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THE MARCH ON INDIA.* IT is a far cry to the year 1499 of our era, yet from that year dates the Russian advance across Asia. Two frontier Governors crossed the Ural Mountains in the depth of winter in dog-sledges, slew fifty Samoyedes, and captured a number of reindeer ; it was thus a mere raid, and was made, of course, as have been most of the Russian advances since that date, without orders from the Central Government. It was an answer to many a like raid of those nomads of the Golden Horde whose yoke Ivan the Great overthrew a few years before. But the rolling back of the Golden Horde into Asia was followed by the advance of the Russians, and that movement has formed as great and integral a part of Russian history and policy, as the colonisation of America and the conquest of Canada and of India has been an intimate and necessary part of English expansion. Nor was it thought necessary, in this early period of the great Asiatic march, for the Gortchakoff and the De Giers of that day to apologise for each separate advance, and declare that a punitive expedition only was intended, to be followed, of course, by immediate evacuation.
Peter the Great hearing gorgeous accounts of the gold to be found on the Amu Daria, despatched an expedition to Khiva and Little Bokhara. The Khivan expedition on reaching the Khiva Oasis fell into a trap, and its members were all killed or sold into slavery. The Little Bokhara expedition cannot be said to have altogether failed, as it began that chain of forts on the Irtish, afterwards extended across the Ishim Steppe to Orenburg. It did not achieve its object, though it built a few forts. A later expedition advanced up the Irtish, and very nearly came into collision with the Khan of Dzungaria's army, which was watching the frontier against the Chinese. So that even in 1720 the ultimate rivals in Central Asia were nearly brought face to face.
The next move of Peter was to secure the shores of the Caspian. He found some pretext for attacking the Shah, and was starting for that purpose when the Afghans invaded Persia; whereupon Peter announced his intention of assist- ing the Shah. The Russians occupied Derbent and Baku ; and the upshot of the whole matter was that the Shah had to sign a treaty ceding Mazanderan, Ghilan, and Astrabad to his friend. It is unnecessary to dilate on the importance of Astrabad. Peter realised it, and also the importance of holding the steppe of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, to the east of the Ural River. " Their steppe," he said, " is the key and gate to all the countries of Central Asia." The conquest of these Kirghiz compensated for the recovery by Persia of Mazan- deran, Astrabad, and Ghilan, by the treaty of Resht, and these are still Persian provinces.
Now we come to the Eastern advances of Russia. Khiva
was the first object of Russian aggression, and this design had to be postponed in the earlier part of the century owing to the Napoleonic wars, the war with Turkey and Persia, the Revolution which drove Charles X. from the throne, and the Polish Insurrection. Bat in 1839 the conquest of Khiva could no longer be delayed, and the Czar issued orders for its invasion, the pretext being the unruliness of the Kirghiz, due, it was said, to the encouragement of the Khivans. That the Khivans were to blame is true, but the Rus- sians were equally responsible. One of their writers declares that the Orenburg authorities tried formerly, by every possible means, to prevent the wandering Kirghizes from adopting a settled mode of life, and pursuing agri- culture, being afraid that cattle-rearing would be neglected. Another Russian writer quite confidentially wrote that what- ever disturbance took place "our enemies are always to blame." So the Steppe was intentionally misgoverned, and the general turbulence fomented, till it was time to cry out for the release of the Russian slaves in Khiva. At first the expedition was to be declared a scientific one to the Aral • Russia's March towards India. By " An Indian Officer." 2 vols. With a Map. London ; Sampson Low and Co. Sea, but this rather thin disguise was not adopted, and a frank enough Orenburg proclamation was issued. However, the expedition was a failure. The next advance was a mission to Bokhara, which was also a failure, as the Ameer, friendly to the Russians while the English were at Cahn!, when disaster overtook us would have none of the Russians, and they departed soon after the murder of Stoddart and Conolly. At this same time Ashurada was occupied by the Russians, and though Lord Aberdeen protested, Ashurada, which was as much a part of Persia, says the Indian Officer, "as Hayling Island is of England," remains in Russian hands.
Till a year or two after the Crimean War Russia was quiescent ; then, however, she began again, and attacked both Khokand and Bokhara. The great Secession War was raging in North America, and the Danish War in Europe, so that little attention was paid to the capture of Khokandian strongholds ; nevertheless, Prince Gortchakoff issued the first of those manifestoes which declared that Russia had no desire to make further advances, " that the advance then made was contrary to the wishes of the Czar and his Government, and looked forward hopefully to an era when those disturbed countries would have peace in the place of those troubles which paralysed all progress." The treatment of the cattle- rearing Kirghiz and the Pendjeh incident are striking enough comments on this diplomatic document ; but the taking of Tashkend in 1865, and the declaration of the Governor of Oren- burg that the town was a Russian province a month before Gortchakoff informed the British Ambassador that " Tashkend was to be an independent town," reduces the whole affair to a preconceived farce. But Khojend, Tashkend, and, in fact, all Khokand, was soon at the mercy of Russia, and then the Ameer of Bokhara was finally crumpled up, and Samarcand surrendered. Gortchakoff was equal to the occasion, with the Czar as " Jorkins ; " but, alas ! in 1875 the Prince had regretfully to acknowledge that "necessity and the wishes of the population compelled the Czar to retain Samarcand." As an interlude, about this time the Afghan frontier was agreed upon, and Afghanistan was declared to be outside the sphere of Russian influence ; and on this occasion British statesmen showed the only possible trace of firmness in their dealings with Russian diplomatists. Then came the occupation of Kuldja, " in perpetuity," and Kashgar was threatened. Yakoob Bey stood firm, and administered some severe rebuffs to the rather coarse diplomacy of Russian envoys, and Russia prepared to invade Kashgar.
One cannot but feel regret for the fall of Yakoob, who was a ruler of character and foresight, but what happened was undoubtedly for the peace of Central Asia. The Chinese suddenly appeared to claim their old province, and Yakoob, after a short campaign, was defeated and murdered. The Chinese occupied Kashgar, and called upon the Russians to redeem their promise of handing over Kuldja, should the Chinese send troops to occupy it. The Russians, in accord- ance with their usual custom, had actually offered to do this, without of course any idea of doing any such Quixotic thing, for no Russian promise made east of the Ural moun- tains has ever been kept,—a sweeping assertion, but one we are not inclined to forego. They gave up part, and retained part ; but the Chinese official, who signed this treaty, barely escaped with his life on returning to Pekin, and the nation insisted on the whole of Kuldja being returned. This had to be done, and thus "the door was slammed in Russia's face." But Russia had already taken a most important move which rendered her indifferent to re- verses in the Far East; she occupied Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian, and the Khan of Shiva saw that the beginning of the end was at hand. A glance at the map of Central Asia will show what a strategical point she gained. By the old route it was a far reach from Orenburg to the Province of Ferghana, across the Northern steppes to Kazala, and along the Sir Paris, By seizing Krasnovedsk she was enabled to command two routes, one over the Ust-Part steppe to Khiva, the other through Mery and Bokhara. We were quite alive to the menace to Khiva, and asked for an explanation; but Prince Gortchakoff said "the establishment would be merely a factory, which would, however, of course, require to be protected by a small armed force." It is amusing, and there must have been a vein of unconscious humour about the Russian Chancellor ; but the laugh is certainly not on our side. We never dreamt, of course, that Mery was an
object. Khiva fell, for the Russians had never any other intention, the details of the expedition being arranged as soon as "the factory was built." Immediately after the fall of Khiva, took place one of those massacres which throw discredit on Russian history. Kaufmann, die.
appointed as to taking a second place in the conquest of Khiva, determined to punish the Yomuds. The elders of the tribe had submitted themselves in the Russian camp, and had been promised security conditional on good behaviour. But Kaufmann summoned them again, and imposed a fine of 300,000 roubles to be paid in cash within a fortnight, though the Khan's Government was, by a treaty signed a month later, to pay but 100,000 of the two millions' indemnity in the first year. Moreover, Kaufmann wrote the next day ordering the officer in command to attack the Yomuds the moment they showed signs of resenting the fine or leaving the country, and to destroy them. They elected to try to escape, and this was the signal for a wholesale slaughter, which began when only four days had expired, and Kaufmann wrote again to say that if the Yomuds did not become submissive they were to be exterminated. It was an act of brutal treachery, and some day will have a terrible retribution should Russia sustain a great reverse; indeed, much of her Central Asian policy has been that of an Asiatic rather than a civilised despotism. The annexation of Mery and the Pendjeh trouble are too recent to be more than referred to. At Pendjeh Russia made frantic efforts, now that she at last had to draw a line, to gain strategical points, delaying the Boundary Commission and massing troops, and finally attacking the Afghans.
" An Indian Officer " seems to have had access to much information of a State nature, letters and documents, that is to say, which Russian writers have made no effort to conceal, and which place Russian policy in a clear enough light. His language is guarded, and his narrative is impartially descrip- tive of Russian marches and triumph and hardship. No doubt he feels bitterly the ignorance displayed at home of the real menace conveyed in successive advances, but he readily acknowledges how often England's distraction has been Russia's opportunity ; and his narrative, though in- fluenced of course by his view of Russian objects, is calm and fair.
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