FORTIFICATION.
THE successful termination of the attack on Sebastopol has revived the controversy on the new system of fortification alleged to have i been employed n its defence. On one side the statement is, that the long resistance of the Russians establishes the validity of the new system, known as the Ferguson system ; on the other it is contended, that no new principles of attack or defence have been established in the so-called siege. Without dogmatizing on the subject, we may be allowed to present some considerations sug- gested by the perusal of the accounts describing the reduction of the place. - The weak point in the controversy lies in the mistaken notion of the object for which places are fortified. That object is twofold,— to form points of support to an army in the field, in other words a secure base of operations; or to delay a hostile army until a relieving army can come up and raise the siege. Fortifications are not and cannot be impregnable ; because in nearly every case they can be invested, and their fall becomes simply a question of time and means. But the South side of Sebastopol was not a fortress in the ordinary sense of the term. It was, what it has been so often called, an intrenched camp, uninvested, amply supplied, and de- fended by an army constantly reinforced. In one sense, indeed, the garrison of this so-called fortress was the whole strength of the Russian army available for operations in the Crimea. From another point of view, taking in the whole surface occupied by the Russians, we may consider Sebas- topol as a position, and a position of that kind, as we have pre- viously pointed out, which is the strongest known—namely, a position covered on one side by steep heights plentifully garnished with men and guns, and on the other by stupendous earthworks, enclosing an arsenal and many ships of war. It is, therefore, an entirely exceptional position.
Bearing in mind these limitations let us consider the nature of the works raised in defence of the South side of Sebastopol. They
consisted of an enormous triangle of earthworks, the base of which was the great roadstead, and the forts on the North aide. The principle on which these earthworks were constructed was, that every point of importance on the external line should be com-
manded by the guns of an internal line, and that every assailable point should be likewise protected by a flanking fire from another,
in addition to its own direct fire ; so that storming without pushing the sap up to the ditch should be as impracticable as in a stone fortification. In addition to this, the interiors of the main works were so arranged as to afford not only bomb-proof shelter to the garrison from a vertical fire, but means of effectual defence by the garrison in ease any portion was carried,—as in the case of the salient of the Great Redan, the Little Redan, and the Central Bastion, where the experiment was tried. Two other conditions of defence were necessary,—an unlimited supply of guns and muni- tions, and an unlimited supply of men and provisions. The former existed in the arsenal; the latter were poured in from the North side.
Such were the means of defence adopted, and such the advan- tages enjoyed by the enemy. How were they taken from him ? Without asserting that the evidence is conclusive, we may point to the fact, that where he adhered to the principles of his defence
—works within works open to the rear—he made a triumphant defence ; and that in the single instance where he departed from that principle he met with a disastrous, a decisive defeat. At the
Little Redan, at the Central Bastion, at the Great Redan, the ap- proaches were flanked by guns, the works were open to the rear ; there was free scope for the employment of troops, and, what is more, of field-artillery. But the Korniloff Bastion, the key of the place, was, strangely enough, closed to the rear; so that when the assailants gained the interior, it was rapidly converted into a for- tress in their hands, impregnable to the enemy. The tactics of the Russians were thus turned against them, and they found that impossible, which, probably, had it been our case, we should have found impossible also—namely, to storm a redoubt amply manned and continuously supplied. Thus, where the principles of the new system were observed, we failed ; and where they were abandoned, we succeeded. Nor is the success explained by saying that the French approaches were carried, with persevering energy, to the very ditch of the Malakoff; because the retort is, that the approaches were also carried to the ditch of the Little Redan, and to that of the Central Bastion ; that, like the stormers of the Malakoff, the stormers of the Little Re-
dan and of the Central Bastion did carry the outer line at the first rush, but found that they could not hold it under the withering
discharges from the guns and muskets of the second line. Is it
not fair to infer that the Malakoff was held because it was pro- vided with no second line ; and that the new principle of defence—
that of lines of earthworks commanding each other, and supplied with unlimited guns, ammunition, and men—did prove successful at Sebastopol ? For have not these arrested the numbers, the skill, and the means of the Allies, for a whole year ?
Now, as we take it, the real value of these earthworks depends upon this and nothing more—that they are good so long as de- fenders are numerous and the means plentiful, but of no avail whatever, for the purpose of arresting the progress of an army, where the defenders Fe few and the means limited. Thus the whole question resolves itself, to give the discussion a practical application, into a sufficiency of prompt engineering skill and means, and a sufficiency of money.
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