THE RUMOURS OF PEACE.
THE rumours of a premature peace are so persistent and are received by the friends of Turkey with so much pleasure, that they are worth, at all events, a momentary examination.
They come from Belgrade, from Bucharest, and from Vienna, in two or three forms, but always with the same drift, that the world may yet be surprised by a sudden suspension of the war. According to one account, Prince Bismarck is the mover, and has suggested terms to Lord Odo Russell, who is consequently
coming over to talk over matters with Lord Derby. According to
another account, the Palace party at Constantinople have made offers to St. Petersburg of terms which delight the Russian statesmen ; and according to a thhd, put forward in leaded lines by
the Daily Telegraph, Russia so dreads the crossing of the Danube, that she is ready to make peace in order to avoid an enterprise
so dangerous and so difficult. All these rumours are stated with a certain reserve, but all are received with a certain credence, and all affect, however slightly, the current of European opinion.
We disbelieve them all, for the same reasons for which we disbelieved the stories of a Russian refusal to go to war. The Emperor Alexander, however much inclined to make peace, has not the power to make it, except upon terms to which the Mahommedans of Constantinople will certainly not accede. His people haie entered into the war with enthusiasm, his clergy are even now preaching a crusade, his towns
are subscribing heavily for the campaign, and his soldiers, weary with long marches and long inaction, are looking forward to their recompense in a decisive victory. To make peace now, except upon terms such as victory would secure, would create a revulsion of feeling through- out the Empire, such as would materially affect the stability of a throne which is trusted with all power in order that its concentrated energy may always ensure success. The Russian nation, which has sacrificed so much, would feel itself befooled. The Russian army, which has endured so much, would feel it- self ridiculous. As yet no advance whatever has been achieved, either towards the objects for which the war is waged, or to- wards the objects attributed by the Mussuhuan party in Europe to the Russian Court. No guarantee whatever has been secured for the Christians, and no territory, or prestige, or strategical advantage for Russia. She has accomplished nothing at all in Europe, and in Asia nothing adequate to her preparations. Indeed, it may fairly be said that as yet she has only succeeded in losing something; that her slow advance, and her feebleness at sea, and her liability to be impeded by insurrections in the Caucasus have distinctly diminished the fear felt of her in Europe, whether by instructed sol- diers or by Turkish Pashas. If she drew back now, the Turks would believe that she drew back in fear of them, while the world would be assured that her organisation, however imposing outside, was in reality so weak that she was unable to effect the passage of a river in the face of an enemy she holds to be contemptible. Russians would be ridiculed in every capital of Europe, and Russian officers, in Germany more particularly, would be unable to endure their lives. To suppose that a Russian Czar, the head of a military auto- cracy, the earthly Providence of a people inflamed with the idea of a Holy War, could voluntarily encounter this kind of obloquy, is to mistake his position altogether. He would simply lose his throne. Defeat would not crush him, unless defeat were clearly attributable to the autocracy, but a recoil before mere dangers still untried would dissolve at once the charm which binds the people to the dynasty, and give strength and substance to all those revolutionary designs which, while the peasants retain their faith in the Czar, are but dreamy speculations. The Czar cannot stop till he has gained a victory, while a victory would change, both in his own mind and in the opinion of his counsellors, the whole aspect of the situation. His army must reach Sofia before he can discuss any armistice, and with the Russian army at Sofia, the whole appearance of the contest will be changed.
Of course there are terms of peace which would be as visible and as consolatory to the Russian people, though not to the Russian army, as victory in the field. If Bosnia and Herze- govina,were formed into a State, and Bulgaria made a princi- pality, and Armenia ceded to Russia, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles thrown permanently open, the Emperor Alexander could make peace,—though even then the grand justification of the war, the final termination of the Ottoman Power, would not have been secured ; but what chance is there of such terms, or any terms in the least resembling them, or indeed of any serious terms at all ? Why should the Turks who refused anything in April concede everything in June In Asia they are not, in their own opinion, beaten, and in Europe they have not been attacked. On the contrary, they have shown to their own conviction that the Black Sea is a Turkish and not a Russian lake, that in Asia they can fight a serious campaign, and that in Europe their position in a defensive war is almost beyond assault. A few intelligent men at Constantinople may be aware that their successes are unreal and their danger great, but the mob of Constantinople undoubtedly believe that on the whole the war has gone for them, and that their fears had exaggerated the Russian strength. They are not prepared to give up any- thing, still less to give up much, and would receive the Rus- sian proposals for peace, however disguised by nominal sub- mission to European advice, as confessions that Russia at heart dreaded the invincible Turkish Army. No such peace could be made even if the Pashas were ready to make it, and to do them bare justice, we can perceive no trace of any such readi- ness. The Sultan tells his people, in old Mahommedan phrase, that "Paradise is shaded with sabres," and that through slaughter lies the safest path to heaven ; Safvet Pasha remains as calmly contemptuous of Mr. Layard's advice as ever; and Redif Pasha rejects the aid of European officers, say- ing, as we think correctly, that if the Ottomans cannot defend themselves, they had better give up the contest. There may be secret weakness in all this, but there is no sign of it, no trace of any of the despondency or irresolution which must precede the surrender of provinces. All the agitation in the capital is in favour of more energy ; all the censure in the Chamber is directed against those who yield ; all the efforts of the Pashas are expended in bringing up more and more "volunteers." It is very difficult to judge of Asiatics, who in great crises are liable to overpowering impulses of depression as well as rage, but all the signs indicate that the Ottomans have their backs to the wall, and will give up nothing.
But Prince Bismarck is urging peace ? The very men who say so, said only yesterday that his object was war, that he was pleased with the contest, and that he intended it should spread. What conceivable interest can he have in seeing Russia retire, with her army all ready for action, her people savage with a sense of energy thrown away, and her Court half-inclined to think that France, the Executive being once more untram- melled, might be a safe ally ? We do not believe one word of it, any more than we do that the Hapsburgs, with seven- teen millions of Slav subjects, are going to stop a war for the emancipation of Slays ; or that Turkey, while warring down Christians, is going to trust 200,000 Christian conscripts with weapons of precision. The overflow of the Danube has caused a lull in military movements, and in every such lull the smaller diplomatists and the gobemouches are equally agog. For all their stories, the great causes which rendered this war necessary still exist in all their strength, and will, as we believe, compel statesmen, willingly or unwillingly, to allow it to go on.
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