. THE DARDANELLES.*
GENERAL CALLWELL'S valuable study of the Dardanelles cain- eiaign, from a military standpoint, appears opportunely as the
complement of the Dardanelles Commission's Report on the conduct of the operations. General Galilee-11 has not aimed at producing a complete history of the campaign, comparable with Mr. Nevinson's work. His object is to emphasize the strategical aspects; and the incidents which had some special tactical interest. The Commission, mainly composed of civilians, was concerned rather to distribute the blame for a failure. - In funda- mentals General Callwell agrees with the Commiesion. " We think," say the Commissioners, " that, when it was decided to undertake an important military expedition to the Gallipoli Peninsula, sufficient consideration was not given to the measures necessary to carry out such an expedition with success." General Callwell says very much the same thing :- " It is no use mincing matters about the Dardanelles. The discomfiture of the Allies in their campaign for the Straits was primarily due to choir fighting forces having been committed to a ticklish adventure without adequate forethought. A Martial operation of an altogether abnormal kind was under- taken without searching investigation of the whole of the factors that bore on the contemplated enterprise. The plan of campaign decided upon at the start--what there was of it—only dealt with a portion of the project that those responsible for command- ing action to proceed had in mind, and it was drawn up on the assumption that an entirely novel scheme of making war was necessarily going to succeed. Hostilities between embattled nations are too serious a business to be conducted in this hap- hazard fashion."
Both the Commission and General Callwell refer to the Report on the possibility of a naval and military attack on the Dardan- elles" which was prepared by the General Staff in 1906. That Report was strongly adverse to such an offensive. General Callwell stated in ltlenday's Morning Post that the document was withdrawn by the Prime Minister, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman,
who attached the highest importance to it. However, like its authors, the Report of 1906 seems to have been ignored by the Government when the time came for considering its lessons.
The ComMissioners are inclined to find fault with the General Staff for not preparing a plan of campaign when " it had become apparent in February; 1915, that serious military operations might be necessary." General Callwell is on firmer ground when he points out that the initial mistake was to sanction naval operations without first consulting the War Office, inasmuch as, if the naval attack failed, it would greatly increase the difficulties of the Army in undertaking i ich military operations as Might be thought necessary., alRe adds in a significant note :--
" The writer can vouch for it that the matter was never considered jointly by the Naval War Staff and the General Staff at the War Office. Had it been, he is confident that tho idea of a purely naval attack, either in the nature of trying to rush the passage or in the form that the attack actually took, would have been abandoned in deference to the representations that the 'soldiers mast have male. For the military objections were manifest and were overwhelming."
It was highly improbable that the Fleet could force the
Dardanelles, overcoming the Turkish guns and howitzers and evading the dangers from drifting mines and concealed torpedo- tubes on either side of the narrow channel. But if the Fleet had achieved the virtually impoesible, says General Callwell, " good- ness only knows what would have happened." There were no British troops at hand to occupy the forts and prevent the
* The Dar5sielks. By.INtsior-Gcneral Sir C. E. Callwell. London : Constable. (18e. net) Turks from returning to their guns as soon as the ships had passed. Apparently it was thought by the Cabinet that if the British Fleet forced its way into the Sea of Marmora the Turks would be seized with panic, that their armies would disperse, and that Enver at Constantinople would throw up the sponge. Of course such results might have followed. The tension in Constantinople was very great at that moment, after the defeats in the Caucasus and in Egypt, and before the German victory in Galicia had restored confidence in the enemy's camp. But it was safer to assume that the Turk, under German guidance, would continuo to offer a stubborn resistance. The British Fleet might then have found itself in a very awkward position, isolated in tho Sea of Marmora with its only line of retreat menaced by hostile guns. Strangely enough, the motive for hastily arranging an offensive against Turkey had ceased to operate long before the Navy could begin the attack. Russia, alarmed at the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus, had asked us to make a diversion. But by January 17th General Woronzow had smashed three out of the four Turkish corps in and near Sarikamish and freed the Caucasus from all danger. Moreover, in the first week of February the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal was successfully repelled. Thus the Government had no need to take precipitate action. They might well have delayed the first naval bombardment until the Army was ready to land in Gallipoli.
'General Callwell's discussion of the famous landings at Helles and Anzac in April, 1915, and of the lamentable failure at Suvla Bay in August, 1915, is of much interest. He tells us that it was his official duty in 1906, in the autumn of 1914, and again early in 1915 to study the problem of an attack on the Dardanelles. Ho came to the conclusion that the best plan was to land as large a force as possible on the beaches north of Gaba Tepe, where the Australians and New Zealanders gained a footing. He would have left Helles severely alone. At Gaba Tepo the Turks undoubtedly expected an attack. But considerable forces thrown ashore on a wide front north of that headland could have outflanked the enemy and established themselves securely on the hills within a few miles of the Narrows. The Australians and New Zealanders were not strong enough to thrust the enemy off the hills. But the whole expeditionary force, rightly handled, might have done so. Moreover, had it landed on the outer or western side of the peninsula it would not have been harassed, as the Holies force was, by persistent fire from the Asiatic coast. Laymen may be permitted to wonder why the conclusions of the General Staff, based on a careful study of the topography of Gallipoli, were wholly disregarded at the moment when they might have been of priceless value. It is now clear that the General Staff's plan would have been more promising and less costly than the scheme actually adopted. The landing of August 7th, 1915, at Surla, combined with the Anzac assault on Sari Bair, was in effect a belated attempt to carry out the General Staff's idea. The Suds affair might well have been a decisive success but for grave defects of leading. General Callwell shows that the few Turks in the district were not strongly reinforced till late in the second day after the land- ing. Nevertheless our divisions were not pushed forward promptly and vigorously to seize the commanding hills, and thus the great opportunity was wasted. The author. thinks that, apart from the muddle about water, one contributing cause of the failure was the excessive secrecy maintained by the com- manders. "The regimental officers and troops in the 11th Division, when they set foot on shore, had no definite conception of what they were about to do or of what they were being called upon to faee.". Had they been given instructions as soon as the transports left Imbros, the regimental officers would have displayed the initiative characteristic of British soldiers as soon as they landed. " For God's sake, push on," was indeed the only order that the Suvla divisions needed. Unhappily they did not receive it till the favourable moment had passed. Mis- fortune dogged our armies in those unhappy days. General Callwell is convinced that the fatal salvo of accurately placed shells which blasted the 6th Gurkhas and the 6th South Lan- cashire% off the dominating ridge close to Chanak- Bair on August 9th came from British guns, though not necessarily from naval guns. But for these high explosives the ridge might have been held, and the whole mass of Sari Bair might have been won. It must be remembered, however, that the success of a well- planned campaign should not depend upon luck. There was far too much of the gambling spirit in the inception and conduct of the Gallipoli Altai.
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