2 DECEMBER 1854, Page 15

THE WAR ADMINISTRATION.

SIR—I observe that in your various papers on the War, you have hitherto abstained from blaming Ministers for the manner in which it has been con- ducted; and such being the case, I know your independence too well not to believe that you do not consider them worthy of blame. Now I have come to a different conclusion ; and 'shall be very glad if I can induce you to dis- cuss the matter fully, and to set me right where I am wrong. Jam both politically and personally a friend to the Ministers : I admire and support their domestic policy' 1 have no sympathy whatever with their opponents. It is, therefore, with the greatest reluctance that I have become convinced of the utter incompetency which they have shown to conduct the operations of the war. I must begin by reminding you, that they had ample time for preparations, and ample warning that such would be required, inasmuch as for nearly a rear before the declaration of war matters had been gradually and steadily ;. drifting" in that direction. No one, then, can say they were taken by surprise. Nor did they allege any want of preparation. On the contrary, the tone used by them on commencing the war was one of unlimited and presumptuous confidence. There was promise enough ; now, let Us look to the performance. First, as to the fleets. We sent into the enemy's waters two fleets, which, through their junction with the French, maintained the command of those waters. Except for the junction with the French, "the greatest naval power in the world" would have been numerically in- ferior at sea to the Russians. As it was, however, the Allied fleets com- manded the sea : but they did no more. For want, as we are told, of vessels of the proper class, our naval forces have been almost totally inactive. Now, at the end of the first naval campaign, we hear of thirty gun and mortar boats being built for special service in the Baltic. In other words, " habemus confitentes." Why were they not built last year, i. e. in time ? There is no mystery about the Baltic navigation. The Government might easily have ascertained what kind of craft was required for it. Surely it were not too much to ask that a Bzitish Government anticipating a Russian war should have provided beforehand the most plainly necessary machinery for conduct- ing it.

Again, as regards the medical department. I would premise, that, being far the richest nation in the world, and having in proportion to our resources the smallest army, that army ought to be beyond all question the best equipped and provided. No conceivable appliance in its utmost perfection should be wanting. Our authorities are condemned by the mere fact of a comparison in these respects with other armies being possible : but more than this—having carefully noted the conflicting statements on this matter, I cannot avoid the conviction that this department was inexcusably ill- managed. Here, as elsewhere the Government has been dragged in the wake of public opinion; whatever it has done has been done under the pres- sure of the newspapers, and even now has left much undone. In saying this, I do not rely solely on the statements of newspaper correspondents, nor on private letters, though I must say their remarkable unanimity is strong evidence. I rely on the admissions of Government itself, implied by its act- ing subsequently, though under pressure, and too late. Mr. Guthrie's ap- peal to the Times forced on it an ambulance corps. Public indignation has just compelled it to supply in part the deficiency of nurses and surgeons, and hospital necessaries. Yet even in last Saturday's Times, I see an announce- ment from the highest authority, Miss Nightingale herself, that in the primary requirement of lint and linen rags there is still a deficiency ; to supply which (proh pudor !) she is compelled to appeal to public charity. And in the same paper, I see the officer commanding one of the brigades of Guards states, that for 250 wounded men on board the vessel which took him to Scutari, there were but one surgeon and one inexperienced assistant. What can Mr. Herbert say to these indisputable facts ?

But I come now to the most serious charge against Ministers—namely, the inadequacy of the army. After a year of threatening and warning, Ministers went to war against the greatest military power in the world with an army on the peace establishment. Even after war was declared, they did not take one vigorous step to increase it, but, having succeeded in sending a force of 30,000 men to invade Russia, (!) they sat down with folded arms, as though to reflect complacently on the energy they had displayed. They have failed ; the honour of England has been compromised ; thousands of precious lives have been sacrificed ; and I trust the country will remember that Ministers alone are responsible for this. Let no one say they have done all that was possible, and that the country had not the means or the will to do more. As to the means, five-and-forty years ago, when our population was little more than half and our wealth not a quarter of what they now are, we had 240,000 regular troops, and in all 800,000 men under arms. As to the will —Ministers cannot pretend that Parliament or the country would have re- fused demands for men or money. They know the country was more than ready to anticipate, and to go bey ond them.

They know that, even so far as they have gone, the country has driven them, not they the country. But, again, they cannot say they could not do more, when they did not even try. Until the actual declaration of war, they made no increase in the army. Even after the declaration, though they took a vote for 50,000 additional men, they adopted no extraordinary step for raising them. The consequence is, that of that miserably inadequate number only 30,000 men have been raised. Again I rely on their own implied ad- mission. Now, under the pressure of public indignation, and when it is too late, they are raising the bounty, reducing the standard, embodying the Militia. Why did they not do this in time to save the country's honour and her soldiers' blood ? Again, as Lord Granville has told us, in July the Go- vernment sent out orders to invade the Crimea, and about 5000 men to form a new division of the army. From that time until the the 8th November, when the Forty-sixth landed at Balaklava, I do not believe that a single de- tachment was sent to supply the waste of war and disease. It would really appear as though the Government thought 60,000 French and English troops were a match for the unbroken force of the Russian empire ! Once more, I say, their subsequent acts condemn them. Now they are sending, we are told, sonic 12,000 men to turn the tide of fortune ; now, when it is too late. Why did they not do in time what they have done now ? If, the moment they heard of the landing in the Crimea, those 12,000 men, with a pro- portionate contingent of French troops, had been sent, their presence might have been decisive. Now the Emperor of Russia has the start of us, and is bringing up three men to our one.

In all matters of detail it is the same thing. We are informed in the Government newspaper, that on the 20th November,—a period when the Crimea is usually covered with snow,—a contract was made for huts for the army. At the date of the last advices, though the weather had of coarse become piercingly cold, no winter clothing had reached the troops; in short, it is very clear that the Government had made no preparations for a winter craa.Patign, Now, Sir, I know that thinking men throughout the country had a Toy different opinion about the nature of the expedition : they stood aghast when they heard that 60,000 _men, weakened by disease, had been

sent to take Sebastopol. Then they fell back on the persuasion that Govern- ment must know better—must have reliable information that the common notions about Russia were erroneous, and that a very slight effort on our part would "crumple her up." But now we have found out that they had no such information—apparently no information at all—but either shared Mr. Cobden's delusions, or simply took a -"leap lathe dark," without making the slightest provision for its turning out to be a leap down a precipice. To sum up. I charge the Government with want of political foresight— want of administrative skill—above all, with want of moral courage to de- mand of the country, in time, the efforts and sacrifices necessary to secure success.