2 JANUARY 1830, Page 11

MORALITY CORRUPTED BY LAW.

WE have frequently had occasion to comment on the defects of the Law, many of which are not only mischievous in themselves, but also lead to most immoral and impolitic consequences in the evasion of their administration. That must be a very evil system which ar- rays men's love of humanity against their love of truth—which places the sweetest sentiments of our nature antagonist to the solemnest religious obligation. But this shocking opposition of virtue and duties the law frequently effects ; and justice, and social policy, always suffer by the collision. Juries are sworn to find their verdicts accord- ing to the truth ; but if the truth involves a punishment for the accused far heavier than accords with their ideas of fitness, they do not hesitate to prefer violation of their oaths to furthering the inflic- tion of a cruelty. Tly.t very virtues of these men are thus, by the in- genuity of the law, converted into causes of their moral corruption,— we say moral corruption, for the man whose tongue has once con- sented to a solemn falsehood, has received a taint which is too likely to spread with any future circumstances of temptation. He who is per- jured once for humanity, will more probably perjure himself again for some less worthy cause than he who has never swerved from the obligation of an oath. The grand preservative of rectitude, is the re- sistance of first deviations from its rules. With respect to all errors, obsta principiis is the soundest maxim of conduct ; and the experi- ence ot- every one will confirm it in the observation, how much easier is abstinence than: temperance. Men who begin by sinning even for the holiest of causes, are too prone afterwards to pursue the so sanc- tioned deviation on their own private accounts. The policy of a wise law should above all things cherish a strict regard to truth, for on the discovery of truth all its virtue depends. The effect of the pesti- lent laws of England, on the contrary, is to produce falsehood in every place, and by all means capable of bringing it forth. The law of England may dispute with Satan himself for the title of" Father of Liars." Take, for example, the process on so solemn an occasion as a vial for life. A prisoner is indicted for forgery—he pleads guilty—the emit is shocked at the truth—truth is not what is wanted—the trial IS lie main business, the truth a minor consideration. The Judge says,'n substance "For God's sake, my friend, withdraw that de- claratitu ; the law, like the lottery, has its chances—trust to Provi- dence, kid tell a lie—unless we have a lie, we cannot go into the investigaton of truth. Without a lie the Court is at a stand. A lie may be greatly to your benefit. A lie may save your life, which we must !ristantly take away by sentence if you refuse yourself that accommointion. We are all sworn here to find the truth ; but finding requires setkinfr, and unless you put a lie before us, there can be no inquiry ; and if you do utter the lie, as I strongly advise you, seeing the advantage In this place which often comes of a lie, who knows but we may at last had the lie instead of the truth." Not in this explicit language, but essentially to this effect, we have known Judges address prisoners cu such trials—and now for the fur- ther consequences, in the great train of falsehood. The accused is pre- vailed upon by the appointed minister of truth:to utter the lie. The lies of the indictment are then recited, for some lies there always must be in indictments of more than one count. We have now got the Judge's earnest recommendation of lying to take the chance of eluding the justice he is appointed to administer, and, for the sake of proceeding according to form, to find that for which the form wa intended, and which appeared without the assistance of the form. We have the prisoner's lie, secondly, uttered for the sake of the possible advantage suggested by the Judge ; and advantage in some shape or other is the common motive of lies. We have, thirdly, the pleader's lies, written for reward. But all this would be incomplete without the Jury's lie. The Jury abhor the idea of punishing with death for forgery—a quib- ble is suggested by the Judge, and they find Not Guilty, against their knowledge, through confession, of the opposite fact. This lie is the lie of humanity, but a lie nevertheless. The above sketch is but taken from a reported case, and deprived of the glosses and customary phras- ings of deception. It is only translated from the law dialect into the foreign language of truth. The acquittal of 0.DARE at the Lewes Assizes, for shooting at Lieu- tenant ROSENBERG, is a present example of the effect of the undis- criminating severity of the law on the verdicts of Juries. O'DAn,E, when the Lieutenant under whom he had formerly served, approached him, said, "I have got something for you, 1Sir," and drew a pistol, The Lieutenant, apprehending danger, raised his sword to strike ; O'DARE fired, but the .ball did not take effect ; and he has been ac- quitted of the intention of murder or bodily harm. The Judge put it to the Jury, whether they thought the Lieutenant's raising his sword to strike could have provoked the man to pull the trigger ; but he did not ask, nor did any one ask, what but the dis- charge of the pistol O'DARE could have meant, when he said " Sir, I have got something for you:'

The truth is, that the Jury did not like hanging the man, and there- fore brought in a verdict contrary to the facts. It is said, they thought the prisoner insane : if so, he is at liberty to shoot anybody else against whom he may feel an imaginary enmity, or lie may have another shot or two at Lieutenant ROSENBERG. Prudence is a quality unknown to the English law. NECK OR NOTHING, is the maxim of the Criminal Code.

If ()TARE were worth a plum, the Court of Chancery would put mischief out of his power, by taking the best care of his person and fortune, or such of it as remained after the litigation for its protection.