29 MARCH 1946, Page 1

RUSSIA'S NO

THE withdrawal of the Russian member of the United Nations Security Council as a protest against the very proper decision of the Council to hear the case which the Persian Government had in due order put before it is a dramatic demonstration of the difficulty of combining democratic and totalitarian ideas in the realm of practical politics. The essence of democracy is that if agreement after discussion proves impossible the minority bows to the decision of the majority. That is the basis on which the United Nations has been built, and on no other basis could it survive. But that a totalitarian country, whose rulers impose their will by fiat, should bow to any majority of its fellows is a con- ception which no totalitarian country swallows easily. The greatest totalitarian country of today flatly refused to swallow it on Wednes- day. M. Gromyko's withdrawal from the Security Council when the Council insisted on discussing the Persian question does not apparently mean that M. Gromyko will absent himself from sessions at which other business is discussed, still less that Russia has any present idea of dissociating herself from U.N.O. Marshal Stalin's recent expressions of confidence in the Organisation, if the Marshal means what he said, preclude that assumption completely. None the less, it is essential that Russia's attitude should be more clearly defined. She took full part in the discussion of the Charter at San Francisco and signed it with complete understanding of what it involved. The question whether she seriously intends to honour obligations so recently contracted is vital—and the refusal to honour other specific obligations, regarding the withdrawal of troops from Persia, is not a hopeful omen.

This larger question must be left unanswered for the moment. Patience is called for as well as firmness, for it is admittedly more difficult for Russia to adapt her ideas to the democratic methods of U.N.O. than for most other members of the Security Council. The immediate question is what action can most profitably be taken in face of the situation created by M. Gromyko's action. So far the right course has clearly been followed. The proposal to hear the Persian delegate was carried, as it could not but be, by 9 votes to 2, the dissidents being M. Gromyko himself and the representative of Poland, which, where Russia is concerned, can hardly be said to have any policy of its own. M. Gromyko's plea that Russia and Persia should be allowed to continue direct negotiations was as specious as his assertion, flatly denied later by the Persian delegate, that an " understanding " had been reached between the two countries was unconvincing. Far more than the immediate issue is involved. All members of the Council (except the two dissidents) showed themselves keenly alive to the danger of leaving a small nation to defend its rights against the encroachments of an over- whelmingly powerful neighbour. This is the very situation U.N.O. was created to meet, and the outcome of the present session of the Security Council is a matter of vital concern to every nation outside the limited circle of the Great Powers. What that outcome will be is not to be predicted, for no one can say what will come of Russia's second thoughts. Actually, apart from the question of the with- drawal of the troops, there is nothing in Russia's demands on Persia, as disclosed by the Persian delegate, which could not be submitted to reasoned and peaceable discussion. But if Russia is to challenge the right of U.N.O. to act in accordance with the Charter which Russia herself took her part in framing, and in due course signed, then the challenge must be taken up, whatever its consequences. To capitulate to Russia over this would be many degrees worse than to lose Russia from U.N.O. altogether.