TOPICS OF THE PAY.
MORE HASTE, LESS SPEED.
AITHEN there has been a bad motor accident, what V does the non-expert owner of the car do ? If he is a wise man, he sits quietly by the side of the road and takes great care not to interfere with the expert under the car who conducts his operations under a system of enforced secrecy. An occasional twitch of the latter's legs is the only visible sign of what he is doing. But though the wise rule is not to worry the driver, and any other experts he may have enlisted to help him, with questions, suggestions, and orders, there comes a time when the non-expert owner, with whom of course the ultimate word rests, is forced to take action. If it is imperative for various reasons to get the car once more going upon the road, and if the delays appear interminable, the owner, however unwilling, may find it necessary to bestir himself. For example, if he sees that the experts employed have ceased work on the essential motive machinery, and have got out a series of maps and are busily engaged in a heated argument as to the best road to follow if and when the car can be got going, lie feels that the time for protest has arrived. He will theme tell the experts that they must first of all get the car to go, and that any argument about the right road or the best road must be put off till the motive-power is restored. That, we are sorry to say, appears to be the situation with which the British people, and indeed the whole of the Allies, are confronted just now. The people in each Allied country ara the owners, and very wisely they began by trusting their experts and not interfering. But they are now beginning to realize that the delay is becoming a terrible danger, It is not to lw wondered at that they note with alarm that the work of getting the world into motion again under Peace conditions has been almost given up, and that what is happening under the car—i.c., in the gloom of the Conference chambers -is a discussion about the routes and systems which are to be followed after Peace is established. In fart, the consideration of what is to be done after dinner is seriously interfering with the cooking of the meal. In these circumstances, and however reluctant they may be to do it, there is nothing for those with whom the final word rests—i.e., the People of the Allied Nations— but to interfere quickly and strongly, and to insist that Peace and the restoration of the motive machinery of the world must take precedence of ideal reconstruction. The world cannot be deprived of the blessings of a settle- ment in order to make quite sure that the views of this or that nation in regard to the Covenant shall receive their full weight. There is no doubt a time for everything, but just now it is the time for Peace. That being so, those whose duty it is to express, and to help to direct, public opinion must speak out plainly, and let the Dele- gates in Paris understand that nothing, not even the most • perfect League of Nations, can compensate for any further delay in the conclusion of the main terms of Peace. As we see by the declaration of the Bolshevik Republic in Budapest, by the German refusal to allow Entente troops to land at Dantzig, and by the general confusion on the Eastern Frontier, from Rumania to Esthonia, the delay in making a settlement is proving the opportunity for the enemies of the Entente, of law and order, and of the peace and welfare of mankind. Uncertaintv—and uncertainty there must be till Peace is signed—is loosening every nut, screw, and bolt in the great world-fabric.
It is neither also nor fair, in our opinion, to attack individuals or the policy of particular States, and to repre- sent that such individuals or such States are responsible for the very unfortunate position which now exists in Paris. But though we refuse altogether to become instruments in creating friction and bitterness between the Allies, it is absolutely necessary to speak plainly in regard to the facts. Unless this is done there can be no remedy. The essential fact which has emerged is that once again undue haste has been the another of delay. By trying to do things too quickly we have produced something -like a deadlock. We have proved once more that the short cut may take twice as long as traversing the main road. Con- sidering the vast complexities of the questions and the
enormous number of conflicting interests involved, and considering also the difficulties in regard to ratification which must exist in many States, and especially in the United States of America, we can now see that it was most unwise to attempt to settle the Constitution of the League of Nations before the Peace was concluded, or even con- currently with the Peace negotiations. It ought to have been remembered that the qualities which make good creators of international Constitutions are often quite different from those which are required to make a sound Peace settlement and to restart the civil life of the world. In these circumstances it seems to us that the wise thing to do is to conclude the sanest and soundest' Peace procurable—i.e., a Peace which shall best provide against what we have always called the sowing of the dragon's teeth, the leaving open of causes for fresh wars, such as were left open by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, and to follow up this Peace settlement by the creation of a Solemn League and Covenant, to be made by the Allies, but having open doors for the Neutrals, for the new States created by the terms of Peace, and finally and under wise conditions for the admission of our late enemies.
What is the obstacle to such a course ? As we under- stand the situation, though we fully admit that our view may be a mistaken one, so thick is the fog of Pence, Presi- dent Wilson objects to allowing Peace to conic in front of the League for two reasons. In the first place, he thinks that the special policy which he has very much at heart in the mat ter of the League may be prejudiced if the Constitution of the League is thought out and argued out after Peace is an accomplished fact. According to those who claim to understand his views, his attitude, not an unreasonable one per se, might be expressed in these words : I firmly believe that I have got a plan for the League of Nations which is of vast importance to the future of the human race. Unfortunately, however, there are several States which disagree with any plan. The only way in which I can overcome this disagreement is by giving the Powers in question some quid pro quo. I can get their agreement, that is, to things about the League of Nations which they dislike, but which I think vital, if I humour them by agreeing to this or that matter as regards boundaries, indemnities, and so forth--matters to my mind of infinitely less importance than the establishment of the League on sound grounds. In other Words, if I let Peace be made before I have got nay Covenantpassed I shall spoil any hand, and shall have to enter the Convention for establish- ing the League with no assets to trade with. It is therefore not business to ask me to agree to Peace and then take my chance of getting my schemes accepted in the Convention.'
Further, we can imagine President Wilson adding : I have got a very difficult hand to play in America. The American people, I firmly believe, are on my side. They desire a good Peace, but even more than a good Peace they desire the foundation of a Solemn League and Cove- nant which will make war impossible in the future. The American is at bottom an idealist,end what he cares for more than nnything else is the abolition of war. But under the American Constitution the President is unfortunately not in a position to act as a full plenipotentiary for h a country. In a sense ratification is required by the Legisla- ture in all countries, but- in most countries this is a mere form, since the Prime Ministers are only in power because they have the confidence of the Legislatures. If they could not get the Legislatures to do what they wanted, they would cease to be Prime Ministers. The President of the United States, however, has got under the Constitution a partner, though a junior partner, in the matter of Treaty- making. And here the old rule applies : He who has a partner has a master. My partner is the Senate, who in this particular matter of Peace Treaties, and indeed of all Treaties, is given executive as well as legislative functions. But this special and peculiar power conferred upon the Senate is not even conferred capon the majority of the Senate. Under a special provision in the Constitution, Treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds majority.of those present in the Senate when the voting takes place. This means that a body of Senators who number one-third of the Senate ptus one, or, if a certain number of the Senate absent themselves, possibly even a smaller number of Senators, have a right to veto any Treaty 'resented to them. Now, knowing any countrymen as I do, I am quite sure that public opinion would prevent the minority of the Kenate vetoing any Peace terms which the American Delegation and the rest of the Allies had agreed upon. America is eager for Peace, and no one would dare to place an obstacle in its way. But it is otherwise with the question of the League of Nations. There it is quite possible that a minority might insist on amendments in a carefully balanced scheme which would upset the whole equipoise and render agreement by the rest of the Powers impossible. Now the plain common-sense politics of these facts is that if the Covenant is tacked to the Peace terms as I desire it shall be tacked, there is a very great chance of my being able to overcome the right of veto of the one-third minority Elms one in the Senate, and establish, not only Peace for the present, but Peace for future times. If, on the other hand, I have to bring the Peace and the League separately and at different times before the Senate, I run the risk of the first being accepted and the latter held up. Therefore, and feeling as I do, it is my public duty to insist on Peace and the Covenant being linked together, and linked in a way which will make them inseparable.'
That, we believe, is a fair representation of President Wilson's view. We are very loth to criticize it, and we are certainly very far from regarding it as in itself a selfish or unreasonable view. There is nothing in the holding of such a view which is in the very least to the discredit of the President, either in the matter of heart or of head. At the same time, and following out our plea for plain speaking, we think that in all the circumstances it is a dangerous and an unwise view, and one moreover which is not likely to succeed. We believe it would be far better for President Wilson to agree to the plan of first making the best possible Peace terms, and then taking up once again the work of establishing a League of Nations. It is not in the least necessary to assume that because it has proved impossible to carry the League at lightning speed and in a hurry, therefore the work already done has been done in vain. Again, we think it much too pessimistic to suppose that the Powers will offer a cynical and selfish opposition to the League simply because they have got the Peace terms they want, and do not wish to part with any portion of their sovereignty. To every Power, remember, the League, if it can be established, offers a tremendous reward—the reward of being obliged to reduce its expendi- ture on Army and Navy to police proportions, and of obtaining a policy of national insurance without a premium. In these circumstances it seems to us that the practical steps to be taken should be as follows : (1) The conclusion as rapidly as possible of the establishment of Peace, and (2) the assembly of a Convention which shall quietly, deliber- ately, and without undue haste or hustle establish a League and Covenant. And here let us suggest incidentally that in the case of the United States, and any other of the Allied nations whose Constitutions require it, there should be representation, not merely of the Executive, but of any other body concerned in the Constitution with the making of Treaties. At the same time, and in order as far as possible to satisfy President Wilson's personal views, we think it would be quite reasonable that the Allies should make among themselves a special Treaty in which they would bind themselves as soon as ever Peace was made to take up at once the work of drafting a Solemn League and Covenant. They might indeed in this Treaty even put a time-limit, say of six months, for the drawing up of the Covenant. More than this, not merely to secure it still further but to make it actual, they might in the Peace terms leave over certain problems, such, for example, as the precise delimitation of frontiers, to the League of Nations contemplated in the Treaty between the Allies signed the same day as the Treaty of Peace. This would make it not only an obligation of honour but of high political con- venience, nay, necessity, to create a League of Nations, and a League of Nations which should have the power and the will to act. We should like to go further, and in the Treaty of Peace have it stated that certain territories, as, for example, the Kid Canal and a small zone on each side of it, should be handed over for ever to the League of Nations as soon as that League is established. A similar disposition should be made of Heligoland, and possibly of one or two other places the destination of which is now proving an apple of discord among the Powers. The possession of each places. if there were not too many of them, and if they were wisely chosen,' might act as a most valuable form of cement for the League.
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