Tory chances in Scotland Geoffrey smith

'What are we going to do about Scotland', Mr Harold Macmillan used to ask Scottish Conservative MPs after his electoral triumph of 1959. He was not thinking of the threat of independence, the prospect of oil or the subtleties of devolution, but the fortunes of the Conservative Party. It was a notable example of spotting a growing problem early on. Grown it certainly has.

A fortnight ago the Scottish Conservatives held a conference at Perth that was not the most exhilarating occasion in the political calendar. That was partly because the party managers took the well-known Conservative technique of keeping any threat of controversy out of the proceedings to such a point that even some of their leading supporters were much disturbed. But it was also because the Scottish Conservatives are now widely considered to be largely irrelevant to the fortunes of the party in the United Kingdom. Their electoral performance has slumped so badly that they no longer count for much in the deliberations of the party at Westminster, or indeed in the eyes of some members of the Shadow Cabinet.

Must this be? It was not always so. Mr Macmillan was casting a troubled eye at the first fall from grace after the golden year of 1955 for Scottish Tories when they were the only party since the war to win a majority of votes and seats — thirty-six out of seventyone — north of the border. By October 1974, the Conservative share in Scotland had dropped to sixteen seats and 24.7 per cent of the vote. How had this decline come about? Part of the answer is that 1955 itself was a bit of a freak. If you see a man wobbling precariously at the top of a lamp-post the most interesting question is not why he then slips but how on earth he came to be there in the first place.

Scotland has never been a Conservative country. Throughout the nineteenth century from the 1832 Reform Act onwards the Conservatives never had a majority of Scottish seats: more often than not they did not have even half. The Liberal grip was weakened only by the split in their own party and the emergence of the Liberal Unionists, who in due course had a significant effect on the course of Scottish Conservatism. But not even in the Labour crash of 1931, when the Conservatives won fortyeight Scottish seats, did they capture quite half of the vote 'there. So 1955 was the exception, rather like those regrettably rare occasions when for a few brief days, due to a happy but quite fortuitous conjunction of events, one's bank balance gives an impressive but totally misleading idea of one's prudence. The happy and fortuitous conjuncture of events for the Scottish Conservatives in 1955 was that there was an exceptional and surprising degree of economic prosperity — exceptional in Scottish terms, that is, where the level of prosperity was consistently below that for the United Kingdom as a whole. The traditional heavy industries of shipbuilding, steel and engineering were not yet in serious decline and new light industry was moving in. This was the era of large outside investment in Scotland, especially American investment. In due course it led to the fear that Scotland was becoming a branch factory economy; with most of the critical decisions being taken elsewhere. But for the moment all seemed set fair. lit was a pleasing contrast to the years of the Depression from which Scotland had suffered so much. In other words, the Scots had never had it so good in 1955. They were enjoying their 1959 four years earlier than the rest of us.

Some ebbing of the Conservative tide was no doubt inevitable after that, though it must have been galling for the crofter's grandson that it was in Scotland of all places that he should have lost ground at the very election when he was leading his party in the United Kingdom as a whole to a victory unparalleled this .century, in that its majority was increased at the third successive election. But the loss of five Conservative seats north of the border in 1959 turned out to be more than correcting the balance from 1955. It was the start of a new trend.

Seven more seats were lost in 1964. Four more went in 1966, so that in three elections within the space of seven years Conservative representation from Scotland was nearly halved — from thirty-six to twenty. There was some recovery in 1970 when three additional Scottish Tory MPs were swept to Westminster in Mr Heath's surprise triumph. In February, 1974, two more seats were won back but another four were lost. Then, with their failure to hold five more in October, the Conservatives sank to their lowest position in Scotland for half a century — since the general election of 1923.

In this sad story of decline it is possible to differentiate two distinct periods and processes. In the. first, encompassing the general elections of 1959. and .1964, the Scottish Conservatives lost a total of twelve seats. Of these, five were in Glasgow itself and no fewer than nine were in greater Glasgow and the west broadly defined. Why then did the Tories suffer such a sharp and swift reverse in the greater Glasgow area? No doubt it was something of an electoral quirk that they should in the first Place have held seven of the fifteen Glasgow seats in the early and mid 1950s. But just to point that out is not sufficient explanation. There were three other reasons, two of more particular significance in that area and one more general. The first was housing. There was the trend, by no means confined to Scotland, for people to move out from city centres to housing estates on the periphery. Those doing so were more likely to be the younger, more thrusting members of the middle class whose departure. from constituencies nearer the city centre would be a blow to the Conservative cause there. This was certainly an important factor in the loss of some hitherto Conservative constituencies. But not all of those who moved fit MY description — as a visit to some housini estates on the periphery of Glasgow Nvoula quickly confirm — and in any case the movement of population cannot explain the

drop in the total Conservative vote, .

A still more important feature of Scott's!' housing in political terms was the very high, proportion of new building that was carrieu out by local authorities. A quarter of the Scottish housing stock was rebuilt during the years of Conservative rule from 1951 t° 1964, ten houses by public authorities for each one by private enterprise — a verAY different proportion from . England. glance at the figures from Glase emphasises the point. In 1958, the earliest year for which comparable figures are available, 33 per cent of all housing in the, city was provided by public authorities: 3; per cent being municipal housing and 2 P.el cent the work of the Scottish Specia Housing Association. By 1966 the proP°I.,; tion provided by public authorities ha", risen to 42 per cent and last year it was per cent. As a rough calculation it is fair tre say that the percentage of Glasgow PO? t housed by the local authority must have luso about doubled between 1955 and now, lit that the council has become the landlordi° most residential property in the city. Local authorities have to operate with_e the limits set by central government and tnof massive house building progranune ct Scottish local authorities was giving efie.,c to the housing policy of Conservati:is governments during the earlier part of t" he period. But, that is naturally not how / individual tenant sees it. Most ineap authorities in Scottish urban areas pav,: been Labour, and it was their couned10'. and officials who seemed to be the benefaict: tors. As one Conservative councillor puts r It was always the socialist who handed ove., the key'. Nor was it simply an illusion the suppose that Labour councils were friends of the municipal tenant. Conservn.. e tive governments may have applauded largo building programmes, but not the low ren that were and often still are charged in parts of Scotland. The lucky occupant Scottish council house had reasons ol s°"0 stance as well as sentiment in Oti/1„1 Labour, even if some of those reasons substance were not in the wider public interest.

There was another factor in the decline of Conservatism in the west of Scotland, though it is spoken of much less and the Precise weight to be attributed to it is much harder to determine. Good judges with direct, practical political experience in the greater Glasgow area differ as to its importance, but the religious connotations that Previously attached to the word 'Unionist' were certainly a factor in the past in Persuading Protestant working-class voters in that part of Scotland to give their support to the Conservative cause. I have mentioned earlier that the Liberal grip on Scotland was weakened only by the emergence of the Liberal Unionists from the split over Gladstone's Home Rule Bill. In 1912 the Scottish Conservatives merged With the Liberal Unionists to form the Scottish Unionist Association. At that time and for some years to come there could be no doubt of the meaning of 'Unionist' in that context. It denoted opposition to Irish

home Rule and sympathy for the Protestant cause in Ulster. Between the wars the title 'Unionist'

came to be used in a different sense — as part of the let all men of goodwill come t9gethe1: we unite, our opponents divide' line of argument that has often been an ImPortant ingredient in Conservative thinking. "g More recently the word has been recalled into service by those who proclaim their attachment to the union between ,Scotland and England, and often their Delia that this union would be placed in Jeopardy by fickle minds who are prepared `° Consider some scheme for parliamentary devolution. r So Unionist has come to mean different things at different times in different parts of Scotland. But in some parts of the greater Glasgow area it did signify, at least in the 9505 and probably the earlier part of the ,1960s, a cause that could override class loyalties in the minds of some Protestant w orking-class voters. Nobody with any knowledge of Glasgow politics could doubt at the religious factor has been an important element there. The extent to which the association of Unionism with the politics of Northern Ireland used to help the Conservatives actually to win seats is hard to determine — it may have been most important in those seats which they could not win. But the fading away of this particular factor .".; Partly because of events in Northern

Ireland, partly because a new generation of Conservatives has refused to play the

Orange range card — may reasonably be thought to have contributed in some measure to the Party's declining appeal to the workingclass voter in west central Scotland.

The other factor in the decline of Conservatism north of the border, which was not

Fonfined to any particular part of Scotland, IS that the party has been much less broadly based socially than in England. This was of especial importance in the second phase of the descent from 1955. This second phase

began in 1966 and was continued in both the 1974 elections, when the loss of seats was not in the greater Glasgow area but was more widely spread geographically. The setbacks were particularly severe in the north-east.

In a number of the seats that fell the candidates were widely felt not to be closely identified with local people in the constituencies. They were Scotsmen, but the impression they conveyed was as representatives of the English ascendancy. This has over the years been a frequent complaint against Scottish Conservative candidates, especially in sensitive seats — though it is only fair to add that there has often been a difficulty in the past in persuading the strongest potential candidates to come forward: it is not easy to combine life at Westminster with a professional or business career in Scotland. But the complaint has not been against candidates alone. The leaders at constituency and local level do just as much, especially in small towns and rural areas, to present the face of the party to the public. If they seem aloof or unrepresentative, then so does the party.

To take one example: in the mid-1960s a meeting in a Highland constituency was addressed by an experienced MP, who found that neither he nor the party's agent for the Highland region was invited to a party that the local chairman was holding afterwards for his officers and friends. In itself the episode may seem trivial. All of us have been discomfited on occasion by our failure to be invited to some party whose success seemed positively to require our attendance. But as an indication of attitudes it was significant.

This failure to present an impression of a modern, relevant party has worried the more thoughtful Scottish Conservatives for a good many years. It may have been one reason why a number of them embraced the policy of devolution in the mid and later 1960s. That would at least show that the party could recognise new trends and had its roots in Scotland. But just as success breeds success in politics as in other walks of life, so defeat breeds a sense of defeat — and introversion. Scottish Conservatives lost the will to win and the expectation of victory. Why bother then to change the local leadership with all the unpleasantness involved? Why not coast along? The trouble is that meant coasting still farther downhill. As Leader of the Opposi tion in the 1960s Mr Heath took an unusual interest in Scotland and was rewarded with a modest improvement in the party's fortunes there in 1970. But then as Prime Minister he was diverted by other problems, nothing was apparently done about the commitment on an assembly and Scotland seemed to slip down the list of priorities. In financial terms the party had always depended quite largely on a few generous contributors, and with the deaths of such men as Lord Fraser of Allander (the first Hugh Fraser) and Sir Hugh Stenhouse the money was running low. Organisation inevitably suffered: there used to be a full-time agent for nearly all the seventy-one constituencies, now there are only about twenty. So, for financial reasons, the party has been forced to propose giving up much of its independent status and plugging in more closely to Central Office in London — a move that may be necesskry but has provoked dispute at the higher levels of the voluntary side of the party in Scotland.

So what does the future hold? Just further progress down the path of woe? Not necessarily. The Conservatives did reasonably well in last month's district elections and are expecting to win back some seats at the general election: about half a dozen is the favoured guess among the party cognoscenti. There are three factors now working in their favour. Most important, there is the general United Kingdom trend against the Government: it is not only the SNP who can expect to benefit from that in Scotland, Secondly, the face of the party is changing. The English ascendancy is in decline. Those coming to the fore in the constituencies now are more representative of and in touch with the local people — though this may be less true in parts of the greater Glasgow area. Thirdly, as the Scottish political pattern has become more fragmented so prospects must improve for a party that can hold on to about one third pf the total vote. The Tories did not even manage that in Scotland last time, but opinion polls have suggested fairly consistently that the Scottish electorate is now split pretty evenly between the SNP, Labour and the Conservatives. That might enable them to slip through on the split vote in one or two constituencies.

But whenever the election comes it will not herald the great Conservative revival in Scotland: • 1955 will not come again. A modest Conservative recovery is likely north of the border. That should help in installing a Tory government at Westminster, but not dramatically. Nor are Conserva tive electoral fortunes likely to be much influenced one way or the other at this stage by the party's equivocationsover devolu tion. Indeed, the case for the Conservatives taking Scotland seriously is not so much that that is necessary to win the election, but that they need strong roots there in order to form a true government of the United Kingdom afterwards.