The future of terrorism
Walter Laqueur
There is at present a world-wide inclination to exaggerate the political importance of terrorism — connected, no doubt, with its sensational character. Nor is it true that there has been an alarming increase of terrorist operations all over the world during the last decade. However, it is perfectly true that while terrorism is not a global threat now, it could become one as a result of technological developments.
Professor Bernard Feld, a leading American physicist, once discussed the nightmarish consequences of the disappearance of twenty pounds of plutonium from government stocks. What if the mayor .of Boston received a note to the effect that a 'terrorist group had planted a nuclear bomb • somewhere in central Boston — • acommpanied by a crude diagram which 'showed that the bomb would work? Professor Feld stated that he would advise surrender to blackmail rather than the destruction of his hometown. Such fears in one form or another have been expressed for almost a century, albeit with less justification. If Johannes Most, a leading German anarchist, and some of his anarchist contemporaries hailed dynamite as the ultimate weapon, a panacea for the solution : of all political and social problems, such joy , was not universally shared. Thus a British police officer in the 1890s said: Murderous organisations have increased in size and scope; they are more daring, they are served by the more terrible weapons offered by modern science, and the world is nowadays • threatened by new forces which, if recklessly unchained, may some day wreak universal destruction. The Orsini bombs were mere children's toys compared with the later developments of infernal machines. Between 1858 and 1898 the dastardly science of destruction has made rapid and alarming strides . . .
With the use of poison gas in the first world war, fears were voiced that millions of people would die in gas bomb attacks. Musprath wrote in the 'twenties that with the help of certain chemicals unlimited areas .could be destroyed in a very short time. Lord Halshury, who had been chief of the .explosives department of the British ministry of war, told the House of Lords in 1928, that forty tons of diphenylcyanarsin (a • -poison gas of the Blue Cross type) were . sufficient to destroy the whole population of London. But the quantity of the poisonous material needed was such that it was generally assumed that only a modern army would be capable of using these lethal weapons. There had been talk in Irish extremist circles in the United States in the 1880s about the use of poison gas, but this had been sheer fantasy at the time. Bacteriological warfare including the poisoning of water reservoirs was first discussed as a practical possibility in the first world war. According to one report 'anarchist elements' had been hired towards the end of the war to carry cholera bacilli from a neutral state to the territory of one of the belligerents. The neutral country was apparently Switzerland, and the 'anarchist elements' were to smuggle the bacteria in fountain pens to Russia. There is reason to doubt the authenticity of the report, nor is it certain that the scheme would have been practical. But in the 1920s the danger was taken seriously, and a study commission on bacteriological warfare was established by the League of Nations. In 1936 a first nerve gas (GA-tabun) was synthesised in Germany, to be followed by the discovery of even more toxic agents — sarin (GB) in 1938, and soman in 1944, all of them fatal within minutes. They all belong to the organophosphates (OPA), a substance first discovered as far back as 1854; but its toxic properties were then unknown. Considerable quantities of these and other gases were produced by the belligerents in the second world war but not used. In 1944 a germ warfare centre was established in the United States; there were similar establishments in other countries. Even before the first nuclear device had been exploded, scientists and statesmen in the United States voiced the fear that some insane people or agents of a hostile power could smuggle a bomb wherever they wanted — 'twenty thousand tons of TNT can be kept under the counter of a candy store'. The possibility of such a threat has been discussed and investigated ever since, During the last seven years there have been 175 cases of threatened violence at nuclear facilities; in 1973 a group of ERP terrorists attacked a nuclear plant near Buenos Aires which was not, however, operating yet; a fire was started in 1975 at a nuclear plant at Fessenheim, France, allegedly by the Meinhof-Puig Antich group. With the growth of the civil nuclear industry, the establishment of new reactors all over the world and the declassification of technical information the danger has grown that technically competent people having stolen a sufficient quantity of plutonium could build a primitive nuclear device. The plutonium needed could either be stolen while in transport or smuggled out from a plant. Nor were the theft of a nuclear device or the 'emergence of a black market in plutonium ruled out. However stringent the means of control employed, it was assumed that they could not possibly be totally effective. Various official and private reports concluded that a sufficiently determined and able group could perform acts of sabotage endangering not only nuclear plants but also the safety of the public living in its vicinity. Another study stated that the acquisition of special nuclear materials by a terrorist group was a threat to be taken very seriously. If the United States faced such dangers, they existed, a fortiori, in other countries in which supervision was less effective and terrorism more active. Yet another study argued that while INW (illicit nuclear weapon) production was both plausible and feasible, the probability for success was low. Assuming that SNM (special nuclear material) had been acquired in sufficient quantity, an effort by a sizeable group of people would be needed over a lengthy period. There was low probability that such a group would have the skills, motivations, resources and opportunities to make the venture a success. The fuel delivered to atomic plants has characteristics which make it nearly impossible to convert to nuclear weapons. The terrorist group would have to steal a number of centrifuges to produce high enrichened uranium from stolen low enrichened or natural uranium. The popular idea of a nuclear device produced in a garage and transported on a tricycle seems to belong for the time being to the realm of fantasy. Technical details are classified; it is believed however that the weight of an effective device would be at least one ton, possibly twice as much. Various other means of nuclear sabotage have been mentioned, such as the disposal of plutonium powder. All these possibilities have to be taken seriously, and the danger will undoubtedly increase in future even though the risks involved for nuclear terrorists are formidable. According to some estimates there is a 50 per cent death risk in stealing nuclear material, and about 30 per cent in bomb manufacture. But terrorist groups ready to make use of nuclear devices or poisonous substances cannot be measured by rational standards in any case, and it is also true that the technical obstacles would be greatly reduced if the terrorists could count on the help of a friendly government which had nuclear reactors and the facilities to produce plutonium or uranium-235. All this may take longer than some experts assume but there is little reason to doubt that 'if present trends continue, it seems only a question of time before some terrorist organisation exploits the possibilities of coercion which are latent in nuclear fuel'. In the meantime certain safeguards — sensors for instance — may he developed which at present do not exist. But there is no reason to assume that there will ever be totally effective safeguards.
Most attention has focused on the potential of nuclear blackmail because it is the most dramatic threat; but modern technology has provided other, equally lethal weapons more frequently discussed in the scientific literature than in popular writing. This refers to various poisons such as the OPAs which include the nerve gases of which mention has already been made and the monofluoro-alipathic compounds as well as BTX (botulinum toxin) which is physiologically effective however it enters the body. In addition there are a great many other potential biological weapons capable of spreading contagions ranging from anthrax to bubonic plague, from certain forms of encephalitis to psittacosis. Some bacteria are difficult to cultivate or to disseminate, but the list of those that could possibly be used is still uncomfortably long. Most of the biological pathogens (like most of the highly poisonous substances) have been available for many decades but there have been several important technological developments since the second world war. These include the continuous culture of micro-organisms, the production of monodisperse aerosols and the stabilisation of organisms to maintain their viability in aerosol dissemination. At the same time modern society has become more vulnerable as the result of rapid communication, central ventilation, central water storage systems and in many other respects. Biological pathogens are more easily available than special nuclear material; transport and dissemination might be undertaken by very small groups of people, Possibly even single individuals. On the other hand, it is precisely the almost unlimited destructive character of biological Pathogens which makes them less suitable as a terrorist weapon, not only because nuclear terrorism has the greater publicity value, but mainly because a threat to use biological pathogens would be less credible. A terrorist group could prove that it is capable of carrying out a nuclear threat by exploding a device in a sparsely inhabited area, whereas a 'trial epidemic' is impossible to launch. A crude fission bomb of, say, 0.1 kiloton, would have a limited effect — that of a bomb of 100 tons of high explosive or more. It could destroy a big factory, or several blocks of buildings. An epidemic, on the other hand, could spread to all parts of the globe, which makes it impractical for international terrorism. A weapon of this kind is more likely to be used by a madman, rather than by political terrorists. For these and other reasons the use of biological weapons despite their greater availability seems less likely than the use of chemical agents, such as the OPA substances, some of which are commercially available in any Case. But chemical agents like home-made nuclear devices involve high risks for those engaged in their preparation and their effectiveness is not guaranteed. By the mid-1970s there had been reports of the theft of mustard gas from German ammunition bunkers allegedly by the BaaderMeinhof gang; a quantity of nerve gas (stolen by criminals) had been recovered by the Austrian police; there has been unconfirmed reports that the Baader-Meinhof gang and a Spanish terrorist group had enlisted the services of chemists and microbiologists; that an Arab pharmaceutical congress had pledged support to the PLO urging training in biological warfare. But there has not been as yet a single attempt at terror on the grand scale.
It can be taken for granted that most of the terrorist groups existing at present will not use this option, either as a matter of political principle or because it it would defeat their purpose. If weapons of this kind were used in Ulster, for instance, Catholics and Protestants alike would be the victims. But some groups might well opt for the weapons of superviolence because their aim is not political change but the total destruction of the enemy.
Various scenarios based on the spread of unconventional weaponry have been developed, such as the use, or threat of use, of arms of mass destruction by poor Third World countries against the 'rich' industrial states. Others have envisaged the emergence of two types of states — those of nations in the traditional sense, with boundaries, capital cities and national armies, and those of groups which are not nations, do not always have precisely defined national territory, but possess some sort of armed force of their own. Such scenarios, while not a priori impossible, seem a little far-fetched; 'surrogate warfare' of this kind would lead sooner or later to full-scale war. A discussion of these scenarios leads in any case beyond the confines of an essay which is not concerned with state terrorism. It seems possible, in theory, that the weapons of superviolence would endanger totalitarian rule as much as democratic societies. But the means of control on which totalitarian rule rests makes this much less likely; there may be the necessary determination on the part of enemies of the regime, but opportunity will be far less than in an open society.
' Credible threats of the use of arms of mass destruction would face governments with agonising choices. The advocacy of surrender (as suggested by Professor Feld and others) seems natural enough, but it would not, of course, answer the challenge.
For according to experience, one case of successful blackmail leads to another and yet another; a left-wing nuclear threat would sooner or later be countered by a similar threat from the extreme right; and there would be conflicting threats of nuclear terror or biological or chemical warfare by nationalist separatist groups. This would lead to constant tyranny by small groups of people or, more likely, total anarchy and possibly widespread destruction, unless, of course, society learns to face blackmail. Society may be spared the dilemma but if the emergency arose countermeasures could involve a degree of state control and represion hitherto unknown in any democratic society except at a time of war. In the long run it could result in the surrender of sovereign rights thought unthinkable at the present. But then it would be a situation at least as dangerous as full-scale war and if a choice has to be made lzetween survival and a restriction of civil liberty and sovereign rights there is no doubt what the response would be. Whether preventive measures could forestall an emergency of this kind is a moot question, but if it came to it, greater clarity about the roots and the character of terrorism would be needed to face the threat without panic and hysteria.
The debate on whether or not one should compromise with terrorists has lasted a long time. Concessions may be advisable in some exceptional cases; consistent conciliation of terrorism on the other hand is bound to claim a higher toll in human life in the long run than resisting it. But while terrorism is on a relatively small scale it is not really that important what kind of line is taken; societies facing a determined terrorist onslaught will opt for a hard-line policy in any case. But what is true with regard to a period in which terrorism is no more than a nuisance does not, of course, apply to an age in which mankind may be threatened by weapons of superviolence • There is the certainty that society would not be able to satisfy the grievances real or imaginary, the demands justified or unjustified, of all its members in the foreseeable future. There is equally the certainty that some individuals will have at some future date the skill and determination to dictate their wishes to society. Such action would, of course, be irrational, leading sooner or later to destruction without precedent. But is this likely to deter individuals or small groups of people convinced that the whole world ought to be punished if their demands, whatever they might be, are not met?
If these are the more distant dangers, there is reason for concern also for the near future. Attempts have already been made by terrorist groups to use precision guided weapons, such as the Soviet SA-7 or the American Redeye, against civilian aircraft.
This does not necessarily add a new dimension to the technology of modern terrorism, but it could lead sooner or later to war between nations. For country X, the victim of such an attack, would assume, rightly or wrongly, that the terrorists were acting on behalf of country Y, which financed and trained them and provided the weapons. It could retaliate by bombing the capital or the oilfields of that country or in some other way. The assumption underlying the policy of the sponsors of international terrorism that they will escape retaliation cannot be taken for granted.
If these are the future perspectives, they are far removed indeed from the origins of political terrorism inasmuch as they were rooted in the struggle against despotism and in tyrannicide. Terrorism appeared in the secret societies and revolutionary organisations of the nineteenth century fighting a tyranny against which there was no legal redress. It was adopted by national movements against foreign oppressors, but also by some movements of the extreme left and right. Circumstances still vary from country to country and what is said about one is not necessarily true with regard to another. By and large, however, there has been an essential change in the character of ter. rorism with the shedding of restraints on the one hand, the growing practice of indiscriminate murder on the other, the emergence of multinational, remotecontrolled terror and, above all, the failure or unwillingness to challenge effective dictatorships. Once it was the strategy of the poor and weak used against ruthless tyrants; today its more prominent representatives are no longer poor, and modern technology is giving them powerful weapons. Some present-day terrorist groups have quite clearly acquired the characteristics once attributed to tyranny, atrox et notoria iniuria; the tyrant wanted to impose his will on society and to keep it at ransom and so do terrorists. Others genuinely believe in their liberating mission, yet if their actions have any effect at all it is that of unwitting pacemakers of a new breed of tyrants. The wheel has come full circle; modern terrorism from its beginnings could challenge only non-terrorists, that is, governments or groups which would stop short at using their own weapons. It first appeared on the scene under the banner of freedom and democracy and at a time when it was thought that these ideas would prevail all over the world. These hopes have not come true and nondemocratic regimes, unlike the democracies, suffer from no inhibitions in dealing with political opponents. If the power of democratic societies shrinks so does the • sphere in which terrorism can operate.
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