29 MAY 1897, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE FATE OF THESSALY.

WE give in another article our view of the general situation in Eastern Europe, which is, briefly, that Germany and Russia are beginning to part, Germany protecting, and Russia menacing, Turkey; but we must say a separate word upon the Thessalian question. That, it is evident, is to be the pivot of the peace negotiations. The Turks, it is clear, consider that they have conquered Thessalv ; they are irritated almost to madness at the idea that infidel Europe should forbid them to keep their conquest ; and they are urging their Sultan with threats to refuse to evacuate the territory, for which they are already organising a complete civil administration. They have, moreover, from their own point of view, some reason on their side. If they were not Turks, and therefore untrustworthy administrators of Christian provinces, they -would undoubtedly be allowed to keep Thessaly. The principle of consulting a population to be transferred has only been applied once in modern Europe, and it is still doubtful whether, when a plebiscite was taken in Nice and Savoy, the voting was really free; while it was not applied, and could not have been applied, when Alsace- Lorraine was ceded to the Germans. The Turks again are in possession, and think that they can keep possession if they choose ; Greece cannot turn them out, the Thessalians cannot turn them out, and they consider it doubtful whether, when it comes to the point, the Concert will turn them out. Apart alto- gether from the possibility that Germany may not approve coercion, they believe the Powers will consider coercion too dangerous, as almost certain to break up the peace, and either to result in a defeat, Constantinople being difficult to reach, or if victory is secured, to produce a furious quarrel for the derelict Turkish inheritance. Moved by these considerations, the Grand Vizier has addressed to the Sultan the following astonishing " Re- port," a translation of which has been forwarded to London by the Constantinople correspondent of the Standard :—" My great age, and the confidence shown in me by appointing me the Grand Vizier of so glorious a Caliph, emboldens me to submit to your Majesty my views on the question of the day. The successes of our soldiers over their enemies have so revived the ardour of the nation that an important portion of it, which was pre- viously alienated from you, has now been won back. The whole of Islam is, therefore, one soul and one body, and stands round your throne in an invincible phalanx. Sire, look upon the Powers of Europe as enemies, who are plotting the destruction of Turkey. If, in the pre- sent circumstances, we yield to European pressure, not only shall we have done nothing to ensure our exist- ence, but we shall alienate our Mussulmans. Therefore I implore your Majesty, for the sake of your vic- torious ancestors, to retain Thessaly. If you seize this opportunity, you are destined to revive the ancient prowess of the great Sultans of the past. During your glorious reign there have been several questions which Europe laid stress upon, and on which you refused to be dictated to, such as the Armenian question and others. What was the result ? You gained the victory. Let these examples guide you in the matter of Thessaly, but if my views are unpalatable to your Majesty, I beg you to accept my resignation." The importance of that amazing document is self - evident. Either the Grand Vizier writes it of his own motion, in which case he must be sure of support strong enough to shield him from the anger of the Sultan, or the Sultan himself has hinted to his adlatus that such a Report at such a time would be acceptable. In the first case, the great Mussulmans of Turkey are willing to defy Europe, as they defied it about the Armenians —and this we believe to be actually the case—and in ,econd case, the Sultan himself thinks that defiance is safe.

Now what will the Concert do ? What it ought to do 3s perfectly clear. For a hundred years it has been a maxim of European policy that no Christian community once rescued from the Turks should ever be replaced under their control. This maxim has recently been acknowledged in the strongest terms by M. Hanotaux, M. de Rudini, and Lord Salisbury, it has been semi- officially endorsed by Count Goluchowski, and it has never been questioned by either Germany or Russia. Indeed, it has been implicitly admitted by Turkey itself, the Sultan having in the beginning of the war pledged himself to avoid any extension of his dominions. If now it is laid aside from fear of Turkish power or dread of a European quarrel, the permanent policy of Europe is laid aside too, and the Sultans are declared at liberty, whenever circumstances favour them, to reconquer at least their ancient territory, to desolate Greece, to replace Bulgaria under Chifket Pasha, to re-establish fortresses domi- nating Belgrade and Bucharest. Constantinople is, in fact, unchained once more to work its savage will, under such limitations only as may be imposed by the power of the Little States which have escaped its sway to defend themselves by arms. The result of such reconquest would be simply awful. Europe cannot keep perpetually interfering in the internal government of an independent Empire ; the populations emanci- pated for years will be always restless under tyranny, and their restlessness will be put down as it was in Bulgaria or Armenia, where the Grand Vizier openly congratulates his master on his "victory." Thessaly, now the most prosperous province of Greece, will in five years be a desert inhabited by slaves trembling always under the frowns, the whips, and the sabres of Asiatic taskmasters, who have never so much as thought of any method of preventing rebellion except wholesale slaughter.

The members of the Concert are bound as Christians,, as statesmen, and as men responsible to history, to pre- vent this horror. They may give way on the indemnity, which is rather a question of policy than of morals ; they may assent to a compromise on the Capitulations, which it is possible have been abused ; they may even endorse a Treaty of Extradition, which will compel every Turk who flies from tyranny to seek some other land than Greece; but they are bound to use their whole power in main- taining the freedom of Thessaly. Will they fulfil that obligation ? It seems shameful even to hint at a doubt upon the subject; but we entertain, and must express, a most serious doubt. If Germany objects they will not, and no one clearly knows what Germany desires to do. If Turkey resists they may shrink back, appalled at the possibility of European war, or professing to rely upon the "moderation" which, except in Armenia, has, they will say, always distinguished the Sultan. There is no proof that they will feel for the Thessalians any more than they did for the Armenians, and much proof, in the language of the Ambassadors, that the successful mobilisa- tion of the Turkish Army has made them far more afraid of provoking the Sultan to a determined resistance. It is said that they will be moved by Christian feeling ; but will Christian feeling move them to risk war, and why should they care for Christian Thessalians any more than for Christian Macedonians or the Christian Greeks of the islands ? It is said they will be moved by policy ; but which of them will be hurt because Thessaly is made miserable, or which will undertake the cost of a war to prevent Turkey from increasing her dominion ? They are not likely, as a whole, to outstrip Great Britain in unselfishness, and the boldest action attributed to Lord Salisbury—who is, we deeply regret to see, weighted by domestic anxieties—is a threat that if Turkey is allowed to remain in Thessaly, Great Britain will quit the Concert. The threat is perfectly right; but in what way will it affect the movements of Edhem Pasha's army ? And lastly, it is said they will be moved by pride, feeling that Europe is insolently defied by a half-barbarian Power; but was not their pride equally outraged when the massacre of Armenians was renewed in Constantinople itself, and did they do anything then ? Russia may move by herself, for reasons explained in the next article, but it is of the Concert we are now talking, not of its component parts. The Concert has not succeeded yet in securing any one unselfish object, not even in enfranchising Crete, and we feel no security that it will be either able or willing to retain Thessaly within the domain of civilisation. Why should it be, when no change has occurred since the Armenian outrages, except that Abd-ul-He=aid, then supposed to be a weak man cowering, is now recognised by Ambassadors as a strong man armed ?