TOPICS OF THE DAY.
still one of extreme gravity. Nevertheless, we believe that not long after these pages are in our readers' hands the worst anxieties for the future will be over, and the nation will have learned that the Russians have agreed to the demands put forward by our Government. But though we feel confident, and have the right to feel con- fident, that we shall not become involved in war with Russia—a war which, if it took place, must result in the most serious consequences for our own people, and might be fraught with incalculable evils for the greater part of mankind—we realise that until the announcement is actually made that Russia has yielded to our just demands, there is still cause for deep concern. An accident, a misunderstanding, might at the last moment alter everything, and convert what seemed the promise of teace into a condition of things which would render war inevitable. We may be hopeful, nay, confident, as indeed we are, that all will end well, but in circumstances such as the present there can be no absolute certainty till the Russian reply has been published.
Meantime, and whatever happens, the duty of all Englishmen is clear. It is to support their Government. We must all speak with the same voice. This, as we trust it always will be, has been fully realised by both parties in the State. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and other Opposition leaders have by their public utterances made it clear that for the moment and on this question there is no such thing as an Opposition. In a moment of peril it is necessary to support the Government, even if we disagree with them in minor details,—unless, of course, they are guilty of weakness so palpable, or of recklessness so great, that an overmastering need arises for safeguarding the national welfare. In the present case, however, there is no need for any reservation even as to the details of the management of a complicated and difficult situation. The Government have made no false step, but have acted throughout as the British people would have them act. They have been neither weak nor violent, but have safe- guarded the honour and interests of the nation exactly as they should have been safeguarded. In the first place, they acted most wisely in not ordering our Fleet to demand explanation or satisfaction directly from the Baltic Fleet. Instead, they addressed their demands only to St. Petersburg. At the same time, however, they made the naval dispositions necessary for ensuring that, if direct action should unhappily have to be taken in regard to the Baltic Fleet, such action should be effective. To have trusted solely to diplomatic action, and to have failed to be ready for other eventualities, would have been to commit a capital error.
The actual demands made by our Government were, we believe, adequate and reasonable. They were not less than the situation demanded, and yet were not of such a character, or couched in such language, as to render their acceptance by Russia humiliating beyond endurance. In the first place, we asked for an apology, and that due reparation should be made to the victims of the outrage. As to this there could be no question of refusal unless the Russians desired war, which we could not assume, and which we feel sure will be proved not to have been the case. Next came our demand that the responsibility for the outrage should be brought home to the proper quarters, and that punishment should be exacted. Needless to say, this demand did not mean that we selected any particular person or persons, and demanded their punishment. To have done that would have been to violate the ele- mentary principles of justice. You do not punish before, but after inquiry. All we could say, and this we rightly insisted on, was that since the nature of the occurrence showed that some one had been guilty of the outrage of firing on harmless fishermen, that person or those persons must be punished. We insisted, that is, that the occurrence should not be treated as a mere regrettable accident for which no one was to blame, but that since the firing was a deliberate and sustained act, and not a blunder like a collision, the personal responsibility must be established and adequate action taken. To do this was obviously more just than to attempt to fasten the direct responsi- bility on Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and to insist on 1us recall. He may no doubt have been in a sense responsible as the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, but we desire to exact a more direct responsibility. We want an example made of the men who gave the order, whoever they may be ; and at present we have no information as to whether it was the Admiral, or a subordinate acting without his superior's orders. The final demand said to have been made to the Russians by our Government was some assurance or guarantee that similar outrages should not be committed in the future upon innocent fishermen and merchantmen. It was natural, no doubt, that such a demand should be made, though we fear that it is not of a very practical kind. The Russians will not, of course, refuse to give the assurance asked for, for no nation ever professes unwillingness to declare that she means to behave in a civilised manner and to maintain the comity of nations. The question is not as toltussia's ability to give such an assurance, but as to her power to maintain it when given. This, however, is necessarily an unfruitful form of speculation, for unless we are prepared to forbid Russia the use of the high seas, which clearly we are not, we must run the risk of her nervous and incapable and also truculent naval commanders involving their nation and ours in further complications. It is, we admit, an ugly prospect, but since no practical remedy is apparent, it must be endured.
The naval precautions taken by the Government were all that could be desired. They most properly did not yield to the temptation that so often exists on such occasions not to take any active steps for fear of increasing international tension. Instead, they acted on the principle that it was their duty, as it was their right, to make such naval dispositions as would, should the need arise, ensure complete success for the action which we must have taken had Russia refused to give timely satisfaction to our demands. That action was to refuse to allow the Baltic Fleet to proceed on its course until Russia had admitted the justice of our representations, and had consented to act on them. The naval dispositions in question took the form of orders to the Channel Fleet, now at Gibraltar, to watch the movements of the Baltic Fleet, and to hold itself in readiness for all eventualities. Further, the Mediterranean Fleet was ordered to reinforce the Channel Fleet, while the Home Fleet was to be ready, if necessary, to prevent the return of the Baltic Fleet to its own waters. Needless to say, these dispositions were amply sufficient for the purpose. The Russian sailors are no doubt brave and stubborn fighters, but it would have been impossible for them to have done anything against such a display of force,—even if their ships had been in the best of trim, which seems more than doubtful.
As in our belief the acute danger will pass, it happily does not now seem necessary for us to dwell at length upon what would have happened had the Russians returned a refusal to our demands. Such a refusal would have been followed by the detention of the Russian fleet, that deten- tion would have meant that the guns would have spoken, and that at once a state of war would have been created. But the war could not have been localised. It must have meant a Russian attack on India; and probably the Russians would have made peace with Japan, no matter what the sacrifices involved, in order to send Kuropatkin and his army to India. That we should be able to defend India against the Russians we do not doubt, but the strain would have been great and long ; and however successful we might be, we could not hope to gain anything as the result of the struggle. There is nothing that Russia possesses which we covet, or which would add to our strength or prosperity. But in addition to the direct burden of a war with Russia there would have been the peril of foreign complications. We do not ourselves believe that France would join Russia against us in circumstances like the present; but still, the risk of complications would be a very real one. We do not of course suggest that these risks should have prevented us taking up the firm attitude we did take up. On the contrary, we hold that we should have been bound to act as we did even had they been far more imperative. At the same time, the existence of those risks will be an additional ground for relief if, as we believe, the crisis ends in peace, not war.
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