29 JUNE 1934, Page 13

Communication

Royalism in France

[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] Sta ,—Few English people can have imagined that Paris would ever again hear shots fired to cries of " Vive lc Roi ! " Yet in the riots of February• it was the members of the Royalist Action Francitise who took the leading part ; it was they who were chiefly responsible for the " little revolution " and for the changes, of .government which followed. Has the idea of monarchy, then, suddenly revived in France ? or has it never completely died out ?

There can be few Frenchmen who have not at one time or another been attracted by 'the idea of " a despot . . . a beneficent despot, naturally, a large-minded benevolent despot—in short, a despot to obey their bidding," and times of crisis have always fanned into a flame the latent enthu- siasm of the masses for leaders of this type. Sixty years ago, after the Franco-Prussian war, the National Assembly offered the throne of France. to the Comte de Chambord ; and only after his refusal to accept the Tricolour was the Republic proclaimed as " the form of government which divides us least." True, the leaders of the Action Francaise of today are not descended, either by birth or tradition, from the Legitithists of 1874, and are looked upon with some mis- givings by dyed-in-the-wool Royalists. But their appeal is strengthened by the fact that they advocate a monarchy not solely on traditional and sentimental grounds, but as fulfilling an urgent national need.

The party originated during the Dreyfus case, when in 1898 a handful of Bonapartists, Royalists and Conservatives formed the Ligue de la Patrie Francaise. Its programme was simple : 'France for the French, and not for Jews or Protest- ants ; hostility to anything savouring of " Liberalism " and the democratic principles of 1789 ; and a foreign policy of the most violent nationalism. In 1908, it expanded into the Ligue de l'Action Francaise, which successfully married nationalism to absolute monarchy ; and the Action Francaise newspaper was started. The League, however, attracted many non-Royalists who were dissatisfied not merely with Republican governments, but with the Republic itself. It has always had an intellectual influence out of proportion to its size,* largely owing to the literary brilliance of its leaders, Charles Maurras, Leon Daudet and Jacques Bainville.

Maurras, the theorist, is one of the greatest living French writers. A Provençal, he combines a chilling logic with a passionate fanaticism, an aloof and aristocratic temperament with a fearless aggressiveness. He lives, owing to his total deafnesS, in an " ivory tower " apart, unaware of the bitter continents 'of his many enemies.

Leon Daudet, son of Alphonse Daudet, is the platform orator and pamphleteer. A bull-necked mountain of a man, his tremendous voice rises even above the din of the French Chamber. He is at once a scholar, a brilliant and versatile writer, and a master of Rabelaisian invective. Pompous politicians loathe and fear him, for his vitriolic ridicule has killed many " promising careers."

Jacques. Bainville is the historian of the party ; his royalism is therefore less absolute, his perspective broader, his temperament less fanatical, than those of Maurras and Daudet.

These men have provided the Action Francaise with a well- formulated programme, which recalls Italian Fascism, but preceded it by fifteen years. They assert that no demo- cratically elected government dares to look ahead, " it Spends one year in thinking of the nation and three in con- sidering its own re-election." " Democracy is evil, democracy is death," writes Maurras. Like the Fascists, the Royalists believe in " discipline and authority " ; in the Fithrer- prinzip ; in a State based on the hierarchy of an elite. They demand the complete sacrifice of the individual to the com- munity, a Gleiclzschaltung of thought and culture, and since all Who are not part of the national culture must be eliminated, they are 'fiercely anti-Semitic. Industry is to be reorganized on a corporative plan, with industrial guilds and professional *Membership is variously given as 00,000-90,000. Came!ots du Rol probably about 1,200.

representation, a programme drawn up by La Tour du Pin long -before Mussolini or Dollfuss.

They are, moreover, the - most violent supporters of chauvinistic nationalism, and during the Bloc National Government, immediately after the War, the party exercised a considerable and disastrous influence on French foreign policy.

To whom do they appeal ? First and unquestionably, to the young men of the Camdots du. Roi—groups organized on military lines. There arc not many of them, but they are adventurous and aggressive and spoiling for a fight. The Action Francaise offers them action and a programme, it demands the sacrifices they are so fiercely anxious to offer. Above all, it gives then► an opportunity of differing from the sober, anti-clerical, republican traditions of their elders.

Again, many Catholics sec in them a bulwark against the disruptive forces which they dread. But most important of all is the Nationalist alliance, for international events have played into the hands of the Die-hards. The growth of German and Italian power and prestige, the apparent failure of the Disarmament Conference, the chaos of Central Europe--all these problems make many Frenchmen feel that only a7strong and united France will insure peace. They are increasingly angry and disgusted with the futilities 'and corruption of the Chamber, and arc easily persuaded that the Action Francaise thesis --that only absolute government is government by the sum total of all interests—is the right one.

All this being so, it is surprising that the Royalists are not more numerous. Paradoxically, the party's monarchism is its chief disadvantage. It has prevented it from co-operating with Republican reactionary groups, such as the Jeunesses Patriotes, and it has alienated the peasants and artisans who had most to gain by the Revolution. Even the dictatorships of today are in a sense democratic absolutisms, inasmuch as a would-be dictator must first win the support of the people. But the Due de Guise, handsome, dignified and aloof, is not the man to rally them. It is probably true that, although its supporters arc extremely wealthy, although it commands seine of the most brilliant pens in France, although it is extremely vocal, the Adieu Francaise has little following out- side the military aristocracy and the Catholic bourgeoisie, except in Brittany and la Vendee. It is likely that its leaders itself would agree with M. Frot's remark that " he did not believe that the Action Francaise were such fools as to believe that they could put the Due de Guise on the throne forthwith."

On the whole, the Royalists remain an incalculable, yet influential, factor in French polities. In normal times they are of little consequence. But in a crisis, a sudden outburst of dissatisfaction with the defects of the parliamentary system, the discrediting of the government of the day through some scandal or obvious failure —then the Action Francaise can be relied upon to whip up the national temper to the pitch of hysteria. Such a crisis might very well raise sonic popular hero to dictatorial powers again ; and the greatest danger would seen► to be, not that the Royalists should succeed in restoring the monarchy, but that they should pull the chestnuts out of the fire for other reactionary or Fascist groups, as they did on the Sixth of February.—