THE ENGLISH TREATMENT OF DENMARK. N OW that we have apparently
made up our minds to the desertion of Denmark, and that the Liberals appear to be intending to compete with the Tories in the emphasis of their congratulations on that resolve, it becomes a duty, though very far from an agreeable one, briefly to review our relation to that unhappy little State from the beginning of the quarrel. The Ministers tell us with some reiteration, and with no doubt verbal truth, that they have never given Den- mark any substantial ground to expect material help,—and that, therefore, while Denmark is not the worse off for England's policy, she has been so much the better off for England's counsel, so far at least as that counsel has been wholesome; and further, they point out that England has incurred no obligation to interfere on her behalf which France and Russia did not also incur, and that her resolute neutrality ought not therefore to have led to more disappointment or more miscalculation than that of the other great Powers. Let us examine, then, impartially the truth of these allegations. Let us see whether England has given Denmark no more reason to hope for her help than the other great neutral Powers ; and whether it is true or otherwise that had England pursued the same cold and apathetic policy which has charac- terized the diplomacy of France and Russia on the subject, Denmark would have been in no better position than at pre- sent, or whether she may not have been even the worse for Lord Russell's weighty but not very successful advice.
And first, we imagine, there is no doubt about the fact that Denmark has400ked all along with far more hope to the chance of Enersh intervention than to that of either Russia or France. Nor do we expect any reasonable person to say that the selection of England as her protector was fanciful or capricious. First, England was the prime mover in the treaty of 1852; and had been the prime mover ever since in the attempt to mediate between Denmark and Germany. Was Prince Gortschakoff or M. Drouyn de Lhuys ever heard to say publicly, as Lord Palmerston said last July, that if Denmark were invaded by Germany she would assuredly "not stand alone ?" When the crisis came, which of the great Powers moved first in the effort to rally the others to her aid ? Un- doubtedly England. When Holstein was threatened, which of the great Powers went so far as to say to Germany, as Lord Russell said in November last, that "should Federal troops enter Holstein on purely Federal grounds, Her Majesty's Government would not interfere ; but should it appear that Federal troops entered the Duchy on international grounds, Her Majesty's Government may be obliged to inter- fere?" Was the Ambassador of either France or Russia -authorized to declare to Denmark, as Sir A. Paget was authorized to declare in December last, that "if an attack upon Schleswig was made, the other Powers could then interfere on ground which was incontestably beyond the Limits of the Confederation ;" or did any other Power hold out so distinct an inducement to Denmark to abandon Holstein as the significant hint of the same diplomatist, that "Denmark would at all events have a better chance of securing the assistance of the Powers alluded to, by retiring beyond the limits of the Confederation, than if she provoked a war by resisting what might be considered the legitimate authority of the Diet on Federal territory ?" When England, acting thus officiously, and as the leader of all the neutral Powers, hal effected her purpose of getting Denmark to repeal the obnoxious patent of March, 1863, and also to withdraw her troops peacefully from Holstein, and when the German Powers, so far from being satisfied, offered the cynical and eccentric justification of further violence " that they could not well enter Holstein except to invade Schleswig," was there any other great Power which held out such pressing inducements to Denmark to take steps for the repeal of the Schleswig Constitution as England ? France, no doubt, and Russia, following in England's wake, repeated tamely the representations which England dictated; but when the Danish Minister asked what use there would be in further concessions to Powers so aggressive, no Minister but the English Minister replied in exhortations couched in so peculiar a tone of significance as the following of our Envoy's at Copenhagen :—" I asked him to reflect what would be the posi- tion of Denmark if the advice of the [neutral] Powers were refused, and what it would be, if accepted ; and to draw kis own conclusions." Was there any other great Power which said explicitly as late as the 14th of January anything equivalent to what Lord Russell said to the Prussian Ambassador, that he "could not doubt that he [the King of Denmark] would be assisted by Powers friendly to Denmark in its [Schleswig's] defence ? " Was there any other Government which in press- ing on Denmark the course she finally adopted as to the Schleswig constitution said, like Lord Wodeliouse, that, "If the Danish Government rejected my advice Her Majesty's Government must leave Denmark to encounter Germany on her own responsibility,"—a statement which surely implied a well-founded hope that if the Danish Government accepted that advice it might not be left to encounter Germany on its own responsibility ?
We admit that the deeper became the peril and the sufferings of Denmark, the more wary became the tone of Her Majesty's representatives. Lord Russell, in urging the Conference on Denmark, expressly said that if he could offer material aid he might then demand her acceptance of this Conference as a condition of that aid, but that lie was not in a position to do so. At the same time lie hinted clearly enough that Denmark would be most im- prudent in offending England by declining her advice. And, then again, at the Conference the external though not the internal history of which is now before us, it is clear that the hope of that aid led Denmark into concession after concession. It induced her first to raise the blockade at sea as a condition of the suspension of hostilities,—a most unfair condition, for which she received no proper equivalent at all, and which, as Lord Clareudon pointed out, was not made a condition of the meeting of the Congress of Paris in 1856. It induced her, again, when it became clear that the German Powers had been guilty of sheer treachery in declaring that they did not con- template the dismemberment of Denmark, to offer a really great territorial sacrifice for the sake of gaining peace,—a sacrifice conceded, as Lord Russell himself admits, on the strength of his own personal promise that he would not advocate without Denmark's full consent any more disadvantageous territorial frontier than that which he proposed in the name of the neutral Powers, and which Denmark accepted,—the lino of the Schlei. Now can any one pretend that when Lord Russell gave this promise, to which he publicly confesses,—and which we grieve to say he broke flagrantly in the spirit, if not in the letter,—the Danish plenipotentiaries had not a right to feel that England stood in a special relation to them not held by the other neutral Powers ? England, in Lord Russell's person, had in fact agreed to press them no further without their own consent, —had tacitly admitted, that is, that they had gone as far as a sincere friend would counsel them to go, and that they had done so in some sort of special reliance on the English Minister's judgment and counsel. The other Powers, says Lord Russell, recommended the same concession. No doubt. But did the other Powers promise the Danish Ministers,—or even stand in the relation in which such a promise could have been asked, —not to propose any further concession without their own consent? Although we do not know how Denmark was in- duced to consent to abandon all Holstein, a great slice of Schleswig, and all Lauenburg (which had never been in dispute) in exchange for the middle part of Schleswig, there can be no manner of doubt that it was done in the legitimate hope of securing material aid if that great conces- sion should be rejected by the Germans,—and that England was uppermost, and rightly uppermost, in the Danish plenipoten- tiaries' thoughts as having tacitly admitted that they had gone as far as they could fairly be expected to go for the sake of peace. The concession was rejected, and then Lord Russell, breaking the spirit of his promise, without the consent of Denmark suggested that a friendly Power should be asked to choose a line between the two frontiers proposed respectively by Germany and Denmark, and therefore of course a line less advantageous to Denmark than the Schlei. And then, because the Danes would not hear of it, though it was also rejected—as usual in much more diplomatic and evasive terms, but quite as substantially—by the Germans, Lord Russell made their refusal to a proposition which he had in spirit engaged not to propose, the excuse for denying them that final aid which he knew they wourt1 expect, and which he evidently felt grave compunctions in withholding. Now we say this is a history of very special encouragement to Den- mark,—a history of encouragement of a kind which no other great neutral Power has given or even half given. We have re- peatedly spoken of our armed interference as a very probable con- tingency; we have used that probable contingency as a motive to bring Denmark to reason time after time ; we have through our Foreign Minister intimated tacitly but clearly that Denmark had conceded as much as in the interests of peace she could be ex- pected to coneede,—and then we have coldly abandoned her. And now as to the other question. Is Denmark practically no worse off than she would be if we had never interfered at all, or is she even the better by the exact amount of our reiterated but rather unsuccessful advice ? No thinking man can doubt for a moment that she is worse off. It is now morally certain she will lose Jutland,probable that she will lose the islands. Had she never felt a hopeof our interference,—had she been buoyed up by no dream of a great Power in reserve, there can be no doubt that after the first disastrous campaign she would have yielded to force majeure and saved Jutland at least, by abandoning the rest. If the pressure of English counsel has squeezed out concession after concession, it was the secret hope of English aid that kept up the buoyancy of resistance. No greater injury can be done to a weak State than to hold out, however vaguely, hopes of assistance until the ambitions and powers of her antagonists are fully roused. To counsel, as we did, piecemeal concessions, instead of to counsel her frankly to make the best terms she could with the enemy, since she had nothing to hope from us, was virtually to abandon her in the most fatal way possible. We have coaxed her back step by step towards the edge of the preci- pice, half intending ourselves, wholly persuading her to expect, our own final interposition. Now that she is on the very edge, we coldly conclude our prudential calculation, find that it will risk more than we like, and so withdraw with a polite and even compassionate bow, as she falls over the brink of the abyss into which Germany is pushing her. Lord Russell even takes the pains to remark that Prussia and Austria still profess not to intend the final push, but that they have told so many skilful lies, and surrounded them with such an air of hypo- critical candour, that he for his part expects the final push ; and the words are hardly out of his mouth before the order is published for the permanent occupation of the purely Danish province of Jutland, and the appropriation of its revenues to the wants of the occupying army.
We have made it clear, then, painfully clear, that we have led Denmark to build on our help as no other great neutral Power has done ; that we have used the hope of ulti- mate help to extort from her piecemeal concessions inadequate to satisfy her enemies, adequate only to lay obligations upon us ; that we have virtually admitted that these concessions have been pushed to the furthest reasonable point; that had we not interfered at all, Denmark could not well now be in nearly so hopeless a condition as she is ; and that in spite of all this we have had the effrontery to wonder how she could put for- ward any special claim on us, to which France and Russia are not equally liable. To us, we confess, this appears to be con- duct which ought to sap our moral influence abroad and make our friendship worthless. That England will fulfil her formal contracts is still unquestionable. But that she will deliberately inspire hopes which she does not care to satisfy,—that she will betray by ambiguous encouragement, and then set off her own interests against the ruin of her dependent,—that she will exact a compliance with her advice up to the very brink of ruin as the price of possible help, and then, without even a pro- mise of that help, reproach her victim with want of trust for not complying with her last and hardest recommendation, and intimate that all claim on her is forfeited,—that she will do this, and not even feel it shameful, is now, we fear, beyond question; and who can say that this is not conduct which must abridge even our material power, curtail largely our inter- national influence, and dishonour our English name ;
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