TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN.
IN spite of the optimistic telegrams that have been so freely sent from America as to the result of the Report on the loss of the Maine,' we remain convinced that, short of that unforeseen event happening which may always, and sometimes does, happen in politics, war will speedily break out over Cuba. We may be told that we are alarmists, but let any of those who think that peace is not going to be disturbed ask them- selves calmly what are their grounds for optimism, and what influences are at work to affect the situa- tion. Peace, it is clear, might be secured in any one of the following ways. There would be no war if America were to give up her claim to interfere in the matter of the Cuban revolt, and were to say frankly We have made a mistake. We have no locus standi we find for dictating to Spain what policy she ought to pursue in regard to her revolted island. Spain, after all, has a right to do what she will with her own, and we have nothing to do with the matter. It may be very sad, but the duty and the responsibility are not ours.' If the Americans were in effect to say that, all fear of hostilities would doubtless be banished, and Spain might pursue in security the pacification or the ruin of the island and herself. Another way in which peace could be secured would be the surrender of Spain's claim to do what she will with her own. Were Spain to let Cuba go, or even to withdraw her troops, and merely maintain a nominal suzerainty, peace would doubtless settle down on the Caribbean Sea. All need or excuse for American intervention would have ended. But will, or can, Spain consent to such an arrangement? No doubt it would be infinitely the wisest thing that Spain could do, but then nations, like men, often cannot, even if they would, do the wisest thing. Remember what a surrender to the Cubans means. It means the loss of Cuba, and the acknowledgment that Spain's colossal efforts to subdue the island have been in vain. It means that the two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers sent to Cuba have been sent in vain, that some £60,000,000 has been spent in vain, and that perhaps one hundred thousand men have been killed, or permanently ruined in health, for absolutely no result. Are these conclusions which the Government of a very proud and not very wise or businesslike people are likely to accept until they are absolutely forced to do so ? They would be accepted with difficulty by a Government which was absolutely secure at home. With how much more difficulty would they be accepted by a Government which is hard beset by an active pretender, and a. Government too which, if it commands the respect, does not in any sense command the enthusiasm of the people. The Queen-Regent is greatly respected, as she deserves to be ; but there is no sign that the last remains of the grandees of Spain would rally round her as the magnates of Hungary rallied round her great-grandmother with the cry of "Moriamur pro rege nostro,"—especially, too, as the rallying cry would have to be the surrender of Spain's last great colony.
There remains one other alternative,—one which seems most reasonable to Englishmen and Americans. That is, that the rebels, with the financial aid of the United States, should buy Spain out. It is stated from Washington that such an offer has already been made to the Spanish Govern- ment. The Cuban Provisional Government, of course with the guarantee of the United States, is to raise .P.40,000,000—a milliard of francs —and hand this sum over to Spain as soon as the last Spanish soldier has left the island. As we have said, the plan will seem very reasonable to Englishmen and Americans. They will argue that Spain will be rid of the terrible drain of the Cuban insurrection, and will have at the same time a round sum in gold sufficient to meet her immediate home needs, which must be very pressing. No doubt that is common- sense, but unless we are greatly mistaken, it is not the sort of sense that will appeal to Spain. A matter of that kind, is, after all, decided not by the Government, but by the people, and the people will argue It matters to us very little whether the Treasury is for the moment full or empty. Perhaps if we were given a permanent surplus by the offer of America it might be worth. accepting, but £40,000,000 is not that. It will all go at once, not to lighten our burdens or even to build more ships, but to reimburse the usurers who have taken up the floating Debt. Practically, we shall get nothing by the arrangement except the loss of Cuba. If we go on as we are we shall manage somehow, for if we are pressed too hard we can always repudiate. At any rate, we will not sacrifice our national honour. If we are beaten out of Cuba by superior force, well and good,—we yield to fate. Don't, how- ever, let us sneak out with a bag of gold in our pockets? Depend upon it, these arguments will tell heavily with the Spanish people, if not with the Spanish Ministry, and are sure to be reflected on the mind of the Government, for Senor Sagasta knows his own people.
Another factor to be considered is the position of the Queen-Regent. In Thursday's issue the Vienna corre- spondent of the Standard gives what he tells us is the substance of a letter addressed by the Queen-Regent to some of her Austrian relatives. It runs as follows. "I am in the difficult position," wrote the Queen, according to the information of the Standard correspondent, "of having to act as the guardian of the dynasty, which I must not expose to any danger, and, at the same time, as the defender of the rights of Spain, of her honour and interests. The surrender of Cuba in any form whatever would unquestionably injure the dynasty under which it took place, whereas to light for it, if necessary, would keep those interests intact, together with the honour of my country. But the disadvantages under which Spain would have to fight are obvious, and a peaceful solution would best serve every purpose." Now, if this letter is in substance authentic, which we in- cline to think it is, the Queen-Regent realises that she, and so her son, would very likely be made the scapegoat for the loss of Cuba without a fight. Imagine the force of the Carlist cry, "Away with the Austrians who have sold the nation and sullied its honour !" By yielding to that cry every Spaniard would feel that he was salving his wounded honour. We have been betrayed and sold. Let us get rid of the weak and cowardly dynasty who allowed such.
treason. The older Bourbons had faults, but at least they how to face the foes of Spain.' That is, by making a scapegoat of the Queen-Regent the Spaniards would get rid of the sense of humiliation. Clearly the Queen dare not give them that opportunity. On the other hand, if Cuba is torn from Spain by the iron hand of America, after the Spanish Government has made a brave fight, the country will feel no sense of dishonour. They will sub- mit to fate with sorrow and regret, but with uninjured pride. It is, indeed, quite possible that an unsuccessful war in which the Queen behaved with heroism (as she certainly would) would make the Spanish people really devoted to her and her son, and determined to keep the present dynasty on the throne. The Spaniards are not a base people, and their instinct would be to stand by the Queen who had stood by the nation and risked everything to maintain its honour. Practically, then, there are no strong influences at work in Spain inclining the Government to the policy of being bought out. But we have already been obliged to dismiss the alternatives of aban- donment of her present position by America and complete surrender by Spain, as impossible. War, therefore, would seem the only outcome. Still, we must say at the end of this article, as at the beginning, that it is always possible In politics that some unforeseen event or influence or tendency may appear and change everything. If the unforeseen happens, there may of course be peace. If not, we hold, as before, that war is the only possible end of the Cuban difficulty. After all, was it likely that the American claim to interfere in the affairs of an independent nation would be acquiesced in without resistance ? We support and approve of the American claim to interfere, but that does not blind us to the momentous character and tremen- dous consequences of that claim.
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