SOME RECENT SCIENTIFIC BOOKS.*
IT is an extraordinary fact that any event of startling import- ance, any discovery which concentrates public interest in one particular direction in human knowledge, produces immediately in its train a flood of literature on the subject, so that we are left to imagine, either that there has been a terrific effort on the part of all specialists to set down their knowledge in the least possible time, or that a pile of manuscript is ever awaiting the opportune moment to emerge into publication. For the affairs of science the yearly event of the British Association meetings provides a temporary revival of public interest ; and, incidentally, we take the opportunity of this moment to review the most important scientific publications of the last few months.
As regards the inclusion of psychology in the domain of science there is a certain difficulty of selection, owing to the dual nature of the subject-matter. For, while eventually the fate and future of mankind must largely depend on the convergence of the three lines of research which mental science offers into one synthesis, yet, at present, the gulf between the mental and physiological aspects seems as wide and unbridgeable as ever. Consequently, we are in- clined to relegate the physiological aspect to science, the teleological aspect to metaphysics, and to keep analytical psychology or psycho-analysis in a third and separate depart- ment of inquiry. In the domain of physical science, Pro- fessor Hobson's Gifford Lectures' must claim priority by virtue of their purpose in defining the intellectual status and value of natural science among the problems of the present day. And the treatment is comprehensive, inasmuch as the whole domain, from pure mathematical theory to the biological problems of heredity and evolution, is very conscientiously covered by the able and concise mind of the author. The final chapters on the theistic problem, constituting the appendix expected of all Gifford Lecturers, need hardly be considered in any estimation of the value of the work.
Professor Hobson is primarily a very distinguished pure mathematician, and it is natural that he should be insistent on the fact that science is, from every aspect and in every department, a conceptual scheme ; and that as the underlying conceptions of all physical schemata become more and more abstract, so the theory of physical realism becomes the 'ess tenable. This is the natural point of view of one whose bias is mathematical. For although, undoubtedly, physical perceptions were the starting-point of pure mathe- matical theory, yet it has the power of outstripping the demands of physical application, and of constructing abstract systems to which, as far as is known at present, there are no physical parallels. On the other hand, if the most practical- minded amongst us were to consider these systems as poten- tially capable of application, in order to satisfy the craving of their minds, the thought would procure for them at the same time a delightful, unlimited vision of the future of physical science. And it must be said, in defence of this luxury of speculative symbolism—the expression adopted by the applied mind for any excursions into pure mathe- matical theory—that when, as has often happened in the past, the conceptions and experiments of physical science fail in the face of some overwhelming obstacle, then pure (1) The Domain of Natural Science. By E. W. Hobson, F.H.B. Cambridge : At the University Press. [21s. net.]—(2) Scientific Method. By A. D. Ritchie. London : Began Paul. [10s. ad. net.]—(3) The Constitution of Matter. By Max Born. Translated by E. W. Blair and T. S. Wheeler. London : Methuen. [Os. net.] --(4) The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition. By C. Spearman. London : Macmillan. [15s. net.]—(5) The Wonder Book of Chemistry. By Jean H. Fake. London : Fisher Unwin. [10s. net]
mathematical theory steps in, with its advance-guard systems, and reconstructs or reforms, the basic concepts. The theories of relativity are, of course, the outstanding examples of such a procedure.
Throughout the book Professor Hobson makes us aware of the limitations of scientific knowledge, and, even in the chapter on Number and its developments where he is at his best, he cautiously points out the inadvisability of assuming too much scope and possibility of application for such entities as the transfinite numbers, the theory of which, as he says, " was created for a special purpose, that of dealing with certain aspects of the numerically infinite ; and its construc- tions and results are all dependent upon a set of postulations and definitions which it has been the aim of investigators to make as precise in character as possible." Professor Hobson even deprecates their use in philosophical speculations. In his subsequent treatment of the problems of physical science he is less convincing, inasmuch as he seems to have appended all the knowledge derived from the latest developments in physical concepts as an afterthought to the older views of Space, Time and Causation. In fact, the whole book has a flavour of a bygone epoch in science, in spite of the author's evident mastery of the most modern developments in the mathematical and physical sciences. As we have already suggested, throughout the lectures he emphasizes the limita- tions of purely scientific knowledge, and hints at the probabili- ties for the existence of a less limited type of apprehension ; but when, in the final theistic chapters, it seems that this hint might have been brought to fulfilment in some expression of belief or doubt, he remains indecisive. Nevertheless, the book as a whole shows a breadth of vision and a grasp, both of the future possibilities and the necessary limitations of scientific knowledge, which must command our respect and admiration.
Mr. Ritchie's Scientific Method,2 published lately in Messrs. Kegan Paul's most excellent international series, is likewise concerned with the general problem of the value of science. But, instead of considering the body of results of scientific research as constituting scientific permanence, Mr. Ritchie seeks for it in the method. As he puts it : " Theory may supersede theory, and more accurate analysis may demolish our apparent facts, but there is a unity and continuity about the method that the mind should be able to grasp, and that is the very essence of science. . . . The kind of definition of science that is required, therefore, is that of science as a process rather than a collection of results. . . . science is the process of exploring the external world." And in the critical survey of this method Mr. Ritchie states his problem to be that of deciding in what measure there is justification for holding any scientific theories whatsoever. An ambitious project, and one which would suggest the necessity for the preliminary establishment of a definite philosophical or epistemological position. In this matter we think that Mr. Ritchie is justifiably brief, bold, and to the point. He makes one metaphysical assumption only, but it is one which undeni- ably carries a good deal with it. He assumes the existence of a perceiving mind and the existence of an object that is perceived—otherwise, the time-worn Subject-Object relation. He dismisses the necessity for any last analyses of such problems together with the question of truth and falsehood, except in so far as the latter helps in the definition of a proposi- tion. For propositions are necessary entities in any criticism of scientific method. Obviously, Mr. Ritchie has been saturated in the atmosphere created by the brains of Russell, Whitehead, Moore and Broad ; and only occasionally does he extricate him- self to make some independent observation. One of these is the-rather stimulating observation, that pure mathematicians and logicians, in spite of their detachment and their constant toasts to the eternal uselessness of pure theory, always select entities which have some connection with the external world, out of which to derive their self-consistent and logical systems. Instead; for instance, of studying some functions which have no praetical application, they choose numbers, which arc of great practical importance. For even the remote trans- finitudes have relations with the objects of every-day life. This observation is a serious reflection upon the purity and detachment of pure mathematics.
The analysis that follows, of the relation between deduction and induction as dependent upon measurement and numer- ability, is very suggestive ; but it is disappointing when elaborated in separate chapters. There are two chapters on induction and scientific laws—pre-Keynes. and post-Keynes, respectively. The book all through is stimulating, and is delightfully written, but the purpose seems to be rather lost sight of after the introductory chapters only to be recalled again at the end.
Of other more technical scientific works, there is an inter- esting translation of Max Born's valuable summary of recent work on the constitution of matter? The essays of which it is composed were written primarily for the benefit of people who have not the time to give to Professor Sommerfeld's more elaborate treatise, also published in translation by Messrs. Methuen.
Amongst the recent multitude of books on psychology, there is, in our opinion, only one which, according to our previous classification, may be relegated to the scientific category. Professor Spearman has made a life study of the laboratory problems of mental measurement, and has now published the results of his deliberations in a book which is to be the fore- runner of a later and profounder work. The present volume* is a record of patient endeavour and thought concentrated on the establishment of definite fundamental, psychological principles. Prof. Spearman found the current psychology of cognition in a deplorable condition, largely owing to the isolation into two water-tight compartments of theory and laboratory practice. Lack of any ultimate laws, any genuine scientific foundations, seemed to him to lie at the root of the evil, and he became convinced that the establishment of such necessary principles was not only possible but feasible.
Noegenesis is the name given by Dr. Spearman to his theory that all cognitive events, alike with those of physics, admit of reduction to a small number of definitely formulatable prin- ciples. His whole inquiry leads up to the establishment of the three main principles, and five subordinate, quantitative ones, whereby he is going to reconstruct the whole of psychology. Whether psychology will permit itself to be reconstructed thus, remains to be seen. The further application of the five quantitative principles will, apparently, be elaborated in the later work. Dr. Spearman is carried far beyond where we can follow him, in his hopes for the application of these principles. Here is part of his peroration—" in the said principles must lie, therefore, an exhaustive determination of the entire cosmos, not only in so far as this can be truly known, but even to the extent that it can be thought of at all. . . ."
One book remains to be mentioned. Fabre's Wonder Book of Chemistry 5 is a relief and a joy after wrestling with problems in the turbulence of controversy. It should be reserved for some hour of the day when tranquillity and the leisure for a very charming story-book are, possible. Apart from the theme and the way in which it is developed, there is a personal biographical interest in the book which is rendered very delightfully. It has not lost in translation any of the charm which it possessed in the original and tenderer language.
AKETHE MCEWEN.
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