M. FERRY'S POSITION.
THE debate in the French Chamber on the Chinese War will not improve the position of M. Ferry either in Europe or in Asia. He has obtained, we presume,—for the actual figures cannot reach us in time—his vote of confidence ; and upon one limited subject—the necessity and the advantage of retaining Tonquin—he was supported throughout his speech by cordial, or according to some accounts, even enthusiastic applause ; but the diplomatists of Europe will perceive many weaknesses in his attitude. In the first place, he does not quite know what he wants, beyond the secure possession of Tonquin. He maintains, with a certain temper, that "the affair of Bac-le,"—that is, the premature attempt to occupy Langson, was an ambush arranged by the Chinese, and that therefore he must have an indemnity ; but he hints that when the Americans proposed that the indemnity should be given up, he was not disinclined to that course, and only broke off negotiations because the Chinese, in a sudden fit of arrogance, demanded the surrender of Anam. He intends, he declares, to keep Formosa as security for the indemnity ; but he does not purpose to carry the system of coercion any further. In other words, he finds his policy of conquest expensive and exhausting, and does not venture even to consider—at all events, until after the elections—the straightforward but costly policy of marching on Pekin. The "directing classes" are more or less with him, but he sees that the body of the people are not ; that the Radical leaders, including M. Clemenceau, who is not a peace man, are all against him ; and that, but for the fear his rivals feel of being compelled by their logic to abandon Tonquin, he would be overthrown. He hesitates, therefore, and temporises, and is not, in fact, in European eyes possessed of a solid power in France, but must " engineer " his policy through obstacles rather than pursue it frankly and energetically. On the other hand, the Chinese statesmen will gather from the debate that Pekin is in no present danger—the cardinal point with them ; that M. Ferry, at most, will only hold Formosa, which is in- visible to the body of their people ; that a pecuniary indemnity is not a sine quiz' non; that a large minority of Frenchmen ex- ceedingly dislike the protraction of the campaign; and that the Chinese Generals are fighting very well in Tonquin. The admis- sions of M. Ferry upon this last point are very curious indeed. He talked bravely of the restoration of order in Tonquin, but admired his "brave fellows" for facing such numbers ; declared that it was not expedient for the Generals there employed "to go too far from the centre of operations ; " but asserted that "daily victory was with them the normal condition of affairs." That will be understood in China to mean that the Chinese leaders have penetrated to the centre of operations, that their troops are numerous, and that though unsuccessful they are daily renewing attacks in which they must gradually, whatever their own expenditure of men, wear the enemy down. The inevitable deduction from those arguments is filet China has only to be passively obstinate to dictate her own terms, pro- vided she will give up Tonguin ; and as her rulers have lately been ready to consent to that sacrifice, and as they find pas- sive obstinacy both pleasant and easy, they will continue in that course,—at least for some months to come. M. Ferry, there- fore, though he does not retire, stands still, and shakes a little. Apart from M. Ferry's personal situation, the position of France in this affair cannot be satisfactory to her more far- sighted statesmen. Accident has revealed an unexpected flaw in her new armour. There is a distinct divergence of opinion between the directing classes, backed by a majority of Members, by the journalists of Paris, and by the Church, on the one side, and the body of the people on the other. The 4ormer are in favour of an aggressive policy in Asia, evhich, as Bishop Freppel explained in the debate, almost in the words recently used in the Spectator, would, if en- ergetically pursued, in no long time convert the group of 1ringdoms known collectively as Jade-China, into a French India, a splendid -possession, not very difficult to govern. They urge this policy every day, and have so far committed the Government that it has occupied half Indo-China, and -could, by doubling its local army, occupy the remainder. But to complete this design, and reign in peace, instead of winning "daily victories," France must enter, or at least threaten, the Chinese capital, and at this point the body of the people step in. They have no objection to colonies, and will take Tonquin or any other country with pleasure ; but• they will have no war with China, no grand expedition, no huge loan for any Asiatic purpose whatever. They are not quite strong enough or resolute enough to insist on retiring from Indo-China, or to compel a peace with China on the basis of the retention of Tonquin ; but they are strong enough to limit the forces sent, to compel their Premier to adopt a waiting policy—imagine France out-waiting China, a panther out-waiting a tree !—and to prohibit absolutely the march on Pekin, without which the grand policy can never be carried out. They are strong enough to weaken the available army, and make the dis- posable fund a small one, that is for the special purpose to make of France a Power very much like Holland, equal to ad- ventures, but not to large or permanent conquests. The whole force of France can never be exerted under such circumstances ; and even if M. Ferry were a Napoleon, instead of a modernised Loavois, he could only keep on pottering, wasting men and money, and hoping that men to whom time has no meaning will at last get tired of the tedium of standing on the defensive. The .divergence of opinions makes France weak, and we find no security that it may not frequently recur. The Government in France will always be able to pursue small projects with- out interference, for the politicians about it like activity, and gain, and prestige ; while the electors will always be reluctant to make great sacrifices for what are to them nearly invisible ends. The Government may demand half Madagascar and batter down petty villages on the coast without remon- strance or even with applause, but if they proposed a march on Antananarivo they would be driven from power. That split- ting, so to speak, of the huge force of France, is a new element in polities, and is so far as we know without a parallel, unless it be in Holland, where the Government carries on wars in the East which the people will neither terminate nor adequately support. We have seemed recently to do the same thing in South Africa and Egypt ; but then it has only been seeming, for the Government had only to propose large measures to find itself supported to its heart's content. We suppose the way out for the French Ministry will be found -some day in an enterprise which the people understand as well as the Government, or the rise of some Minister who is trusted -even when he asks large sacrifices ; but the change, the cordial union between leader and people, is not visible yet.
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