The Autumn Re-shuffle POLITICAL COMMENTARY
By ALAN WATKINS
LESS than four months after he has won a crushing electoral victory, Mr Harold Wil- son's security of tenure, or lack of it, as leader of the Labour party is being openly talked about. I say 'as leader of the Labour party' rather than 'as Prime Minister' because it is in these terms that his position tends to be discussed. Mr Wil- ion, it is admitted, may be a dab hand at deliver- ing solemn television broadcasts from Downing Street (looking more distinguished, and showing more shirt-cuff, with every broadcast). He may even be quite good at winning elections. But what precisely is the point of winning elections and having a Labour Prime Minister if he turns out lo be more Conservative than the Conservatives? For the first time since October 1964 this question is being asked not merely by observers of the passing political scene but by those who are actively involved in it.
And the answer, though vague and hesitant and tentative, is not wholly reassuring to Mr Wilson. True, he still has his admirers. The fact remains,' writes one of them, 'that Mr Wilson acted with courage and fortitude. For in essence he has repudiated the philosophy of his party since it became a political force in this country.' Thus Mr Harold Wincott in Tuesday's Financial Times. Mr Wincott will, I am sure, understand perfectly if members of the parliamentary Labour party cannot share his enthusiasm.
Mr Wilson, then, has a difficult six months, even a difficult year, of political management ahead of him. He has to keep his ministers happy, and he has to keep his back-benchers, if not exactly happy—that would be too much to ask—then in a state of reasonable complaisance, The two objects do not invariably coincide. Take, for example, the question of a Cabinet re-shuffle. A re-shuffle is any Prime Minister's method of giving an appearance of life and vigour to his government. If the measures cannot change, then at least the men can. But it is a method that must be used with circumspection. Ministers who are downgraded, or dismissed, harbour grudges. Back-benchers, on the other hand, are fond of re-shuffles. Hour after hour they sit by the tele- phone, waiting foi it to ring. When it does not ring, they too harbour grudges. Really it is all very difficult, as Mr Wilson is well aware: in the past twenty-two months his general policy has been to let sleeping dogs—the expression is not, alas, wholly metaphorical—lie.
But all the present signs are that in the autumn (whether immediately before or immediately after the party conference) the Prime Minister will reluctantly and with a heavy heart make some fairly substantial changes in the Govern- ment. Looking back, it would have been better if those changes had been made when the new Government was assembled after the election. In the event, Mr James Callaghan, Mr George Brown, Mr Michael Stewart and Mr Herbert Bowden all stayed at their posts. Of course, it is too much to claim that if there had been changes, particularly at the economic ministries, the present crisis would not have arisen. Never- theless, there was a case either for a reorganisa- tion of the functions of the Treasury and the DEA (possibly on the basis I outlined last week) or, at least, for one fresh economic minister. Today the case is even stronger.
We may begin by considering the situation of Mr Callaghan. One attribute he has always pos- sessed is a well-developed sense of political self- preservation. `I find,' he is said to have remarked on one occasion, `that if you do the right thing, it always turns out best for you in the end.' At any rate, during the election period (even, pos- sibly, before) Mr Callaghan began to believe in personal political terms the Chancellorship of the Exchequer was something of a wasting asset. There is, indeed, a great deal to be said for this belief. The Ministry of Agriculture used to be spoken of as our principal political grave- yard : but in truth there is a much better case to be made out for the Treasury. Mr R. A. Butler, Mr Peter Thorneycroft, Mr Derick Heathcoat Amory, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Mr Reginald Maud- ling . . . where, in the words of the well-known newspaper feature, are they now? Admittedly Mr Harold Macmillan is an exception in that he went on from the Exchequer to Downing Street; but he was Chancellor for only a single budget. And, again, it is surely not a complete coincidence that neither of the present major party leaders was ever at the Treasury.
The management of the British economy, in short, has a well-established tendency to depreciate the reputation of the manager at any given moment. This Mr Callaghan realised. But if he was to leave the Treasury, where was he to go instead? Some friends suggested that he would make an absolutely splendid Lord Presi- dent of the Council and leader of the House; a solid, competent, reassuring, Morrisonian figure. But no : Mr Callaghan, while confessing the attractions of the idea, thought that on the whole the leadership of the House was an appropriate post in which, full of honours and sleep, to spend his declining years (assuming that, in the mean- time, he had not received a summons from the Palace). The job on which Mr Callaghan im- mediately had his eye was the Foreign Secretary- ship; but unfortunately Mr Wilson showed no disposition to shift Mr Stewart; and so the matter rested.
We should not assume that the matter will continue to rest. To quote Mr Harold Wincott again : 'As and when this deflation bites, there can be no night of the long knives in the Cabinet in an attempt •to restore the Government's popularity. This will go down in history as Mr Wilson's, not Mr Callaghan's, deflation.' From which I conclude, with respect, that Mr Wincott does not know his Wilson. At the moment, cer- tainly, Mr Callaghan is in a strong position inside the Cabinet. In due course, however, the un- popularity of his measures will begin to attach itself to him. It is therefore in his interest to leaVe the Treasury as soon as he decently can. And one idea which is now being convassed is that Mr Callaghan should indeed go to the Foreign Office. The Treasury would then be taken over by Mr Anthony Crosland or, more probably; Mr Roy Jenkins. Mr Stewart would be prevailed upon to return to one of the home departments—the Home Office dr Housing or Education.
Now we come to the moment for which we have, or ought to have, been waiting—the entry into our story of Mr Brown. There are two assumptions which can reasonably be made: that Mr Brown will not be downgraded and that at the same time the present political relation- ship with Mr Callaghan cannot be allowed to subsist indefinitely. If, therefore, Mr Callaghan goes to, say, the Foreign Office, Mr Brown can happily remain at the Department of Economic Affairs. But if Mr Callaghan stays at the Treasury then something must be done about Mr Brown; and the only posts which would seem to be suit- able for him are the Foreign Secretaryship or the leadership of the House, combined naturally with the Deputy Premiership. The situation can be put in a slightly different way: if there is to be any question of reorganising the DEA as a de- partment subordinate to the Treasury, Mr Brown will have to be shunted upwards or sideways. For while Mr Crosland or Mr Richard Crossman (whose claims to the DEA were canvassed at election time) could be approached to work under the Treasury, Mr Brown could not.
The evidence suggests, however, that at present there is no intention of compromising the independence, such as it is, of the DEA. Las week, it is true, Mr Brown withdrew his resigna- tion not so much because of any promises from Mr Wilson as because of the demonstration of affection from the parliamentary Labour party. (It appears that after Mr William Rodgers, who initiated the demonstration, had seen Mr Brown earlier on Wednesday evening he was convinced that resignation would be the outcome.) Never- theless, the DEA, though its primary function may have disappeared, will be able to keep itself fully occupied in the coming months. First of all the national plan, like Communist history, will have to be rewritten. Then it seems that some detailed work will be attempted on the degree of unemployment which will afflict particular areas, and the methods by which the unetrnloved can be 're-deployed.'
But above all there is the operation of me wage freeze. The Prices and Incomes Bill is to be modi- fied to give powers to penalise trade unionists or employers who break the standstill. The Bill is also to be changed to give legal force to certain recommendations of the Prices and Incomes Board. This second modification is intended to operate particularly after the six months period has ended and certain limited increases are per- mitted. Who better, ministers ask, to handle these difficult ' and delicate matters than the original brother from the branch, Mr Brown? Actually I can think of several, but let that pass. Yet whether under the direction of Mr Brown or of anygne else, the DEA's real political function is to be a symbol of hope; a reminder, like an empty, dust-gathering cham- pagne bucket in a time of prohibition, that happier days may lie ahead. And at present the party certainly needs a symbol of something. Certainly, Mr Wilson himself does not begin to provide it. Which brings us back to the point at which we started.
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