29 MAY 1897, Page 16

THE SEPOY REVOLT.•

GENERAL INNER'S former volume, Lucknow and Oude in the Mutiny, established for him a reputation as a writer on the history of the Indian Mutinies. He was quite right in thinking that, despite the number of volumes that have issued from the press on that prolific subject, there was ample room for a study in three hundred pages of the broader features of the war, even though he should not be able to. speak of them with the "precise personal knowledge" which bad made his account of the Siege of Lucknow so valuable.. Alas ! the number of those who have taken the pen in hand in order to distort the facts, and to misrepresent the fair inferences from that wonderful story of tragedy, heroism, suffering, and achievement, has been great. We cannot precisely say that all parts of General Innes's volume seem to us of equal value as to the clearness of the picture which they give of the events of that terrible time. Probably in the hands of any one the earlier period—that which is by General Innes spoken of as the periods of " the origin " and " development" of the revolt, and of " the vital struggle" which covers the time prior to the arrival of the firs: reinforcements from England—would, from its dramatic character and the concentration of interest on a few definite spots, be more attractive as a story than "the decisive contest" and "the suppression of the revolt,".--that is, the time when the war was directed by Sir Colin Campbell, and involved the greater part of Northern India in the field of its operations. Bat in reading General Innes's history it seems to us that there is more than this difference between the value of the first two- thirds of his work and of the latter third. In the first portion his historical style and his philosophical and political, reflections on the causes which tended to produce events seem• to us alike vigorous, convincing, and often brilliant. The. latter third shows traces both of baste and indifference.

It was, perhaps, almost inevitable that any one who was in India in those days should, if he held to the one, somewhat despise the other of the two great Lawrence brothers. We cannot, however, help thinking that the genius of the elder brother is now so firmly established as an historical truth, that, though General lanes is distinctly a follower of Sir Henry's, yet in the main his judgment on his powers and actions is pretty nearly that which history will pass upon him. No one has, so far as we know, within equal space brought out so effectually as General Innes the splendid statesmanlike prescience, the organising power, and the capacity for attaching the natives to English rule, which made the services of Sir Henry so potent among the causes which prevented the Mutiny from involving the loss of India. On the whole, justice is done to Lord Lawrence when credit is given to him for the fact that it was he who bad to take the responsibility of denuding the Punjab for the sake of helping the besiegers of Delhi. He acted only, General Innes believes, after much delay, almost against his own judgment, under the vigorous pressure of Nicholson, Edwards, Chamberlain, and Cotton. General Innes at all events contrasts with very powerful effect the way in which the outbreak of the Mutiny justified the political forecast of the soldier-brother and rendered doubt- ful both the action prior to the war and the judgment of the brother who had, as a Civil servant, superseded him in the government of the Punjab. This is the more remarkable because General Lanes has brought out, more logically and effectively than we have elsewhere seen it, the fact that though ultimately it was chiefly with a mutiny that we had to deal, yet that there was very • The Repoli Revolt: a Critical Narrative. R3 Mout. General McLeod lune*, O.C. London z A. D. lanes and Co.

considerable danger at one time lest it should be no mere mutiny, but a general insurrection of the Indian Princes and people. Prom that we were saved by the precipitate action of the Mogul party in seizing upon Delhi and proclaiming the authority of the effete Emperor. General Innes has admirably brought out the effect which this had in at once checking the tendency to disaffection of all the native Princes by recalling to them the unforgotten horrors of the moribund period of the Mogul Empire. He has traced throughout with great skill the effect which the loyalty or disloyalty of the native Princes had upon the effective action of their subjects. Thus, though Scindia was utterly unable to prevent his own troops from fighting against us, and though when the Ranee of Jhansi by a bold move dashed at Gwalior, Scindia was unable to save even his own fortress, because when he drew out his own army to oppose the Ranee, the whole of it deserted to her rather than fight for the British Government, General Innes yet declares that " the loyalty of Scindia saved India for the British." "Had he chosen to oppose us, the whole Mahratta race would have followed him." " Had he turned rebel, he would have been the Champion of the Revolt, and would with his army have at once turned the tide at Delhi, and stopped the siege." Similarly, Innes shows how Henry Lawrence's success in modifying the opposition of the Rajpoot chiefs, though it by no means stopped the revolt in Onde, incalculably diminished the fighting efficiency of the forces opposed to us. The inhabitants were ready enough to join the mutineers, but they did not fight as they would have done under their own leaders. He proves clearly that this exercised a most important influence at every stage of the campaign. Thus, during Frank's advance on Lucknow, Innes ascribes the comparatively feeble resistance that he met with to the absence of the native leaders :—

" It is quite certain that the bulk of the enemy consisted of matchlockmen, Eajwara or Talookdaree troops, and that they did not fight well ; in fact, hardly fought at all, except when forced to stand at bay. Moreover during the whole of this advance, not one of their leaders was of their own race—Hindoo Bajpoots ; they were all Mahomedans and ex-officials of the Lucknow Court, such as Mehtidee Hnssan, Bunda Hussan, Guffoor Beg, Fuzl Azim, Mahomed Hosgeyn, and so forth. In fact, the conduct of the Rajwara men under these circumstances—very different from what it was on other occasions when led by their own chiefs seems to point irresistibly to the conclusion that those chiefs held aloof from the hostilities, and that the men were, in their hearts, with their chiefs, and joined grudgingly in the fighting."

There is apt to be so much confusion on this point that it is well to make it quite clear. It is certain that the mere loyalty of the chiefs, neither then nor now, is sufficient to ensure to us the loyal devotion of their people, if there are general and widespread causes of discontent ; but, on the other hand, the difference in the effective fighting power of the people united under their hereditary chiefs and the people acting as mere individual sympathisers with rebellion, is a feature that comes out conspicuously in the whole story of the Mutiny, and is most effectively brought out by General Innes. He shows how disastrous, because of the want of appreciation of these facts, was the effect of Canning's " Confiscation Proclama- tion" of March 20th, 1858. It converted the Talookdars, who had been feeble but on the whole consistent abstainers from the revolt owing to Henry Lawrence's policy, into bitter and despairing leaders of insurrection. It fanned anew the rebellion in Oude just as it was on the point of being extinguished. The broad thesis which General Innes sets himself to establish is that the Mutiny as such broke out spasmodically, and without adequate prepara- tion, as a consequence of the indiscipline which had been allowed to flourish in the native army, and of the unpopularity of the general service order, which, though it only required that men enlisted after its proclamation should be available for service beyond the seas, yet created a general feeling of dis- trust throughout the army, and prepared the way for the excitement actually produced by the next efficient cause, the well-known cartridge incident, on a body of men who bad become conscious that they were numerically enormously superior to the British army in India, while exaggerated rumours as to our losses in the Crimea had left the impression, sedulously fanned by agitators, that there was no possibility of the British being seriously reinforced from home.

On the other hand, he believes that at the same time there was a very widespread feeling of dissatisfaction and distrust among the natives, and especially among the native rulers, due partly to the natural feeling of warlike races which had been displaced by alien conquerors, partly to the progressive extension of our Indian Empire, but largely, also, due to the refusal of the Government to recognise the right of adoption, so that, as native houses became extinct, their dominions were sequestrated. He believes that the Mogul party, in particular, were attempting to take advantage of this state of feeling to organise a revolt of which they would reap the benefit. Before they were ready they found their opportunity in the outbreak of the Mutiny, due to causes altogether inde- pendent of those that affected the population, but connected with them by the fact that a large proportion of the Sepoys were enlisted from Oude, and were therefore influenced to some extent by the especial causes which affected that province. Taking the book as a whole, it is an interesting summary of one of the most striking and important episodes in the history of the world and in the wonderful story of the relit, tions of England with her great dependency. General Inner is too full of his subject not to press on us those lessons which seem to him applicable to our present condition. They are wisely and thoughtfully drawn, but his greatest service seems to us to lie in the way in which he has clearly sketched the men who bore the brunt of the fighting during its earlier stages. In particular, considering that it has pleased his biographers to dress the grand, far-seeing, and statesmanlike character of Henry Lawrence in the garb of a monk or a reUgieux, it is no small matter to have him assigned his proper place in this great drama.