TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE OVERTHROW OF M. BRISSON.
pREDICTION about France is usually vain, but reason- ing as men usually reason, we are unable to believe that the present crisis will end without a revolution. It is the Republic which is at stake, not this or that Govern- ment, and the Republic is weak. As we read the scene of Tuesday afternoon, the Army, after terrorising a Court- Martial, two inferior Courts of Justice, and three Ministers of War, has succeeded in terrorising the Chamber. The " burst of temper" of General Chanoine was evidently a calculated burst, for he himself states that he acted because of a quarrel with M. Brisson as to the treat- ment of Colonel Picquart; and it was this outburst which deprived the Ministry of all hope, and probably of all wish, to escape defeat. At first the Ministry had hope, for they must all have agreed to the Premier's first move,—asking the Chamber to lump together the seven- teen interpellations on the Dreyfus case, and take that business first. The Deputies agreed to that course, and all seemed going well, for though M. D6roulede thun- dered, he was only M. D6roulede, when the Minister of War, availing himself of a rude, though not insolent, reference to himself, forced his way to the tribune, and with every appearance of agitation declared that he had always agreed with his three predecessors in their hos- tility to revision, and that he now "restored to the hands of the representatives of the country the trust committed to him,"—a proceeding as much opposed to constitutional etiquette, the Chamber not being Sovereign, as if it had occurred in the House of Commons. The Ministry, who had only that day been sitting in council upon the very subject at issue, with General Chanoine in the midst of them, were thunderstruck by his "stab in the back " ; they adjourned for an hour, and when they returned the heart was out of them. M. Ribot, one of the gravest politicians in France, did his best to help them, and his Resolution affirming the supremacy of the civil power was carried, as the Decalogue would be carried in England, by 559 votes to two ; but immediately after, M. de Mahy's amendment calling on Government to terminate the "campaign of insult " against its Army was passed by a majoritylof fifty-three, or 296 votes to 243. If that was not a vote of censure there never was one, but again a private Deputy, not the Premier, made an effort to break the blow by proposing a rider expressing confidence in the Ministry on that point. It was rejected by 286 to 254 ! Ten Deputies had gone over, perhaps sobered by the visibleness of the crisis ; but the feeling of sympathy with the Army, or fear of the Army, was too strong. Every opponent of the Government, and many Moderates, thought that M. Brisson in referring the Dreyfus case for re-trial showed distrust in the honour of the Generals, and M. Brisson, most honourable and sincere of Republicans, was dismissed with odium.
The Army wins, and the only point for discussion is how far it will carry its victory. The Generals may rest con- tent with a Ministry hostile to revision, but unless the Court of Caseation dismisses the appeal before it, which is improb- able, we do not see how they can so rest. If the Court accepts the appeal and orders revision, the secret dossier, whatever its contents, must come out ; and it is precisely that contingency which the Army, from whatever motive, has decided to prevent. They cannot prevent it legally— at least if we are right as to French procedure, and the Ministry of Justice cannot withdraw its application to the supreme Court—unless the Assembly—both Houses —interferes by statute, or there is a revolution. This revolution may, of course, be Republican, that is, it may take the form of a new Constitution with the President elected by the people, and possessed of the veto and a right to remove all Judges ; and it is said that several powerful reactionaries in France incline to- -wards this solution. Logic, however, is strong in France even in the Army ; the revolution would be made by soldiers, and soldiers' logic demands that the head of the Army should be a trained soldier, a true Commander- in-Chief. Civilians do not sympathise sufficiently with soldiers' pride. We believe the desire to secure that end will be passionate, and that the Army will either hit upon a princely candidate with a name of historic ',harm — the most likely being Colonel and Prince Louis R naparte—or that it will repeat the strange Boulanger incident, and place at the head of the State a General who, if he wishes to stop there, must win his Marengo. It is for that, a pitched battle won, that France has been thirsting for twenty-seven years, and the man who gives her that gratification, that relief from her abiding wrath and sense of humiliation, may ask any reward. Events may go very differently, but we cannot. believe in the death of genius in France, and if there is a.. soldier of genius within h ranks, or capable of being found outside them, we are unable to think that in the present welter of parties, principles, ambitions, and powerful personalities, he will fail to find and to seize hie opportunity. It is a sad scene for those who hold civil order to be essential to progress, or who have any sympathy with the Southern races, but we would ask our readers not to make the popular mistake, and exaggerate the bad qualities of the French Army. That Army has been told for twenty- seven years that it is not only the hope of France but it France, and in that rhetorical statement there is much of truth. All adult males in France are liable to serve,, and a clear majority of them are still soldiers, that is,, are liable to be shot if they do not turn out when ordered to fill up the last reserves. The officers, active Or- in retreat, count by scores of thousands, they are wretchedly paid, they have under the new discipline to work hard, they serve till they are sixty, and as their reward is their professional status, its honours and its immunities, they become a caste. Every caste grows by degrees morbidly sensitive about its position, and that depends in the case of soldiers almost entirely upon the esteem in which it is held. It is not unnatural, therefore,. that the officers of the French Army should be morbidly sensitive, should be unwilling to believe any charge against their picked men, shbuld long, as all other French- men long, for the general sympathy and admiration of mankind. Englishmen have an individualist pride of their own, which almost disqualifies them from under- standing collective pride, but they may see it among the men of any old regiment, or at least believe that it exists in the French Army with the intensity of a Southern passion. Upon this Army has descended for months a, shower of opprobrious words, sometimes witty, more often foul, always galling to the point at which a Frenchman challenges the speaker. Their chiefs have been accused of forgery and suspected of murder, they have themselves been described as" useful mainly for capitulation and mas- sacre," and they are taunted as being " outside justice," or ridiculed as incapable of comprehending evidence. Is it. wonderful that, being a caste, being Frenchmen, being hard-worked, much disciplined, and poor, they should be in a savage mood, should at lowest demand, with General Chanoine, that they should have a Government which can " silence calumniators of the Army" ? They do not, be it remembered, believe Dreyfus innocent, they do not distrust their own Courts, and they do believe that civil authorities are much influenced by rich Jews, and have a. prejudiced wish to accept every charge against men in uniform. Their temper is most regrettable, most uncon- stitutional, if you will, most unpatriotic, but it is also, we think, most natural. That it will produce grave results we have no doubt whatever, even if the present crisis should by some unexpected intervention, or through some adroit device, be soothed away. Certainly it will not be checked by any fear of the populace, which besides being- divided, is quite powerless. The Socialists are talking- nonsense. The days when barricades were possible are over, and neither in France, nor Germany, nor Austria. could the whole population, if united and in a rage, resist. the whole Army for forty-eight hours. When the nations adopted universal conscription, real powerpassed to the men who have cartridges enough for a three days' campaign.
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