ENGLAND AND HER DIPLOMACY.
PRINCE BISMARCK has certainly attained one of the objects of his life,—he has transferred the diplomatic centre of the world from Paris to Berlin. For months past the journals alike of England and the Continent have been filled with reports of diplomatic movements, the pivot of which was Berlin, and which have been described with a minuteness unusual in the chat of an Ambassador's antechamber. Every arrival at Berlin has been watched, and every departure re- corded. A Grand Duke's visit has been an excitement, and an Ambassador's call an event, while the Funds have risen and fallen on reports that Emperors and Kings were, or were not, on their way to Potsdam. The visit of a petty Prince like the King of Denmark has been interpreted to mean changes in the map, while the question whether Prince Gortschakoff would, or would not, go out of his way to avoid a call at the Berlin Foreign Office, has excited all political society.
We do not deny that all this gossip, if only it is reported accurately, has a certain intellectual interest, or that it is worth while just now to watch pretty closely the movements of the really great. Europe, with the partial exception of France, but including England, has fallen back once more under the rule of individuals, and as five or six men can, if they please, move armies, and as we are visibly living in an era of territorial changes, it is natural that those individuals should be strenuously and persistently observed. But we do object very much to the deduction so frequently drawn,—that because an excessive activity is manifest at Berlin, therefore it is indispensable that the Eng- lish Government should show itself as fussily excited about Berlin movements as the rest of the world. It seems to us that it should, on the contrary, be quite calm, observe everything, learn everything, but confine action to a steady increase of strength at its weakest point,—its immediately available force for a demonstration. That is the way to secure influence when the time comes, and the way also to avoid the panic which so often plunges the country into some dangerous or ill-considered course of action. Let us for one moment, laying aside all party views, consider how far the danger with which we are said to be menaced is
real, where it may arise, and how far Berlin can mitigate it for us. The popular notion of that danger we may, we believe, set aside. Russia and Germany may bicker for years without fighting—and if they do fight, Eng- land could no more interfere effectively than if they were two countries on the groat river of Mare. What could our thin regiments do upon the Vistula, even if they could get there ? The real danger in which England may be in- volved is this, and this only :—There must be, sooner or later, an explosion in Constantinople: The Government now exist- ing there is dying of its own vices, of its own stupidities, and of circumstances, such as the decay of its ruling class, which it has no power and little will to amend. It is kept up solely by the patience of the armed section of its sub- jects,—a patience which must end soon, and may end on any given day within the next six months, If the explo- sion ends in the flight or ruin of the Sultanet, or in a massacre of Europeans, all three quite probable con- tingencies, the marvellousdominion, the whole Eastern Empire of Rome, which Providence, in its inscrutable wisdom, has allowed the Turks to destroy, will lie open as a prey to the strong ; and unless human nature is greatly changed for the better, which is at all events uncertain, every statesman with force behind him will try to get something out of the spoil. That is the danger, and that, we fully admit, concerns England deeply. She might be compelled by immediate and pressing interests, or by a deep conviction as to the true welfare of the world, to insist by a direct exertion of fighting strength upon a particular solution, or to veto in the same way a solution she deemed injurious. She might, for example, be absolutely forced to Occupy Egypt, or if, as would probably happen, Persia were thrown with Turkey into the pool, to land an army at Buslaire. Those are possibilities, remote or near, according to the observer's judgment, but still possibilities, to be considered, and within certain limits to be met. What, then, are the precautions to be taken? Clearly, the first of them is to be strong enough i to secure whatever t is necessary to secure, to be ready in England and India with men and money and material. If i we have not them, n esse or ln posse, no diplomatist, we may rely on it, will seriously attend to us. Well, are we collecting these things ? Certainly not we are getting rid of these things as fast as we can, spending money all over the world, shipping off material to places where it is not wanted, ex- pending soldiers hourly in a corner of South Africa, and a corner of Central Asia, for no adequate purpose whatever. The Army is not strengthened ; the Mediterranean Fleet not made capable of its true work, which would be to separate Europe and Asia ; the Treasury is not refilled. Nothing is done to avert the danger apprehended, and believed by those in power to be most serious, except pestering an un- willing and incompetent Sultan to execute reforms which he cannot execute without surrendering his only remaining source of strength,—the devotion of the fierce caste which prefers anarchy and its consequences, to the loss of its divinely i ordered ascendancy. Or f we are doing anything else, it is i fidgetting at different Courts, n order to make sure that who- ever else may profit in the general overturn, Russia shall not. Now, is not all that feeble ? But we may obtain allies ? What is the use of allies who want solutions which do not suit us ? In Europe, the question at issue is settled without our help. Germany and Austria are agreed that, whoever has Constantinople, Russia shall not ; and as that is all we even affect to care about, and as the allies are perfectly well able to make their de- cision executive, there is no reason whatever for English meddling. It is Asiatic Turkey we are interested in, and as Germany and Austria care nothing about Asia, would, indeed, be apt to bribe Russia to make concessions in Europe by giving her provinces in Asia, there are just two Powers left who could help us seriously. One of these is Russia, and the other France. With a sincere alliance with Russia, intended to endure, we could settle Asia just as we pleased, without the faintest attention to anything or anybody except our own interests, Russian interests, and the good of the people of Asia,—that is, assuming, as is always assumed, that the dominion of Europe over Asia will, for a century or two, be a good. With the sincere alliance of France we could make our position in India absolutely secure, so secure that the Eastern Question would be for us of com- paratively minor importance. While France acts with Britain, nobody can touch Egypt, Syria, or .Mesopotamia without our 'Written consent. Now, what is British Diplomacy doing to secure either of these alliances ? It has made the first one temporarily impossible, and has made the second exceedingly improbable. With Russia, we have only an armed truce ; with France, a foolish co-partnership in Egypt, based on the pecuniary interests of some financial firms, which has already produced suspicion and reserve, and may yet produce active quarrelling. We are spending such diplomatic strength as we have in worrying the Sultan, in fretting the Czar, and in fostering combinations at Berlin at which, and therefore at us, France looks askance. Now, is not all that failure ?
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