retention; constipation; slowing of physical and mental activity; headache; giddiness; disorientation; hallucinations; drowsiness; maniacal be- haviour (sometimes); increase in body tem- perature.

DM. Sneezing and coughing; nausea: vomit- ing; severe headache; acute pain and tight- ness in the chest. Symptoms may last up to three hours.

CS. Extreme burning and tearing of the eyes; difficulty in breathing; tightness of the chest; stinging of the skin; running nose; dizziness; nausea and vomiting (in heavy concentra- tion). Effects last a few minutes.

CN. As for cs, with the addition of burning, itching and (occasionally) blisters.

The last three agents are classified as riot controllers, though, according to one us army manual, DM is 'not approved for use in . . . any operation where deaths are not acceptable.'

cs (a British development) and CN are known to have been used in Vietnam.

In addition to fundamental research into caw agents. Fort Detrick also applies itself to the fundamental problem of dissemination. In view of the small numbers of people exposed to infection, such classical methods as the poisoning of water supplies or injection of lethal matter into ventilation systems now lie entirely within the domain of television script- writers. Reality has progressed to the use of aerosols. Attendant upon this fact has been the necessity of instituting a whole new field of research, known as `aerobiology:

Although Fort Detriok carries out small-scale production of caw agents and develops pilot plants, the main production of weapons occurs further afield. Mass production of biological and chemical weapons is carried out at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, a 15,000-acre facility employing some 1,400 people. Toxic chemical research and production are also carried out at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland. Nerve gas, mustard gas and anti-crop weapons are pro- duced at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Denver, Colorado. Finally, Sarin, a lethal nerve gas, is mass-produced and loaded into land- mines, rockets and artillery shells at a facility in Newport, Indiana, at an estimated annual cost of $3.5 million.

Sarin, also known as GB, is of particular in- terest because it has been adopted as the standard nerve gas in the us. According to an army technical manual, it produces 'running nose; tightness of chest; dimness of vision and pinpointing of the eye pupils; difficulty in breathing; drooling and excessive sweating; nausea, vomiting, cramps and involuntary defe- cation and urination; twitching. jerking and staggering; and headache, confusion, drowsi- ness, coma and convulsion. These symptoms are followed by cessation of breathing and death . . . Although skin absorption great enough to cause death may occur in one or two minutes, death may be delayed for one or two hours. Respiratory lethal doses kill in one to ten minutes, and liquid in the eye kills nearly as rapidly.' The Sarin production plant at New- port employs 300 people, and has been operat- ing for twenty-four hours a day since 1960.

The last, but by no means least, exhibit is the Dugway Proving Ground, a site in Utah some 1,200 square miles in area where 900 People are engaged in the testing and assessment of CBW weapons. The pre- cise nature of activity here is any- body's guess, but we are assured that: 'According to Pentagon officials, there is no large-scale field testing of chemical and bio- logical agents on human subjects. Limited testing is done on volunteers at Detrick— Seventh Day Adventists who serve in the Armed Forces only as noncombatants—and occasional experiments have been performed on prisoners. But the military logic of real testing is evidently outweighed by fear of injury and contamination, and field trials are reportedly limited to animals or to non- pathogenic simulated agents.'

During the few days following 14 March of this year, 6,000 sheep within a few miles of Dugway mysteriously gave up the ghost. The army doubted very much that it was anything to do with it.

The end-products of all this CBW activity are 'chemical weapons . . . designed to meet the requirements of all services. They are available in a variety of forms from regular artillery shells to the Sergeant missile (which has a range of 139 km), the Honest John and Little John rockets, and chemical landmines. They are also available as bombs for delivery by coventional military aircraft. Detailed in- formation on delivery systems for biological agents is classified, but unclassified manuals suggest that biological weapons are available as.warheads for missile systems (for large-area attacks), as cluster bombs, and as spray tanks and .dispensers mounted on aircraft.'"

The reaction of the scientific community to United States involvement in caw is, as with all forms of military-oriented research, am- biguous. On the one hand, there are those to whom humanity is of prime importance,

* This and the preceding quotation are taken from two definitive articles by Elinor Langer, which appeared in the journal 'Science' last year.. I hare, throughout, drawn freely on the facts contained in these two articles.

'Here is the news. Those of a nervous disposition are advised to switch

and who accordingly refuse to participate in CBW research; on the other hand are those who regard humanity in the form of the American

people as the prime concern and thus take part in, or at least condone, caw research in the

name of defence. Few actively condemn it. Nevertheless, there is a growing opposition to caw prompted not so much by concern for the inhumanity of caw per se, but rather directed to the extent with which involvement in CBW has permeated the non-military scien-

tific establishment, in particular the university, or arising as a by-product of a general disen- chantment with the military stemming from the particular circumstance of the Vietnam war.

The distressing. fact is that military research in general, and CM research in particular, is

no longer limited to the military, but, in the

form of contracts awarded by the military, per-, vades the university, the autonomous research.

institution and private industry. Operations of the military-industrial complex lie beyond the scope of this article. The university, however,

presents a more clear-cut case, for the existence of military research on campus, if shrouded in secrecy, is inconsistent with the view of the university as an arena of free discussion. For this reason, one of the first battles against CBW .

was joined three years ago on the campus of the University of Pennsylvania, which was operating caw research contracts to the tune

of a million dollars a year. .At the present time, war is being waged against the presence on certain campuses of units of the Institute for Defence Analyses, a 'think tank' devoted to the study. of military planning.

In each of these cases the issue of secrecy. has been sufficient to prevent the necessity of

raising the question of morality involved, in

the presence of any military research on the campus. But in instances where university re-

search contracts awarded by the Military do not involve , classified work the issue of morality predominates. Yet as long as the research workers in question are perfectly free to publish their results tvvhich means not only free in theory, but free of the subtle pressures which engender 'voluntary' non-publication) and as long as the research is not obviously military-oriented, objection is extremely diffi- cult. To be sure, it would be cleaner were such projects to be civilian-financed; but to insist upon this is probably to take too naive a view of the world.

The more recent objection arises from the freely admitted use of both anti-crop and anti- personnel caw agents in Vietnam. According to the Johnson administration, operations in Vietnam do not contravene the Geneva pro- tocol, though to many this assertion represents merely an exercise in semantics.

Given the validity of this claim, however, in the whole range of ( OW weapons from the incapacitating to the lethal, where does one draw the line? Opposition to the use of any aw is based upon the real fear that even the iNe of anti-crop and non-lethal anti-personnel weapons sets a dangerous precedent, for the distinction bewecn lethal and non-lethal raises

a fine point in the absence of a complete understanding of long-term effects. Further- more, in the words of a resolution recently

submitted to President Johnson by a group of leading scientists, 'ca weapons . . . could be-

come far cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons, thereby placing great mass destructive power within reach of nations not now possessing it; they lend themselves to use by leadership that may be desperate, irrespon- sible, or unscrupulous.' The debate continues.