29 AUGUST 1896, Page 7

CRETE AND THE PORTE. I - 4 0RD SALISBURY has achieved a great

success. He has forced the Turk to loosen his grasp on the throat of Crete, he has secured peace and a reasonable prospect of good government for both sections of the island popu- lation, and he has done this without raising any dangerous questions or wounding any national susceptibilities. In a word, Lord Salisbury has done in Crete what he would have liked to do in Armenia. When Lord Salisbury urged upon the Powers the duty of saving the Armenians from destruction, be was told by their representatives and rulers that the task was too difficult, and that to put pressure on the Porte of the kind required might raise the whole Eastern question in its acutest form. In a word, the Powers took the line that Lord Salisbury was proposing to go into a powder-magazine with a naked light merely to help and set free a dog which was being tortured there by the ruffianly guard. It was, of course, sad to leave the poor creature to suffer, but when the risk involved in a rescue was considered, no reasonable man could doubt that the prudent thing was to leave the guard to kill the dog by inches. What was the torture endured by the dog when compared with the misery that would result from an explosion ? ' Lord Salisbury did not, of course, believe in this precious defence for free outrage, but unfortunately he could not himself get at Armenia and stop the atro- cities. Geographical considerations forbid the sending of a fleet to Lake Van. All, then, that he could do was to make a series of more or less ineffectual protests at the Porte. When, however, the tragedy of Armenia was about to be repeated in Crete, Lord Salisbury had his opportunity, and used it to the honour of England. The Powers, still harping on the powder-magazine theory, actually proposed to establish a blockade of the island, and so secure that the work of the torturer should go on without interruption. Lord Salisbury naturally refused to have anything to do with so monstrous a proposal, and- instead let the Powers know that Crete was not Armenia, but a place within the reach of England's arm. The Powers saw that he meant what he said, and they also realised that this being the case, the best way of supporting the inviolability of the powder-magazine theory was for them to join in forcing the Sultan to do what England insisted must be done for Crete. As a result, England led the Concert of Europe in demanding from the Porte the establishment of good government in Crete. Of course, such a demand was irresistible, and thus, thanks to Lord Salisbury's skill and firmness, the Cretans have been saved and the magazine has not been exploded.

We could have wished that the autonomy secured to Crete had been somewhat more far-reaching. In par- ticular we wish that the Governor had been appointed for life instead of for a term of years, or else that a hereditary Prince, as in the case of Samos, could have been set up. Again, we should have liked it made somewhat clearer that the Sultan is not, under any pretext, to have anything to do with the internal affairs of the island, but is to be confined rigidly to his annual fixed payment out of the revenue, which, in order not to wound the suscepti- bilities of the Porte, is not to be called a tribute. Still, every Constitution tends to develop according to the spirit in which it was founded, and we see no reason to suppose that the Cretan will be an exception. In all probability the Governor will be reappointed after his first five years are up, and the Assembly, free from Turkish interference and supported by an independent judiciary and civil service, will be able to render the island autonomous in all but name. When once the Turkish Army has left the island—a garrison of two thousand men is to be retained, but these are not likely to give any serious trouble—the weakness of the Turkish Fleet and of the Turkish Treasury may be relied on to prevent their reappearance. As long as the annual payment is made, the Porte will in future trouble itself very little about Crete. That is the way of the Turks. They will fight desperately, inch by inch, to, keep their hold upon a province, but when once that pro- vince has slipped through their fingers it is finished, and they make no more attempt to regain what they have lost than they do to repair a mosque that has fallen into ruins, or an aqueduct that has ceased to hold water. The remnant of Turkish authority preserved in the new Constitution for Crete will never be repaired or kept in order. It will, instead, gradually waste and diminish, till Turkish suzerainty will mean no more in Crete than it does in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia.

Lord Salisbury's success in Crete suggests the question, "'Would it not be possible to apply the same or similar treatment to other portions of the Ottoman Empire ? " If the spread of the "gangrene" can be stopped in Crete, why can it not be stopped elsewhere ? The nation would, wt2 feel certain, be heartily pleased if Lord Salisbury could devise a scheme for rescuing any other places inhabited by Christians. Why should not Russia, even at the eleventh hour, do something to save the miserable remains of the Armenian people ? If she were to undertake the task, she would receive the sympathy of this country, and no attempt would be made to set up an autonomous Armenia which -might some day stand in Russia's path. It is natural that Russia should dread the creation of a bar to her progress -towards Constantinople. If, then, Russia, for reasons of her own, will not annex Armenia at once, an autonomous -province might be created, which would save the Christians from massacre, and yet not act as a barricade against Russia. In truth, the time has come when it is necessary to realise on 4111 hands that the Turkish Empire is irrevocably doomed, and that the question as to the distribution of its provinces among the Powers entitled to them must now be faced in -earnest. The statesman who first understands this, and has the pluck to act upon it, is the statesman who will in the end achieve the greatest success. Let us hope that this statesman will be Lord Salisbury. Of course, we fully realise the danger of a scramble, but we do not lessen the danger of a scramble in Dame Europa's school by pre- tending that the back and sides are not breaking away from the apple-cart when it is palpable to the meanest capacity that the whole structure is on the point of collapsing. Under these circumstances, the wise thing to do, and the thing most likely to prevent a row, is for a couple of the bigger boys in the school to settle who is to have what, when the great smash comes. But England and Russia are just the boys to settle the matter. Why should not Lord Salisbury and Prince Lobanoff arrange a scheme between them, and leave it to the rest of Europe to accept their plan ? If they deal equitably with Austria and Italy, and are reasonably generous to the smaller Powers, there may be grumbling, hut there will be no resistance. Nobody is going to try a -coalition against Bussia and England, especially when they are in the right. Depend upon it, this plan of the two tig boys settling the distribution of the apples by them- selves is far tetter than the plan of arranging for a public .meeting of the school. That would be certain to end in blows. What is wanted is for some one to give Europe a lead, and in our opinion Lord Salisbury and Prince Lobanoff are just the men to give that lead. No doubt Russia's -opinion on doubtful points should predominate, because she is the Power most interested. We cannot profess to have the interest, either in the European or the Asiatic Trovinces of Turkey, that she has. Russia, then, may to -a great extent call the tune. If it is reasonably fair, as it -ao doubt would be, we should endorse it, and then the rest of Europe should be asked to acquiesce. Probably -we shall be told that things could not possibly be managed in this way, but unless we are greatly mistaken this is the way in which all great changes are managed. For months—nay, years—things look hopeless and impossible ; then two statesmen meet across a table, take rough notes on half a sheet of letter-paper, and the thing is done.