THE NASSAU CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. SEWAR.D.
THEcorrespondence just published between the English United States Governments on the recent restric- tions of the trade between New York and the Bahamas, calls up a striking picture of the conflict of national passions and international interests which the statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic have to watch and keep under strict control in the present unhappy war, and affords, too, fresh testimony to the impartiality and firmness, and also the not undignified con- sideration, with which Lord Russell has uniformly treated the Administration of the United States throughout the severe strain to which their temper and energy have necessarily been exposed, both by enemies and neutrals. It is not very easy, but it is in some measure a national duty, to place ourselves in the position of the Federal Government before reviewing that correspondence. We have never held Mr. Seward's ab- stract virtue very high. We think it obvious, both in the Trent affair and in the subject of this correspondence, that he was not prepared to cheek his own subordinates or correct their in- justice towards British interests, at all before he was compelled to do so by the urgent pressure of our own Government. He is blind up to the last practicable moment, and only opens his eyes when it becomes clearly to his own interest to see. Still, do not let us ignore the trying position in which the Administration of Mr. Lincoln stands towards Great Britain—a position which might well try severer virtue than Mr. Seward's. Nothing can illustrate this better than the correspondence now before us. We find a war Administration, the creature of the people and constantly urged on by it to a stronger policy, justly enraged against its civil foes, poised between despair and desperate hope that the great popular dream of the Union may still be realized once more, looking originally to England for sympathy in a struggle with slave- owners who rebelled in the cause of slavery, disappointed in that sympathy, and meeting with little but scorn for their mis- timed boasts and exultation in their reverses, often thwarted in their attempts to reduce the enemy by the speculative acti- vity of English merchants in running the blockade which their cruisers have established, and by the skill of English ship- builders, who have furnished their rivals with the means of destroying their commerce. And in this very trying situation they suddenly discover that a large portion of the goods, in fact destined for their enemies' support and use, are actually passing through their own bands. The English colony of Nassau in the Bahamas, not above 200 miles from the coast of Florida, is an easy voyage of less than 600 miles from Charles- ton, in South Carolina, and from other Confederate ports in the same State, whether blockaded or now occupied by the Federals. Nassau suddenly rises into the possession of a large and flourishing commerce with the revolted States, and draws its chief supplies from New York itself. Merchants in New York ship to Nassau all the goods for which the Con- federates are famishing; merchants in England send to Nassau vid New York large speculative supplies of these goods ; and the New York Consul thus actually finds himself perpetually asked for clearances for a constant and full stream of supplies for these hated foes. Of course, it is not in human nature to take such a matter easily, and it is not in Democratic human nature to take it at all without a snatch at the supplies thus asking to be handed over by way of Nassau to the people's bitter foes. The English fleet is said once to have voluntarily sold the Dutch fleet powder when its own was exhausted, in order that it might be able to renew the engagement. But that was a piece of humorous chivalry which does not suit the grim Yankee earnestness. And we cannot but admit that, however strong the international law and the treaty engage- ments may be, it cannot but be a highly distasteful effort to. the officers of an imperious democracy to grant innumerable clearances for a commerce which is obviously feeding the life of the rebellion to a neutral go-between towards whom the- popular indignation is scarcely less vivid than to the enemy themselves.
Yet this is what both international law and explicit treaty engagements require from the Customs' authorities in New York, and we do not wonder that they have been quick to in- vent all sorts of artifices, legal and illegal, for thwarting and hampering the trade. If we were reducing Ireland, and Portuguese merchants in Liverpool began to make huge con- signments to the Azores of goods which we could often trace- back to blockaded Irish ports, our Customs' authorities in Liverpool would not be sedulous to smooth the path of the Portuguese merchants and Consul there. We do not say that they would behave exactly as Mr. Collector Barney behaved at New York, who' with the true virulence of democratia eloquence, tells Mr. Chase that, "in the exercise of the discretion devolved upon me as an of/leer of the Government of a sovereign People, I have prohibited the shipment of coals and dry goods . . . . to Nassau and the West Indies and other foreign ports where I had reason to suspect, &c."—the funny bathos of which statement only brings out more clearly how strongly the popular mind was excited on the subject of this indirect trade- with the Confederates. But we do think that though nothing would be said by Englishmen about the "discretion devolved upon the Customs' collector of a sovereign people," embar- rassments would somehow be found thickening in the patk of the Portuguese merchants whom we have imagined as engaged in sending goods from Liverpool to blockaded Cork or Galway via the Azores. Still, we should not the less sup- port the demands of the Portuguese Government for the same- fair play and rigid application of treaty rights and inter- national law which we now demand ourselves for though much should be allowed, and is now allowed, by Lord Russell for the irritation of a people thwarted where they had vainly looked for sympathy and aid, there is no safety in these- matters except in the strictest self-command and rigid execu- tion of the letter of the law.
And upon the question what our treaty and international rights as neutrals are in this case, it is obvious enough that Mr. Seward does not substantially differ from Lord Russell, unwilling as he is to admit distinctly that his own subordi, nates have been either blind or indifferent to their violation. There can be no doubt that though the United States autho- rities have an international right to prohibit the export from their ports of goods contraband of war, like arms and gun- powder, or specified articles semi-contraband of war, like coals, and therefore, el fortiori, to put any limits less than prohibitive on such export of specified articles as they may think desirable for themselves as belligerents, provided these restrictions apply equally to their own ships and all foreign ships, they have no right to make vague- regulations of this kind, which will only be operative and restrictive at the discretion of the Custom-house officers, with a view to enabling the said officers to give or refuse clearances, according as they " suspect" that the articles ex- ported are or are not intended ultimately for the use of the enemy. If the exportation of contraband or semi-contraband be either prohibited or restricted, the prohibition or restriction must apply equally to all neutrals, and such restriction must be explicitly adapted to keep such goods out of the reach of the enemy, and not be liable to be twisted into a means of injuring a single neutral. Thus, when the -United States chose to prohibit the export of coal "to any port north of Cape St. Roque, on the eastern coast of South America, and west of the 15th degree of east longitude," it was strictly in conformity with international law, because this restriction was intended and adopted to keep the coal completely out of the reach of the Confederates ; but if the regulation had only given power to the Customs' officers to prohibit its export to any port within this region, which, in their discretion, they might have thought dangerous, and they had ac- tually used this discretion chiefly against a single neu- tral power, that would have been a violation of inter- national rights. In our case, too, it would also have been a violation of treaty rights, the treaty of 1815 giving us explicitly a right to freedom of commerce with the United States on the • footing of all other nations; Babied to their domestic laws and regulations, and, of course, to belligerent rights. Now, this liberty would be, in fact, for- feited if the Customs' officers had put in force against us restrictions which they put in force against no other nation. But this is, in fact, not with respect to coal, but with respect to articles in no sense even semi-contraband, what the New York Customs' officers have done. They have refused, for instance, to let packages of prints, calicoes, and dry goods be forwarded to Nassau in English ships, except under conditions which they have enforced on no other nation's ships; and in the case of no other destination. They have assumed, in fact, that Nassau was the one port of trans- shipment for Confederate ports which it was important to starve. And, instead of trying to stop the ships sailing from Nassau to the blockaded ports—which is perfectly legitimate —they have endeavoured to prevent any cargoes reaching Nassau which were likely afterwards to be transshipped for Confederate ports. This is wholly inadmissible. Even things semi-contraband ought not to be shut out at the dis- cretion of officials from any neutral port that is thought the most dangerous. There must be explicitness and adequacy between the means and end even here. But to shut out things not semi-contraband from any neutral port at all, is absolutely a breach both of our international and of our treaty rights.
There has been another form of the same illegality. The United States have undoubtedly a right to refuse clearance to all vessels bound to the blockaded ports, or to any which they have good grounds to believe are really so destined, though sailing under false papers. Nay, more, if they doubt the destination of the ship, they may exact bonds that the goods shall be bond fide delivered at the port for which the clearance is given. But once so delivered they have no further right to control their destination. The international right of a belligerent to blockade certain ports is, of course, accompanied by a right to prohibit clearances from his own harbours to those ports, and a right to punish false clearances. But when once the neutral port is reached, the engagement performed, and the goods delivered, their consigner is not answerable in any way to the laws of the country from which she sailed, and to demand any guarantee that the goods shall not be trans- ferred in bond into a ship bound to Confederate ports is to attempt to enforce a limitation entirely beyond the juris- diction of the belligerent power. Yet the New York Customs' officers have repeatedly demanded bonds that the goods shipped for Nassau shall not pass in any way into Con- federate hands, and even within the last two months they have demanded a bond that the goods shipped to Nassau shall not be bonded, but entered for consumption at Nassau, in other words, pay the duty there, which would so increase the expense as to diminish the chance of their being re-exported to Confederate ports; and in the absence of such a bond -they refuse clearances. Now, this is clearly an assumption which no belligerent power can make. It may be very mortifying to think that goods are likely to run the blockade by way of Nassau; indeed it is, of course, mortifying that any power should choose to be neutral at all ; but if neutrals are to be, there must be this risk. If it is in principle lawful to ship from New York to any distant neutral port like London, whence, of course, goods may be at any time sent back to ran the blockade, it cannot be leas lawful to send them quite as freely to Nassau, simply because that port is a few thousand miles nearer. The attempt to obtain a guarantee for their consumption in any express locality, or against their consumption in any express locality, is simply monstrous. Ill that any State can require is to know whither they are bound, and to take security that there they actually do go and are delivered there.
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