THE WAR AND THE POWERS.
WUthe Powers attempt to intervene in our quarrel -with the Boers ? That is a question which is being very widely asked just now. If we are to answer it shortly, our answer must be: "No, but they would very much like to." But though we feel little anxiety on the subject, we are not the least surprised that the matter is being eagerly discussed at the present juncture. for there are plenty of suggestions of fcireign intervention in the air. To begin with, the foreign Press is full of rumours
a as to mysterious doings in the European Chancelleries, of exchanges of views between this and that Government, and of dark sayings by "leading diplomatists." Indeed, if we are to believe some of the Continental journalists, England is on the eve of being faced by a great coalition, which will act as the combined Governments of Russia. Germany, and France acted after the war between China and Japan. We shall be allowed, that is, to fight as much as we like with the Boers, and to win as many battles as we can, but when it comes to settling the final terms we shall be told that the Powers will not consider it consistent with their vital interests that we shall alter the status quo in South Africa. In other words, we shall be warned to leave the Republics alone. In support of the view that something of this kind is likely to occur, and that the game played so successfully against Japan will be attempted, men point to the great scale on which our military preparations have been carried on, and still more to the fact that we are virtually mobilising our Fleet, or at any rate putting the best part of it on a war footing. There would not be all this to-do, they say, unless the Government knew there was a danger of foreign compli- cations.
To deal first with the point about the preparations. We admit that the preparations are of a kind which would be excessive if we and the Boers were the only Powers in the world, but at the same time we do not think that they must in any sense be taken as a sign that the Government believes that intervention is likely. Rather we should say that the attitude of the Govern- ment might be expressed something after this manner. 'The difference between making preparations just adequate and preparations on the higher scale is not very great, and therefore it is best to do the thing thoroughly. It has besides this great advantage. Even if we got into serious trouble in South Africa we shall not, if our pre- parations are thorough, offer any temptation to foreign Powers to put unfriendly pressure upon us. They will now be able to say to -their Chauvinists : "It is true England is embarrassed, but then her mobilised Fleet and the great increase to her land forces make her stronger than ever. She is mobilised already, and could, therefore, if threatened strike with all her strength a fort- night before we could." It is clear, then, that it pays us to be ready, although there is probably no real danger.' Who can doubt that prudent men would argue something in this way, and agree to give no possible excuse for a Chauvinist wave carrying any of the foreign Powers off their feet ? But though we think that our high state of naval efficiency would be quite sufficient to keep the Powers from trying to dictate terms to us, we hold that there are other reasons even stronger which will forbid them from entering into such a scheme. To make it worth while for them to take hostile action, they must feel absolutely certain of beating us, and beating us, remember, to the ground. It must be a war of the delenda est Carthago kind' for, needless to say, they would not expect that their demands would be acceded to. We are not Japan ; and after all they do not really believe us to be effete. Intervention they know would mean a war, in which either they would fail or else the United Kingdom would cease to be a world-Power. But if the thing is argued out seriously, we do not believe that even the most excitable of foreign statesmen thinks that we should be destroyed. And for this reason. In the first place, it is more than probable that with our great Fleet and exceedingly efficient, if small, Army we should in a defensive war be able to stand up to, and beat off, Germany, France, and Russia,—granting that combina- tion possible, for the sake of argument. But even if we found the task just too much for us alone, we should have no reason to despair, for the United States would in the last resort be obliged to forbid our extinction by coalesced Europe. In her own interests America must do so. She knows that if England were destroyed, the Powers, flushed with victory, would turn their atten- tion next to America. The United States is not loved on the Continent, as she found out last year, and the moment England had disappeared the Monroe doctrine would also disappear. That doctrine has come to mean "hands off" in Mexico, Central America, and South America. We have in effect assented to this claim on the part of America, but Europe has not, and chafes bitterly at what it regards as a piece of insolent selfishness. The United States could not, then, even if all thought of kinship were thrown aside, afford to see us go under. But the thought of kinship would not be thrown aside. No doubt at this moment every official American would declare, and probably believe, that his country could take no part in any European quarrel, and that though he would be sorry to see England destroyed, it would not be right for the United States to mix herself up with the affairs of Europe. No doubt this " correct " attitude would be maintained with perfect success as long as we were victorious, holding our own, or even if we were only just holding our own. The moment, however, that we were beginning to get seriously the worst of it we believe that there would be but one voice in America. The news that we had got our backs to the wall and would be "done fot " unless help came from our own flesh and blood, would set the whole continent on fire from Maine to California, from Oregon to South Carolina. We do not want to say a word as to what was done here last year when America was threatened by a coalesced Europe, for Such action as was taken here was not taken with any idea of favours to come. America would, we fervently trust and believe, not help us because of that, but because of something far deeper and stronger. There is a tacit, but none the less perfectly clear and binding, understanding between the two peoples to the effect that, though they may have their private quarrels, and though each may do things that do not concern the other, the moment one of them really gets his back against the wall the other will be found at his side.'My brother and I quarrel : but it is my brother and I against the world.' Now the Continent knows this instinc- tively, and therefore it does not want to try a battle to the death with the United Kingdom. There is yet another reason why England will not be confronted by a coalition. It would not pay Germany to join our enemies, and without Germany a coalition would be im- possible. We may be sure that if France and Russia would not fight over Fashoda, they will not fight us over the Transvaal. We are very much stronger at sea now than we were last year, and they are relatively perceptibly weaker.
But though we entirely refuse to believe that any attempt will be made to provoke a war by the Powers playing the game they played so successfully in the case of japan, we do not think it impossible that some of the Powers may take advantage of the war to claim compen- sation. That is, Russia and France may attempt to do things which they have not dared to do previously for fear of England. It is said, for example, that France will buy Ceuta from Spain (and also possibly the Canaries) and fortify the former so strongly that it will become a new Gibraltar. She will at the same time find an excuse for taking Morocco under her wing after the manner in which she took Tunis. Russia, on the other hand, will choose the moment for arranging with Turkey that her battleships may come and go through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, though the warships of other Powers shall be excluded, for getting a large portion of Northern Persia within her grip, and also for strengthening her hold on Pekin. Very possibly something of this kind will be attempted, but it may be pointed out that it will be a very dangerous game if pushed too far. There are no doubt certain things which we should be willing enough to concede if compensation were asked for in a friendly way, but there are others which we .would- not yield. In any case, if we chose to stand firm we should have very little difficulty in defeating the plans of France and Russia. Germany does not want to see France in possession Of Morocco, or Russia made pre-eminent in Turkey. If, then, we were to say to Germany : ' If you refuse to help us now we shall let France take Morocco, and allow Russia to dominate all Asiatic Turkey ; whereas if you stand by us we will secure Asia Minor to you, and if France fights us will give you and. your Italian allies all Northern Africa from the Cyrenaic Peninsula to Cape Spartel (i.e., the whole southern coast of the Mediterranean) as a Colonial Empire,' Germany could hardly refuse. In a word, if France and Russia were to ask for "compensation" of a kind which we thought unreasonable, we could without difficulty make offers to the TripleAlliance which would put Germany, Austria, and Italy on our side. But the Triple Alliance plus the British Fleet and an army of sixty thousand men accustomed to war, and able to be placed by our Fleet exactly where they would be most formidable, would be an immensely powerful combination. Russia thinks herself invulnerable, but she has never been attacked by a great sea Power in combination with a great land Power.
It is not, however, really necessary to consider these matters, especially in regard to Russia, which is not really a Power at heart hostile to England, though owing to many misunderstandings on both sides she thinks that England is intent on thwarting her favourite ambitions, and must therefore be considered as her enemy. In reality, the only serious enemies of Russia are the Germans and Teutonic Austrians, who are the essential foes of Slav aspirations. We may feel pretty certain, then, that there will be no attempt to intervene and dictate terms on the part of the Powers, and also no serious endeavour to enforce com- pensation at the point of the bayonet. The only thing that could encourage the Powers to try to act as they acted in the case of Japan would be any serious symptoms of anxiety here. If we were to show fear they might possibly move. But there is not the slightest chance of that. The temper of our people is all the other way. It is conceivable that some harm of a different kind might be done by the conviction of the man in the street that we could safely "take on" the whole Continent. That is the only risk we run from public feeling here.
Previous page
