2 DECEMBER 1871, Page 8

THE GLATTON AND COAST DEFENCE.

MR. REED has written, on the stability, security, and capa- bilities of the Glatton, a letter which really opens the whole question of Coast Defence. The Glatton is an ugly, inde- scribable, marine monster, the bulk of which is below the surface of the sea, while the portion not submerged is so near the sur- face that heavy waves can sweep over the exposed deck. She is, in fact, like a half-sunken rock, subject to the wash of the sea in rough weather, and a mobile body, to boot, liable to roll and pitch, no one can yet say to what number of degrees. She has no rigging, but Mr. Reed asserts that even if she were full-rigged, like the Captain, her stability would be double that of the lost vessel. Nevertheless, she is not and was not designed to be a sea-going cruiser, and while she could move about the Channel in "moderate weather," she is unfit "to encounter the heaviest seas of the Atlantic or the Bay of Biscay," unfit for "general ocean service." The reason is that, like the half-sunken rock in a tempest, she would be liable to be overwhelmed by the waves. No one has ventured to doubt the offensive and defensive power of the Glatton. She wears twelve-inch armour and strikes with 600-pounders from her turret, which stands clear out of the sea ; and though an enormous mass, offers little except that turret as a mark for an opponent. Thus she is a most formidable engine-of-war, the scope of her action being limited only by depth of water and rough weather. She could not move in shallow seas ; she dare not face a furious tempest, under penalty of possibly going down.

How, then, are vessels of her model to be utilized for coast defence ?

An enemy prepared to invade England would act under one of two conditions. He would either overpower our fleet, transport an army to our shores, maintain his line of com- munications with his triumphant squadrons, or he would strive to land his troops during the absence of our fleet, from what- ever cause, and trust the maintenance of his communications to his untouched fighting ships. There are many points on our shores, from Cornwall to the east of Scotland, at least as favourable for the disembarkation of an army as the coast of the Crimea. The invader would not select a fortified port for attack, although, if strong enough, he might assail one by way of diversion ; he would choose an open beach offering plenty of space for the simultaneous landing of a corps suffi- ciently strong to entrench itself at once and cover the debarka- tion of stores and matdriel. Now, in the absence of our iron- clad sea-going squadrons, it is obvious that the operation could only be impeded, interrupted, prevented, by the action of a coast flotilla,—small, swift, heavily-armed boats of light draught, whose objective should not be the protecting fleet, but the transports. Since, if the transports could be crippled, dispersed, blown up, set on fire, the result would be cheaply bought, even were the whole flotilla sacrificed ; for, providing the landing were frustrated, it would matter little that a hostile fleet should ride triumphantly in the Channel. Of course, if a regular squadron could arrive in time, the sound plan would be to engage the enemy's big ships and destroy them ; the destruction of the transports would follow ; but in the absence of a fleet of first-rate ships, the sound method of proceeding would be to risk everything in order to get at and smash or drive off the transports. If the Glatton, and vessels like her, were really able to risk any weather, one or two would have force enough to distract the hostile fleet, while the smaller fry aimed at the transports. But here arises the doubt, is the Glatton a ship that could risk any weather, even in the Chan- nel? If not, she would take her place in another category,— that of a defender of places like Portsmouth and the Nore, work for which she seems to be indubitably fit. She could prevent a single ship or several ships from bombarding Ports- mouth at long range, and if Mr. Reed is right in his estimate, she could run to any point between the Lizard and the Firth of Forth, and do her best against a hostile squadron. That doubt ought to be cleared up, and the ship assigned to her proper category in the list of floating defences.

The distinction between Harbour defence and Coast defence should be borne constantly in mind. A harbour, arsenal, dock- yard establishment is a fixed object, and should have its own means of resistance. A great depot, like Portsmouth, can be defended by torpedoes, forts, rams, floating batteries, covered with the thickest plates and carrying the largest guns. But these must be stationary. The long lines of open beach can- not be defended at all, except by means capable of being directed upon the assailed point. The defensive agencies, since the point of attack cannot be foreseen, must be essentially mobile.' The fortified harbour requires its gar- rison, the open beach demands a force analogous to an army in the field. We want, therefore, strong swift vessels of light draught for coast defence, as distinguished from harbour defence. If, for example, an enemy plainly designed an attack on Sussex or Devon, Kent or the Forth, the coast defenders, wherever they might be, would be directed upon the point assailed, with orders to risk everything in a resolute effort to frustrate the landing. In order to accom- plish this task, the craft employed should fear no weather ; the rougher the sea, the more daring and home-thrusting should be their onset, and no calculation of odds should prevent them from striving, even at the cost of destruction, from getting at the transports. Now, it is plain that a ship which could not live in violent seas would be useless for the purpose, since a gale might overtake and disable, perhaps submerge her, between the starting-point and the goal. We do not say, we have no right to say, that the Glatton could not live in any rude com- motion of the Channel or the North Sea ; we only note that there are doubts as to her capabilities, and express a hope that the doubts will be removed.

For the rest, the new gunboats appear to be just the kind of craft needed for the purpose of harassing, perhaps frustrat- ing the landing of hostile forces under circumstances most favourable to invasion. They are strong, small, swift, lot us hope, and they will be heavily armed. In the hands of young sea-dogs of the old type, they would, at least, impede an enemy's operations, and gain time for the land forces to

i gather n front of the invaders. If there were enough of them, and their operations were daring and thorough, they would prevent a landing, or bring the expedition to ruin by delay. If the fleet were absent and only required a few hours' grace to steam in upon the enemy, the gunboats would surely purchase the grace, cheap at any cost. Of course a Glatton and a swarm of such gunboats would render a landing impos- sible. The leading principles of coast defence in its most extended signiacation are, therefore, analogous to those applicable to land warfare,—local and immove- able means for the defence of harbours, arsenals, dock- yards, that is, forts, where the sites are suitable, torpedoes in any ease, with rams and mighty steam floating batteries to serve as advanced posts, solely to avert a bombardment by single irondacls at long range ; for the extensive reaches of open beach rapidly movable craft, able to work in shallow water, small enough to elude the shot of their big brothers, strong enough to resist a fair amount of battering if they are hit, and able to pour into a transport fleet a destructive and destroying fire. It is essential, should we be compelled to have recourse to the last methods, that the gunboats should be directed against the ships carrying the land forces, and that to achieve this aim they should risk everything. Happily for us there is plenty of time in which to form a navy adapted to every case. We have the most powerful ocean war-ships in the world ; we have also the Glatton and Devas- tation; we have the beginning of the " Gun-carriage " squad- ron. With these and torpedoes, our coasts and harbours—our sea-frontier—humanly speaking, ought to be secure.