JAPAN'S NEXT MOVE
By STRATEGICUS
HE campaigns in southern Russia and in China emerge through the fog of war vague, ill-defined, full of sound and fury. If could analyse and accurately estimate them we should have a unably trustworthy indication of the present trend of the war. an be confidently asserted that both of them involve issues of lamental importance ; but beyond that little can be said that is gly reliable. As to the former, for instance, most of the material [ should form the basis for judgement is wholly contradictory. battle of Kharkov started in a comparatively small way. An irk on a front of 4o miles or so is no great matter when the using armies are stretched out over something like 2,000 miles. is front of attack, however, was rapidly extended to over too miles witnessed a penetration of at least 4o miles at one point, and saw [amounts of material captured or destroyed and heavy casualties icted.
;rafted upon this is the battle of Izyum, which now appears to ce begun to control the main battle. It took place, as was pointed :last week, on a part of the front that invited attack. This, indeed, 5 so obvious that even its limited success is a minor mystery. cording to the earlier Russian reports the Germans suffered very try casualties in the first phase, and now there is some evidence it they are beginning to claim dividends on their outlay. The portant fact about this attack and counter-attack is the gradual relopment of a great struggle on a critical part of the front. Cher the commanders like it or not, the scale has outgrown original conception completely, and seems likely to develop still re. The axis of the original attack was from east to west. It ed fated to make a half-turn towards the south-west, and quite Bible that it would end in a north-south direction.
It is, however, the Germans and not the Russians who have given the wrench towards the south, and it is not at all certain that may not finally regret it. The centre of gravity of their con- tion in the Donem area at present lies past of the line of their ce ; and if the Russians should accept the challenge and turn full strength towards the south, considerable German forces be in danger. There are, of course, other possibilities of peril the enemy in his present counter-attack. If the Germans are tening to take considerable Russian forces in the Kharkov • t from the rear, the Russians east of Tagenrog are in a position turn the tables by an attack upon the German rear. Indeed, a ent from the Tagenrog area seems to be so dearly indicated, the German reports that an advance had actually begun from direction were feasible enough to gain some credence. In fine, are very dangerous possibilities for both sides in this battle ; it is for that reason that it seems destined to act as the trigger se year's campaign on the Russian front.
ention, however, has been drawn to China increasingly during last week, for a number of reasons. Two officers, one British One American, have given their impressions of the campaign &Irma. There have been several reports of Japanese movements appear to suggest major operations. There has been a marked ton of Japanese movements in any other direction. It is for reasons that one is led to enquire whether there is likely to *Japanese attempt to secure a decision in China and what are chances of success in such a venture. The two questions are one, since it is evident that, if there is no sound reason to a decision within a reasonable time, it is in the last degree y that the Japanese will make the attempt.
Is clear that the Japanese wish to round off the Chinese cam- Which has now lasted nearly five years ; and they must desire the more at present since China has come to represent the 5 springboard for 2n attack on them. It is also obvious that Occlusion of the Burmese campaign has opened up new lines kproach to the heart of China. Now for the first time Japan cove against China from the south-west as well as from the and the opportunity of delivering a converging attack is not
lightly to be resigned. Once more China is more isolated from out- side help than she has ever been. She can expect no help from a Russia fighting for her life against so powerful an enemy as Germany. She can expect no more than the smallest trickle of help from the Allies while the present position obtains in Burma. She is short of the heavier forms of equipment, short of aircraft and above all short of the petrol that moves aircraft.
Such- a complex of conditions may suggest an attempt to finish off China, if it is at all possible. Heavy fighting has actually broken out in Chekiang, and the Chinese report that reinforcements are steadily pouring into the province, although the Japanese have already ioo,000 men at the front. If we are to judge from reason supported by these solid facts it seems that Japan is actually setting about another attempt to smash the Chinese resistance, as far as organised fighting goes. In spite of this, however, it seems scarcely credible that she will launch such an operation unless she has some assurance that the campaign can be concluded within a very short time. There can be no doubt that her plans will at some point converge with those of Germany ; and if she should conquer China that would scarcely advantage the Axis. Moreover, if she should become embroiled in a long-drawn-out campaign, it is difficult to imagine how she could do anything at all to assist the Axis.
It seems likelier that she means to occupy the coastal areas from which Japan might easily be bombed. She would, even in that case, move with considerable force, but would not necessarily be com- mitted to a prolonged campaign that would occupy a large body of first-rate troops indefinitely. Whatever her purpose, the Allies are deeply involved in the issue ; and it is for this reason that the state- ments made about the Burma campaign are of such importance. General Stilwell has stated that "only a little added strength would have been enough to have tipped the scale "; and that appears to be certain if the Japanese turned us out of Burma with only 50,000 troops. The exact strength of the British force is not known ; but there were two Chinese divisions, and if we were always inferior numerically the difference cannot have been great.
The question arises why there were not a greater number of Chinese troops on the spot. Granted that more Imperial troops could not be spared at the time, there is no obvious reason why more Chinese reinforcements should not have been sent. The reason was given by the senior British officer, who stated that the number of Chinese troops that could be used in Burma was conditioned by the matter of supplies. We had engaged to feed them, and it was impossible to feed more than were actually engaged there. The inference is that we lost the Burma campaign through the lack of communications. Indeed, we lost it at Rangoon. It is not a very encouraging conclusion, since it merely refers the matter farther back. It seems, in fact, inevitable we shoula conclude that we lost it at Singapore ; and, since this was doomed as soon as we lost control of the south-western Pacific, we lost it in the battle of the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean.
But now, since Burma is lost and no useful purpose is to be served by a radical enquiry into the decline of our sea-power, it is wiser to enquire what can be done to assist China. General Stil- well, who says he is returning to China shortly, insists that we should retake Burma as our means of re-entry into China. That, however, is much easier said than done. It seems impossible that we can enter Burma again until we have secured the control of the Bay of Bengal and the south-western Pacific ; and that is not likely in the near future. Meanwhile, China will have passed through her crisis and the question of a decision will have been answered. Some means must be found to keep China armed and supplied ; and, since the existing communications could not supply the less than 50,000 troops who fought in Burma, the way to provide assist- ance is to create fresh avenues of supply. Some attempt has already been made to establish new roads across the Assam frontier, and it should not be beyond the organising power of engineers on the spot to hasten their completion. It is obvious that they will be necessarily more precarious and less useful than they would have been if completed before. The Japanese will at least hold the Burmese ends of the roads ; and, unless they can be driven off, no land communications will be of any use. The only means of achieving this and of helping China under present conditions is by air-power. General Stilwell and the British officer both emphasised the disastrous effect of lack of aircraft in Burma ; but now a very considerable air-strength is being built up in India, and this is the one way in which immediate help
can be given to China. It seems very slight, and indeed it promises to be effective ; but it should be used, and if only a of the possibilities suggested by Major Seversky (in the im articles he is contributing to The Daily Telegraph) can be re very much more may be achieved than we imagine. At least ability to provide overwhelming support must not prevent us d all that is possible ; and meanwhile we should profit by minute's respite to build up our strength in India, Ceylon Australia.
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