28 SEPTEMBER 1951, Page 1

Crisis in Abadan - Unless the Persian threat to expel

the remaining British tech- nicians in Abadan is modified within the next few days it will either have to be complied with or resisted by force. The grounds on which forcible resistance could be justified are clear. To expel the technicians would be to flout the re,com- 'mendations of the Court of International Justice, by which Persia is bound just as much as is this country, whatever she may main- tain to the contrary: the British technicians are in Abadan to carry out the terms of the 1933 oil concession agreement, which, in our eyes, is still a binding international document. We have, moreover, on more than one occasion warned the Persians that we should use force to protect British lives, and British lives ,would undoubtedly be in'clanger if the Persian police and army tried a violent ejection. Thqre is thus a good case for landing troops, in Abadan to prevent the eviction from taking place. On the other hand, if force is used its precise intention must be made clear in advance. If the main object of the British Govern- ment is to avoid endangering British lives, then the best course is obviously to withdraw the technicians at once. If troops are meant to guard the valuable installations at Abadan against pilfering and sabotage, they should have been introduced there two or three months ago. So presumably force is contemplated only to underline a principle ; the principle that international agreements cannot be broken with impunity. Whether the importance of the principle outweighs the risks involved in a use bf force is a judgement that the Cabinet will have to make. It will have to take into consideration the views of the American Government, which has all through the dispute co-operated most helpfully. There is not So much reason to fear Russia's invoca- tion of the 1921 Russo-Persian- treaty, which in any case only allows Russian entry into Persian territory if Persia is made a hostile base. Indirect Russian intervention is a greater danger than direct. The most serious consideration is the effect on British prestige throughout the East of what would look like tame capitulation to the lawless demands of a small and ill- governed State. It is not finally -decisive, but it is a factor' of the first importance.