THE PROBABLE FAILURE OF' ink, ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.
IT would almost seem as if Providence intended the English to continue occupying Egypt. From the moment we entered the country in 1882, we have been making sincere efforts to get out of it, and_ hitherto they have all been foiled. Under Mr. Gladstone's Government, orders were actually issued for the evacuation, and were rendered nugatory by an advance of the Mandi which, as events showed, would have ended in the subjugation of Egypt by the. Soudanese, whose magnificent courage in battle taxed,and nearly over-taxed, the endurance of the British soldier. Under Lord Salisbury's Government, a Convention with Turkey was arranged which, whatever its other results, would have ensured the departure of the British Army within- five years; and it either has been, or in all human probability will be, arrested at the moment of signature by the jealousy of France. The Republican Government, which of all French Governments of late years has been most hostile to Great Britain, and has shown its hostility in Indo-China, in the Pacific, and in Egypt, finding itself supported by Russia, which is irritated by British sympathies in regard to Bulgaria, has ventured to use language at Constantinople- which in other days would have been a prelude to war. We gather from Sir J. Fergusson'a reply on Monday night, that whether the Note said to have been addressed to the Porte by the French Ambassador is authentic or not, he is not prepared to deny that representations akin to those embodied in that document have been laid before the Turkish Government. In other words, the French and Russian agents have informed the Sultan that they will not recognise the Convention, that if he refuses to ratify it, they will protect him from all conse- quences, but that if be keeps his word, they will take active steps to safeguard their own interests, especially in Syria and Armenia. That means, in plain English, that the Russian Government will demand instant payment of the war indemnity, or occupy a further portion of Armenia as a " material guarantee" for the money, and that the French will make a demonstration against Syria,—perhaps occupy that province, as Napoleon III. did in 1860. It is even asserted that the garrison of Erzeroum has been greatly strengthened, and that a strong French squadron is on its way to Syria,—both statements probably mere reports. Naturally, the Sultan is alarmed by threats so serious, which may be sincere—for Germany would not interfere either in Armenia or Syria—and which, if sincere, could certainly be carried out. Nobody could stop Russia and France acting together in Asia except England, and England could not stop them without plunging into a great war for which she is, mentally at all events, entirely unprepared. So well is this understood, that we incline to believe the report that the Sultan, if he decides to refuse the Convention, will do it by demanding a definite renewal of Lord Beacons- field's- guarantee ; and on receiving an evasive reply, will make that his excuse for a retrograde step which it must, for more reasons than one, be most annoying to him to make. He thought he had gained a great advantage to his position as Khalif ; he thought he should get some money ; and to surrender both hopes at the moment of realisation must be intolerably disagreeable. Nevertheless, he may yield, and the Convention may fall through.
It is this guarantee which is the crux of the affair, and which will, we imagine, compel us to reassume our burden in Egypt. There is, that we can see, no other way out of it. The Sultan cannot and will not sign the Convention unless we promise to safeguard him from the consequences, and that promise it will be most difficult, if not impossible, for the British Government to give. We do not believe in the power- lessness of this country, holding, as M. Frere Orban said in Belgium a few days ago, that " England is always strong enough to do what she wishes to do ;" but then, does England wish to wage war in defence either of this Con- vention or of Turkey ? We do not believe it. Nobody cares much about the Convention, or desires an exclusive liability to be requested to defend Egypt, or understands with any clear- ness why, if Europe does not demand our departure, we cannot
wait in Caimuntil circumstances are more propitious, or the nation has arrived at a more resolute decision. The notion of fighting France for such a right as that conferred by the Con- vention would be most unpopular, as would also, though in a less degree, be that of fighting Russia. Wars are serious events at present, and a great war for so inadequate a stake as Sir- H. D. Wolff's adroit but most unsatisfactory agreement, would irritate every man of sense within the Kingdom. A war to enable us to retreat from the Nile I—that is too absurd. On the other hand, a war, or a guarantee leading to war, for the protection of Turkey, would break parties in this country into little pieces. Mr. Gladstone would leap at a chance which he could most conscientiously use ; his speeches would blaze with perfectly truthful denunciations of Turkey, and in a fortnight Parliament would be hopelessly out of hand, and the compli- cations so great that even a dissolution would offer no hope of remedy. The Liberals would be furious, and the Unionist Liberals could not support such a policy; it may be doubted if they could even tolerate it. If they did, it would be with no heart, and no real faith in the cause, and the Disunionists would be suddenly and strongly reinforced by the men who think war without adequate reason an intolerable offence. It is most improbable, nearly impossible, that Lord Salisbury would allow such a situation to arise ; and if he would not, there can be but one alternative. He must drop the Convention and remain in Egypt, stating clearly and unmistakably that Eng- land will wait, that she has endeavoured most strenuously to fulfil her pledges about evacuation, and even to read them in the sense desired by her rivals ; but that the jealousies of the Powers have defeated her good intentions, and that she must therefore stay on. That may be an inconvenient coarse, especially to the War Department ; but it is not a dangerous one, for-it would be supported by the undivided force of the people. Englishmen, to speak plainly, are not prepared to fight for a very feeble Convention which they do not half approve, or for the maintenance of Ottoman dominion which they regard as an evil ; but they are prepared to ran any risks, those of war included, rather than accept direct dictation as to the evacuation of Egypt. They went there, with the consent of the Powers, to perform a mission ; and unless undivided Europe orders them out, they will stay there until either their mission has been performed or Europe haseanctioned some acceptable, or, at all events, workable compromise. They have every reason to avoid war just now, bat they will accept war rather than a humiliation which would for a generation to come destroy all their ipfluence for good, if not their own security. That, however, is no proof that they would accept war either for Turkey or the Convention.
It is, of course, hinted everywhere that France and Russia would be baffled if England entered into the alliatice of Central Europe, and no doubt that is correct. That alliance, with our help, would be irresistible, and we could at that price obtain a free hand over a great part of the world. But then, where is the motive, at present at all events, for paying so enormous a price as would be involved in the obligation to take a previously decided part in the expected Continental war I We are not more afraid of Russia than we have been ever since 1842. We have no more quarrel with France than we have had ever since 1815. To bind ourselves to fight France if she attempts to regain her provinces—for that is what the alliance of Central Europe really means—would be utterly unjust, and would involve the permanent hatred of the only country whose attitude towards us is of vital importance. Talk about danger from Ireland France is four times as near, has fifty times the Irish resources, and directs the only Fleet which experts believe to be little inferior to our own. We may have more cause to dread Russia ; but even as against Russia we had better fight our own quarrels, and not bind ourselves to consider that in resisting St. Petersburg, Vienna must be always in the right. The proposal is too large for the circumstances, more especially as we have the alterna- tive of falling back to our original, or rather our existing position. It is nonsense to say we shall be disgraced by the failure of the Convention. It was not proposed in our interest alone, but that of Europe ; it entailed on us an indefinite obligation ; and if a part of Europe does not like it, we can give it up with a bow, and sit still till our opponents regret their folly.
Previous page
