FRANCE IN EGYPT.
THE foreign policy of France at the present moment is one of the most curious studies of a chameleon-like Foreign Office ever submitted to the eyes of politicians. Again, in a single week, everything has changed. Last week, M. de Freycinet was all eagerness to act with England in the pacification of Egypt. This week, he is all reserve,—will co-operate with us, if he is allowed, in protecting the Suez Canal, as that is a small work without danger, will not co- operate with us in pacifying Egypt generally. koreover, the Senate snubs him by the Report of its Committee, even while it proposes to vote the small Naval credit which the Chamber has already granted, and the Committee of the Chamber has rejected the Suez-Canal credit, though it cannot make up its mind as to the exact principle on which its rejection is founded. It will not adhere to non-intervention. Still less will it adhere to the principle of a thorough-going Anglo-French alliance. It only knows that, on the whole, it dislikes the credit, and prefers the policy of keeping out of fresh international responsibilities altogether. Whether the Chamber will follow its Commmittee in this matter is another question, depending greatly, no doubt, on the character of M. de Freycinet's communications to it to-day, when the report is to be discussed.
The explanation of this curious relapse into timidity is plain enough. The Conference, contrary to the expectations formed last week, has not authorised France and England to act as mandatories of Europe, though our own Foreign Office can assure us that we at least have the cordial support of Europe in the task we are undertaking. M. de Freycinet is only expressing the almost unanimous tone of feeling in the French nation and Parliament, when he declines ostenta- tiously any task likely, in his own estimation, to hamper France, in case any of the great Powers of Europe should desire to involve her in fresh quarrels. His view is very frankly expressed, though it does not seem to be quite as ostentatiously timid as that of the nation at large. He estimates that what he could properly do at the request of Europe,—which means, for him, Germany and Austria,—he could not afford to do without that request. If he accepts the duty of helping to guard the Canal, it is only because he thinks it so limited a task that it would not hamper him in ease of a European quarrel, or if in some minute degree it did hamper him, would not hamper him so much as it would aid him by engaging the good-will of England on his side. But there is a large party in the Chamber of Deputies, as we have seen, who go even beyond this point of timidity, and decline to have anything to say to the protection of the Canal, so long as Germany keeps her present impressive silence, and appears to them to be on the watch for an opportunity of springing on the back of an over-burdened foe. M. de Freycinet, cautious as he is is hardly cautious enough for the Chamber of Deputies. He does not conceal that, though he would be very glad to assert French influence in Egypt, he dare not do it while Germany and Austria appear to be watching for an opportunity of using Mahommedon power to weaken France. He does not deny that though he would like a strong English alliance, he hardly hopes for a strong English alliance on any subject in which England's own interests are not identified with the interests of France, and avows plainly that even the strongest English alliance he could hope for would not compensate him for uniting the two great German Powers against France. And yet, frank as he is, he is not so frank on these points as to win the full confidence of the Chamber. The Deputies think him almost foolhardy for proposing so much as to touch the responsibili- ties in Egypt with a single finger. They follow M. Garabetta so little, that the idea, of a thoroughgoing alliance with Eng- land is rejected by their representative Committee by a majority of two to one. They are, apparently, almost over- whelmed by terror lest, with the Tunis difficulty already on their hands, they should accept any fresh burden, with so lynx-eyed a foe as Prince Bismarck watching for the oppor- tunity of springing upon his handicapped rival. Nothing, pro- bably, would have induced many of them even to think at such a time of intervening in Egypt, had they not feared that a fanatical Mohammedan movement in Egypt would imply fresh difficulties of a very serious kind in Tunis. But even the prospect of these difficulties will not induce them to help in putting out the incendiary fires they regard with so much alarm, while the German sphinx looks on grimly, with cynically-com- pressed lips, declining to give a distinct sanction to anything they propose to do. This absolute paralysis of France under the frown of Germany is quite the most remarkable fact of the political situation. No doubt, the advance made to Italy by the re- quest that Italy will join in the protection of the Suez Canal, is one of its results. Hitherto, Italy has held aloof in great displeasure at the Tunis expedition,—a displeasure which has, in some degree, been extended to England, since the English and French Control in Egypt appeared to make light of Italian interests in the Levant. Whether the proposal to give Italy a share in the protection of the Canal will in any way appease the Italian people remains to be seen, but a strong alliance between France and Italy, useful as it might prove to France, is hardly possible as yet, so much has Italy been taught to depend on Germany for her European position, and so unfavourable are the Foreign- Office traditions of France to any cordial co-operation with the kingdom whose rise French statesmen united to consider so terrible a calamity to the French. At the same time, unless France is to wait till her people and her armies recover the self-confidence which was BO utterly extinguished in 1870, the only remedy for the present paralysis appears to be a more cordial alliance between France and Spain, and France and Italy, to supple- ment the good understanding between France and England. At present, there is something quite pitiable in the somer- saults of French foreign policy. The breath of Germany is all omnipotent, and even the silence of Germany is interpreted as the most ominous menace. With Russia paralysed by her Nihilists, with the Porte hesitating between ,a European and an Eastern policy, and with Austria intent on conciliating at once Germany and the Porte, and, worst of all, with France robbed of all belief in her own genius, only England and Germany at present seem able to have a foreign policy of their own at all. England is free to take her own line because she is impregnable at home, and Germany is free because, with Austria acting as her lieutenant, she can command the great battalions of Europe ; but France is, for the moment, almost a cypher in the world. What with her unlucky obligations in North Africa and the overwhelming diffidence inspired by her collapse twelve years ago, she appears able only to wheel round and round, brandishing her sword in the face of the world, as one who is always dreading the appearance of some mighty antago- nist,—an antagonist who nevertheless, keeps his own counsel, and enjoys the dread Which he takes no pains to provoke, though he carefully avoids anything which might tend to lay it to sleep.
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