2 JANUARY 1886, Page 15

THE RE-ELECTION OF K GREW.

THE re-election of M. Grevy may not be of much advan- tage to the Republic, but it is, in one way at least, a good omen for the future of France. There must be a con- siderable fund of political sense in a people whose representa- tives perceive•and accept a situation like that of December 28th, and do so quietly the only thing, possible to be done. It is difficult to doubt that the majority in the Assembly are somewhat tired of. M. Grevy, that they, would-gladly have made a change if they had seen the way to one, and that they regard him with a certain distaste, which is not dislike, and which is consistent with respect,-but which.is tataL-to -all enthusiasm. His regime has been- marked by no great -suocesses and some great failures ; he has allowed the vast expenditure which now so irritates the people; and his re-election coinoides with a period of depression which affects .every great interest in France. We are all apt to suppose that una.-x. -such circumstances Frenchmen grow rash, that-they give way to restlessness and impatience, and that they plunge into the unknown with hope, merely because it is the unknown. There is, however, a business side to the French mind, which is too often- un- remarked, but which has a distinct, infliience 'even on subjects' like foreign policy, in which it is easy to-appeal to sentiment, to the pride of the people, and to the tradition of the dig. This business side came into play. on December. 28th.. There was no one to substitute for M; Chevy ; helad proved himself fit, for his-position as he understood it; he divided opinion less than -any other man, and he was. consequently re-elected with the full. approval of a people who, again, show mucla sense in 'appreciating% Gre vy's attitude—One would rot havetlieugh,t that self-efface- ment in a President,zespect for legality andaimphcity of external life, -would attract- Frenchmen, tior,have -they shown any sign, of attraction; but, nevertheless, they feel' a respect for those sad-coloured attribute's, and -though not enthusiastic for their possessor, they. are not repelled by him. They are con-- tent that such a man should preside, even though it be for fourteen long years ; and in that content with such a person in such a position for such a time, there is an element of hope for the future of a country where, if the majority will only be sensible, the future is assured. Just when she is not very happy, and not very proud of herself, and not very successful, France ceases to be eager for change, makes no search for a showy leader, suppresses her sense of weariness, and quietly re-elects to the Presidential chair M. Chevy, a patient, high-charactered, and, it is said, faintly humorous legalist, who never did a great ac!., delivered a great oration, or uttered a great epigram, but who, on the other hand, is incapable of a great job, a great blunder, or a great crime. Considering how ready we all arc to accuse Frenchmen of levity, and changefulness, and impatience of hard facts, we ought to give due weight to such an election as this, which, had it occurred in America, would have been thought evidence of the most sober judgment.

Moreover, the event, like some others which have preceded it, shows that the existing Constitution of France, with all the defects so patent to journalists and constitution-makers, has, at least, this one merit.,—it does work. It has lived thirteen years, at any rate, which is a long time in France, and none of the predicted failures have occurred. The President has not violated it. The Army has not threatened it. The populace has not risen against it. There has been no penal Dissolution. The Chamber and the Senate have not come to loggerheads. The President has been re-elected with less fuss than often attends the nomination of a Vestry chairman. Nor can it fairly be said that the people have not governed. It is probable that the late Chamber did not quite represent them about foreign expeditions ; but that happened to ourselves also in 1878-79, and the new Chamber is ready enough to express the popular will. The Chamber, as M. Brisson has publicly acknowledged, has really so condemned the Tonquinese Expedition, that it will be impossible to expend the credits assigned for a continued campaign, the nominal majority being due only to the invalidation of eighteen Reactionary elections. The people, or a large section of them, have not quite liked the persecution of the Church ; but then they have sent up two hundred Reactionists to say so, thus showing, at any rate, that the Government cannot falsify the expression of their will. As to official extravagance, that, no doubt., has existed to an extent which, rich as France is, endangers her finances ; but then the people not only assented to the extravagance, but, by their silent pressure upon the Deputies, actually caused it. Every Department has fought for expenditure on itself, and all have fostered those terrible schemes for Public Works which, if they were fully carried out, would ruin any country in the world. It is the financial ignorance of the Democracy itself which is responsible for the condition of the French Treasury. So far as the Constitution was intended to make the French people a self-governing corporation, acting through fixed institutions, it has succeeded to the full. The people do govern—often very badly—and the institutions do work, and in France those are great things to say.

The weakness in the French Republic revealed in this election, as in the Ministerial crisis which has followed it, is a failure to produce strong men. There is no alternative President, and nobody whom either the country or the Assembly strongly wishes to be Prime Minister. There is no dominant party,and there are no leaders one of whom each party or section of a party regards as its permanent head. Who is the head of the Right Nobody knows. There is not even a man full in front of the party, and its real leader is probably the Due de Broglie, who cannot obtain a seat, and remains always in a kind of political chiaro-oscuro. Who is the head of the Opportunists ? It is certainly not M. Jules Ferry, whom the Republicans have just defeated, and who is for the hour the most unpopular man in the Chamber ; or M. Brisson, who has just been forced to resign; and if it is M. de Freycinet, it is certainly not because Opportunists believe in his stability. The Radicals are supposed to have a leader; but just compare M. Olemenceau's confidence in his followers with Mr. Parnell's sway over his Irreconcilables! There are no fully trusted leaders in either Chamber whom M. Gr6vy can accept, far less leaders whom he must accept ; yet the Constitution is not one which secures to a country independence of leadership. The American parties occasionally have no leaders. An acute correspondent recently declared in our columns that they never have any ; and that is true of the Houses of Congress, though not quite true of the people ; but then, Congress has limited powers of legislation, and still more limited control over the Executive. The French Assembly, on the other hand, which in serious questions means practically the French Chamber, is theoretically absolute, having power to pass or repeal any law, and to dismiss any Minister, and in practice is the ultimate ruler of the country. It gives orders of the last importance every day. As Govern- ment by an inorganic public meeting is impossible, it needs trusted guides, and its weakness is that it neither finds them nor trnsts them, but asks guidance from men whom it changes at intervals of a few months, often before they have either succeeded or failed. That is the point at which the existing Constitution of France breaks down, and not any defect of machinery or any want of connection between Government and people ; and we confess we fail to see clearly either cause or remedy. The Chamber, as regards Ministers, is fickle to im- becility, more fickle than any but the weakest of Kings, or the feeblest head of a great concern; but why it is so remains an inexplicable puzzle. To use a rather brutal expression, how does it pay the Deputies to shift their combinations every twelve months ? We may assume that the vice of envy, which has so largely affected the special course taken by the French Democracy, and the special desire of the people for equality, also affects the Chamber, and incites groups to thwart, traduce, or desert rising men ; but that is hardly a sufficient explana- tion. Strong men would overcome envy as they overcome opposition, and, as a matter of fact, leaders have constantly arisen in France; and, while they clearly do not come to the front of groups in this French Chamber, they did come in the Chamber of Louis Philippe. We suspect the cause lies deeper, and that the peasants and artisans who make up the bulk of the French electorate avoid very strong men, preferring candidates —as English Premiers were once said to prefer Bishops—for being safe and indistinguishable. If that is the case, and average leaders are to guide for short periods a fluctuating public meeting of average men, power will either escape from the Chamber and fall to the permanent Heads of Departments, or, which is more probable, the Republic, in spite of a fairly

working Constitution, will be frequently exposed to most serious danger. The best work cannot be done by machinery in governing any more than in any other art ; and it is a powerful machine the French have got, not a system which evolves great, or even considerable. artists. France does not want saviours of society ; but she does want, like all other countries, men able to give form and purpose to otherwise inorganic groups, and to all appearance she is not getting them. It is possible, of course, that this may not signify, and that the Chamber can govern for itself, without a Select Committee of Executive chiefs ; but if so, a totally new

and most unexpected phenomenon has appeared in history, which has as yet had no record of a Chamber of five hundred elected by a people of millions, and able, without trusted leaders, to guide their policy, frame their legislation, and conduct their wars to success.