YESTERDAY'S MAN
Timothy Garton Ash on why
change may be too fast for the new East German leader
THE new East GerMan Party leader has the reputation of a hardliner. He rose through the apparatus of the Party youth organisation, and was then responsible for internal security. But soon after taking the top he shows signs of surprising 'pragmat- ism'. He declares there will be `no taboos' in cultural life. He allows more imports of Western consumer goods. He opens a tentative dialogue with the Protestant church leadership. Is he, perhaps, a dove in hawk's clothing?
I describe, of course, the advent of Erich Honecker. as Party leader in 1971. Now here we go again. The new East German Party leader — Egon Krenz — has the reputation of a hardliner. He rose — as Honecker's protégé — through the appar- atus of the Party youth organisation, and was then responsible for internal security. As Erich Honecker was directly in charge of building the Berlin Wall, so Egon Krenz was directly in charge of years of quiet, grey, efficient repression behind that Wall — so quiet and efficient that many people
in the West failed to notice it. Like Honecker, he was long accounted , the crown prince. Last week, as the country was convulsed by demonstrations, he final- ly got the crown. And lo, almost the first thing he did was to talk to church leaders. He eased curbs on the press. He promised a major liberalisation of travel restrictions.
Plus ca change. . . ? Well, yes and no. Yes, in the sense that Krenz is a man very much in Honeeker's image and tradition. but no because the .situation is quite different — and much less favourable. Honecker did not come to power in a domestic crisis. He had Brezhnev not Gorbachev .in Moscow. And he had not
been preceded by a Honecker. Political cards that were trumps in 1971 are grimy and dog-eared today. But yes again, in the sense that in a Leninist system a new Party leader's previous record is an unreliable guide to his future actions. In the nature of this system, the likely successor is well advised to keep his trap shut, or only to open it to mouth a sprightly version of the `Wasn't April when we began using the slogan, "It costs a bit more but it's worth it"?' Party line. If you look at what Gorbachev said before 1985, you could not have guessed how far and how fast he would go after 1985 — although there were, to be sure, more encouraging signs than in the case of Egon Krenz.
Perhaps a better comparison is with Janos Kadar's successor in Hungary, Karo- ly Grosz. Grosz's earlier record was also not very encouraging. But as soon as he assumed office he dramatically changed his tune (in this case it started when he became prime minister). The fact that he was almost entirely a careerist and an oppor- tunist, unlike Kadar or Honecker, who must both be credited with still having some convictions born of real experience, made the turning of the coat easier. He then set in motion a series of 'reforms' which acquired their own fantastic momen- tum, and, in just over a year, swept him away. Grosz was thus a 'transitional' leader in a double sense.
Could the same be true of Krenz? As with Grosz, his personal niceness or nasti- ness, 'reform-mindedness' or lack of it, are not the issue. The issue is what, in the given crisis, an opportunist functionary of that stamp will regard as the best option for self-preservation. The option of repression is made attractive by the strength and efficiency of the security apparatus he knows so well. The State Security Service — the 'Stasi' — are Olympic gold medal- lists in their game. In the summer, Krenz praised the Chinese authorities for the massacre on Tiananmen Square. Against this, there is the reluctance (although by no means absolute refusal) of the Kremlin to see such methods used. According to senior West German sources, on his recent visit to East Berlin Gorbachev clearly indicated to the East German leadership that the Soviet troops stationed in the country could not be called upon for purposes of domestic repression. Against repression there is also the potential West German reaction, which might result in a staunching of the flow of hard currency on which the East German economy already to a significant extent depends. Because of the exponential growth of popular protest in recent weeks — something like one out of every five inhabitants of Leipzig were on the streets last week — the cost of repres- sion has also soared.
All this speaks for reform. But the trouble with reform in East Germany — even more than elsewhere in Eastern Europe — is, of course, that once you start it is difficult to stop. We need an 'attractive socialism', says Krenz. We need 'another GDR', says the Metternich of West Ger- man Social Democracy, Egon Bahr. But what on earth could that be? What is the half-way house? 'The enemies of social- ism,' said Krenz in his acceptance speech, the external and the internal [enemies] . reckon to "reform" the GDR back into capitalist conditions.'
Now the curious thing is that the orga-
nised internal opposition in the GDR at this moment does not want to do that. Since the early 1970s the Protestant Church has defined itself as a Kirche im Sozialisnnts — a Church in socialism. The New Forum, and other smaller groups, generally define themselves as democratic socialists or, at most, social democrats. Ideologically, they are closer to Dubcek than to Pozsgay or Mazowiecki, although a Dubcek turned Green. They look for a `third way', a reformed system in the GDR sufficiently humane and attractive to keep people there without the Wall, but suffi- ciently different from the Federal Republic to justify the continued existence of a separate state. Ideologically, therefore, you might think that there was still a possibility of dialogue with such oppo- nents. But historically communists in general, and German communists in par- ticular, have abhorred deviant socialists most of all.
Moreover, even if Krenz were prepared to enter into serious dialogue with these groups, there is no assurance that they are representative of wider popular attitudes. Of course we cannot know how East Germans would vote, given the chance. But whereas 20 years ago it used confident- ly to be said that much of the country remained true to its Protestant, working- class, social democrat traditions, there are some indications that political opinion in the GDR may have moved `to the Right'. Certainly that seems to be true of those who have left: although they are, by definition, not a representative sample. Yet these speculations are already too far-reaching. For the question today is not what will happen in the next months or years, but what will happen tomorrow. As I write, an estimated 150,000 people have just demonstrated on the streets. of Leip- zig, and workers in an East Berlin factory have announced the formation of an inde- pendent union. An East German Solidar- ity? Even a few weeks ago it seemed unthinkable.
Meanwhile, in that extraordinary villa colony north of Berlin where most of East Germany's top leaders (including Krenz) live behind a high wall — when a friend and I asked the guard at the gate what this compound was, he replied, 'ein Objekt' there sits a sick old man who suddenly has time on his hands. What does he do? Lovingly he turns the pages of a large, expensively produced, red-bound volume, Erich Honecker: From My Life, in the Leaders of the World series, (`already published: Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. . . . In preparation: Nicolae Ceausescu, Kurt Waldheim'). Tenderly he recalls his con- versations with the series publisher and `General Editor: Robert Maxwell, MC'. But will Robert Maxwell come to visit him now? Or is it 'In preparation: Egon Krenz'? If so, Maxwell had better hurry, otherwise he might again find himself puffing yesterday's man.
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