TOPICS OF THE DAY.
FRANCE'S DILEMMA.
THE Germ an Premiers have agreed with the Central Government, most wisely as we think, that passive resistance in the Ruhr must cease. The French Government have thus in appearance secured a triumph for their policy, but it is in appearance only. Their real difficulties are about to begin. We say this with no bitterness towards France, and with no desire to see her in trouble. For the very reason that we wish well to France, and want to see her just claims justly fulfilled, we cannot pretend that things are other than they are. If we take stock of the present position and then compare it with the position in which France stood last January, the losses to which she has been put by the occupation of the Ruhr cannot but be regarded with amazement by lookers-on, and with deep anxiety by Frenchmen capable of understanding a political balance-sheet.
We will put the chief items of the account side by side, and let our readers judge whether our opinion is substan- tiated. At the end of last year France retained in essen- tials the almost unanimous support of the British people. A portion of our public was, no doubt, critical in certain matters, but this did not prevent a general confidence in the good intentions of France. Look at the situation now. Except for a small section of the nation, who in effect hold that the French Government can do no wrong, this confidence has been shattered.
There has also arisen an idea that France is coldly indifferent to British feeling, and will make not the slightest sacrifice of her own views in order to meet our strongest wishes. Rather, our wishes and hopes are treated with disdain. When we tried to meet France by an offer, probably the most generous that has ever been made by one nation to another, she received that offer with something like contempt. It was either ignored or else explained away as so hopelessly inadequate as to be unworthy of attention !
To say that the action of the French Government was resented here would be to use language quite inadequate to the occasion. If our people had not felt that the situation was too serious to allow amour propre to be considered even for a moment there would have been an outburst of indignation in England which would have surprised the world. The British think—rightly, no doubt—that national pride is apt to become a vice ; but all the same we are still at heart a proud people. But enough on this point. The essential thing to note is that public confidence in the present French Government has been destroyed.
The occupation of the Ruhr both as a matter of policy and because of the ruthless way in which it has been carried out, is strongly opposed by almost every section of the community. Liberals, whether led by Mr. Asquith or Mr. Lloyd George, are unanimous in condemning it.
The Labour Party regards it with abhorrence. The Unionist Party is in a sense divided on the matter, but we cannot doubt that the majority of Unionists are opposed to the policy and action of the French Govern- ment. They are not any more Pro-German than they ever were, but they are not now Pro-French. Even those who are most distrustful of the Germans and most anxious to punish them, and who are most desirous to support France, have no thought of opposing Mr. Baldwin and his policy of firm opposition to what France is doing in Germany. We cannot pretend to regard France as still our Ally when in regard to the casus foederis she is taking action which is not only independent but excites our strong disapproval. Theft is not a suggestion among even the most eager friends of France that Mr. Baldwin's Government is to be opposed in Parliament or forced to change its policy towards France. If French opinion is unwise enough to take the line that no substantial loss is sustained in forfeiting the confidence and good will of the British people, let her face and examine the hard facts of the situation as a whole. The avowed object of France is to obtain reparations from Germany. But will anyone venture to say that Germany, bled white financially by the ' struggle in the Ruhr, is in a better position to furiLmoney by the thousand million sterling than she was nine months ago ? Is the Ruhr, with its silent mines, smoke- less chimneys and its sullen, half-starved, revengefully-. minded people, a better place from which to get coal and iron and cash than it was last January ? Only if debts are easier to collect from bankrupts, into whose hearts the iron of hate and *despair has entered, than from men with some hope of recovery. Can France possibly say that her reparation prospects are brighter ?
Next, consider the situation of France in her domestic affairs, for the effects of phantom and barren victories like that which she has just won cannot be evaded. Let her look at the value of the franc now, and then recall the figure of December 31st, 1922. That tells her financial situation more plainly than words.
It is nonsense to talk about hostile operators and foreign conspiracies... to keep the franc down. Such influences, if they existed, could not resist the far stronger desire to keep the franc as high as possible.. The foreign exchanges do not lie, they are not chimeras. They register the exact opini ons of the traders and financiers of the world, men whose minds turn on money, not on high policy. Their diagnosis of the economic position of France is not favourable. How could it be ! The hope of getting reparations from Germany in a reasonable time has faded to almost nothing. France in her folly rejected Britain's offer to let her off half her debt, and who knows whether that offer will ever be renewed ?
America watches and waits for her money with a hard face and with the unanswerable comment, " If France is rich enough to keep a million of men under arms, to subsidize her Polish and Little Entente Allies, to reject the British compromise on the Debt, and to waste her opportunities of getting cash out of Germany, she must be rich enough to pay us in full."
And all the time France is borrowing and printing paper money and spending money like water to ruin the industries of the Ruhr and to make Germany poorer than she was before ! The financial side of the Ruhr policy has never been told to France or to the world, but it may in some measure be guessed. France has a vast and growing army on German soil. What does that mean in daily expenditure ?
What of the future ? What will France do next ? How does she propose to get out of the Ruhr imbroglio ? How will she deal with a status lymphatieus on the Ruhr which may prove far more embarrassing than passive resistance ? What proposals is she- going to make to us and her other Allies as to a new way of getting reparations out of Germany, for the initiative now rests with her ? Finally, what proposals is she going to make to Britain and to the United States as to the payment of her debts ? We are both waiting, and not too patiently, for here, again, the initiative is with her. These questions are so embarrassing to France and so menacing that we shall not discuss them further. To do so might seem to suggest a hostility towards France, which has no exist- ence. We want nothing so little as to seem to be exulting- in her difficulties and dangers. _
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