The RAF: present imperfect and future indefinite

A Senior Officer

Whatever strategic posture is adopted by this country, what is certain is that there will be a major air threat with which to contend. I will not deal with the problems posed by the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile threat, as this is outside the scope of discussion on deterrence.

In any debate on the air threat to this country or NATO there is one essential difference between that posed by either naval or ground forces and that which is represented by air power. Fleets and major land formations take time to deploy. This means that the military indicators of a possible attack can be collated and assessed, and thus, we hope, the necessary political decisions can be taken in time for deployment. This almost certainly would not apply in the case of air forces, where one is faced with long-range aircraft capable of flying at, or faster than, the speed of sound. The rapidity with which air power can be concentrated puts this aspect of the Warsaw Pact military threat into a different category, thus the peacetime surveillance requirement is somewhat different from that of watching fleets and ground forces.

The air threat in which the Royal Air Force is mainly concerned is that against the Central Region of Europe, to a lesser extent against the European Northern Region and finally, against the United Kingdom itself. This threat is far larger than could even• remotely be dealt with by the Royal Air Force on its own, which is for this reason possibly more integrated into the NATO defence system than the other two services; although it is of course clear that all our three services operate within the NATO context.

The Warsaw Pact air threat can be divided basically into three, the strategic, the tactical and the defensive. Facing NATO, the Russians have over 500 mediumto long-range bomber or air reconnaissance aircraft. If required, a significant proportion of these could attack the United Kingdom from bases within the Warsaw Pact countries. Even now the United Kingdom is the subject of electronic surveillance by long range aircraft specifically equipped to identify radar frequencies, communication networks etc. The activities of these aircraft allow the Russians to see the efficiency of our own air defence systems. One aspect therefore of the peacetime contribution that the Royal Air Force makes to the overall deterrent strategy is to be seen to be at a very high state of readiness. All unidentified aircraft approaching the UK air defence zone are intercepted and identified.

The tactical threat to the Central Region is formed by over 3,300 aircraft. Many of these are what is called dual capable: they can be used specifically to give close support to their own armies, which means that they are a direct threat against the Northern or Central Army Groups, or they can be used against our own airfields and other major targets in the heart of Germany and elsewhere, in which case they became a direct threat against the NATO air forces. They can also be used in the air defence role when they are, of course, still a threat against our own air effort.

The last aspect of the WP threat is that presented by the considerable surface to air missile (SAM) armoury in operation in Eastern Europe. The last Arab-Israeli war has demonstrated the importance of the missile in the equation of air power. The importance placed by the Soviets on this aspect of air warfare is seen by the tremendous effort that they have put into electronic warfare. This in itself is a threat, in that it will affect both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the NATO air forces.

The peacetime posture of the Royal Air Force is arrived at by the interplay of three elements, the fact that we are a part of NATO, the requirement to provide the air element of those UK strategic mobile forces assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR, and the mission to maintain the integrity of the UK airspace.

Royal Air Force (Germany) is an integral part of Second Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF) and provides the Conlmander. RAF(G) will not, in war, support the British Army in Germany. At this point it is worth mentioning the proposal to integrate the Royal Air Force into the Royal Navy and the Army. From the wider NATO defence point of view, the case is very weak indeed. The full flexibility of air power can only be achieved by the concentration of air resources at the highest level. Thus, if one is to argue the case for total integration, then it would be better to go for integration of the all Central Region Air Forces. This to some extent has been achieved in the Allied Tactical Air Forces throughout NATO, but has of course fallen short of total integration for understandable national reasons.

Let us develop this theme a stage further. Air defence in NATO is concerned with the whole. The UK air defence region, for instance, is one of four air defence regions in Europe. It is completely 'locked into' the radar early warning and the control and reporting systems. The RAF close support aircraft in Germany will, in time of war, be readily available to support any one of the four Corps in the Northern Army Group. To commit then.' totally to 1(BR)Corps would almost certainly be a waste of potential air effort as well as imposing an unacceptable inflexibility on their use by Commander 2ATAF.

Assuming that the current tasks of the Royal Air Force remain, what are the sort of decisions that must be made to ensure that it remains an effective part of the deterrent strategy? One of the unpalatable facts of life is that the cost of the modern aircraft is rising with an ever increasing rapidity. The Concorde saga has been reflected time and time

again with military projects. What we re require is, not so much a series of decisions the sort of aircraft we need — after aii th are part of the normal function or Ministry of Defence — but a resolution bY politicians that these decisions, once tak aren't changed. The Air Force is still suffe from the decision to cancel the TSR2. aircraft was ideal for its task, strike (nucl„ and attack (battlefield close support). It in 1964 and the test pilot concerned said it was the best aircraft he had ever flovl. had vast development potential as weht being the most advanced of its type in world.

The MRCA, a European project, still jail service and when it does, at long last, be% operational it may not be as good as the Tv was nearly ten years ago. A great export ero tential was also thrown away but, if re if decisions are anything to go by, this is; parently not a significant factor in the pre'' Government's thinking. The point really is that the effectsq decisions taken at the political level:gt equipment concerned directly with air Pct, have consequences which are quite 04 proportion to those concerned with decisl,"or taken, for instance, on land forces. ;# example, if 1 (BR) Corps had not been equipped with the Chieftain tank, but 11„0 kept the Centurion, would the Corps be rod less effective today? If the results of 1 Arab-Israeli war are anything to go bYsti wouldn't be. The Centurion tank in the Isrdo Army out-shot all the Russian tanks 0,4 survival capacity against hits was better '? the American tanks with which the 1st! were also equipped. The effect of the TSR2 decision is stilr with us and the pod combat effectiveness of the RAF is

greatly affected by that decision. NA

The future of effective air power in • firil will only be assured by an integration dustrial and political effort. Today in 2A0 the multiplicity of aircraft, which in cases cannot ever use the same weaP inhibits the flexible use of air power. We„Illa go for relatively few aircraft which are ble of more than one role. These must be" as part of a multi-national programs only for the obvious military advantag: standardisation within NATO, but N's equally obvious economic advantage longer production runs. One area in which all the NATO allies, to the exception of the US, lag behind is WO all the facets of electronic warfare (0)01/ is particularly so in the fields of electr counter measures (ECM) and electr°i/ counter counter measures (ECCM). 1.11`01/ portance of having a comprehensive arrild of this 'black box' weaponry was..:ipl highlighted in the Middle tast war. It" a false economy to imagine that because,/ is an expensive field we cannot therefc"' ford to be in the game. In contrast to the articles on arra naval strategy I have not attempted t0 for a particular strategic posture. Basifolil this is because in the 1980-90 era the Air 411 can adapt itself to whatever strati adopted. The naval solution would aPPierl require an effective air defence system 04, United Kingdom, while the posture posttl'el, in the first article will require not onlY defence task still to be carried out but °I continuing presence to the air effort 01 Central Region. Incidentally, the RoYs'f Force still contributes a significant par,tfti overall nuclear strike plan of the t's Region and will continue to do so ford, time. However, the balance between,A) two tasks is critical. The air defence PI' cannot really take on the role of the s (nuclear) aircraft nor is it a satisfactorY support weapon system. If .decisions are oe made which may involve a major Oily our NATO stance, then we must alreaa thinking in terms of the weapon sY'

ed to implement that strategy. The sort of e-scale we must think in terms of is about ht to ten years hence.

The mission the Royal Air Force also has is Providing the strategic mobility for those formations which are assigned to CEUR as reserves. To be realistic reserves, must be capable of moving long dis'Ices at relatively short notice and they °aid be able to arrive quickly. This means efore that the Royal Air Force must .tinue to have a transport fleet capable of _rig the job. There has been talk of running 'vn this force. If this happens then the only °means of moving large numbers of troops Material will be by sea and land or by civil lines. 0 This solution, of course, has many attracIt does however, have one major dvantage; Britain would cease to have a acetime strategic force which could be uved quickly without disrupting normal eetime traffic. When we look at the uneen short notice moves of troops that taken place over the past ten years, it Uld be a very confident, or foolish, decisionOr who removed 'this capability from the laStiCS

transport element of the Air Force.

In conclusion, whatever the political defence decisions, air power is essential both to successful deterrence and to the successful conduct of war. To be in the defence business at all is expensive and there is a size below which an air force cannot fall. The Royal Air Force has its peactime mission now and this it can fulfil. Decisions taken for short-term gain have, because of the nature of air power, effects which go oil for years. The recent decision not to continue into the Super Harrier project has once more demonstrated the extraordinary blindness of some ministers as to what the real consequences to the air force are, when the UK, having taken the lead in the advanced weapons system, drops the project to others. We must continue towards commonly equipped NATO air forces, although we will probably never manage a single NATO air force. We must also remember that the balance of air power in Europe, can, by the rapid redeployment of Societ forces, be radically changed for the worse far faster than the balance of naval or land power can ever be altered.